This article was written as part of an investigation into crimes committed in Suwayda during July 2025. It reflects only some of the findings and will be updated at a later date. For more information, visit the page dedicated to our investigation project: https://interstices-fajawat.org/our-projects/investigation-project/

Between July 13 and 21, 2025, the Syrian province of Suwayda in southern Syria was subjected to military aggression by armed groups affiliated with the Syrian de facto authorities, resulting in the deaths of more than 930 civilians and 550 Druze and Christian fighters. While this operation was widely presented as an intervention aimed at restoring order following inter-communal clashes, an in-depth analysis of the causes and circumstances of these events reveals a very different reality and highlights the full responsibility of Ahmad al-Sharaa’s non-elected government in what must be considered a war crime.

Context

On December 9, 2024, the day after Bashar al-Assad fled to Russia, Ahmed al-Sharaa (nom de guerre: Abu Mohammad al-Jolani) proclaimed himself head of the Syrian state, categorically rejecting any form of power sharing, decentralization, or federalism, while demanding that all armed groups lay down their arms and join the new national army, placed under the command of dozens of Islamist warlords appointed at the end of December to the highest positions in the army, including several foreign jihadists.

Along with the Kurds, the Druze are the only communities in Syria that enjoy both a form of autonomy within a specific territory and significant armed forces dedicated to the self-defense of their community on ethno-confessional or political grounds. For Al-Sharaa, their subjugation is therefore an important power issue, as only their total surrender can secure his control over the entire Syrian territory. During the first half of 2025, the de facto government proceeded methodically to achieve this goal.

As we publish these lines, the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa have been almost entirely retaken by government forces and Bedouin armed groups, while the fate of the province of Hasakeh remains suspended pending the outcome of talks between the government and Kurdish forces. Consistent reports also suggest that US diplomacy is supporting the Syrian government in its efforts to bring the province of Suwayda under its control. It cannot therefore be ruled out that a new deployment of force may take place in the coming weeks.

First phase: negotiations and seeds of discord (January–March)

On January 1st, 2025, a first convoy from the General Security attempted to enter the province of Suwayda without prior coordination with local authorities and factions, who refused them access. The Druze position was very clear: there can be no armed deployment in the province and no disarmament of local factions in the absence of a state, a constitution, and a government, and therefore a minimum of democratic guarantees and concrete commitments to the protection of minorities.

This event prompted one of the three main Druze spiritual leaders (Sheikh Aql or sheikhs of reason) in Syria, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, to clarify his position in two interviews with Syria TV and 963+ on January 8. He shared his vision for the future, calling for national unity and inclusive, decentralized governance within the framework of a civil state. In particular, he emphasized that Suwayda had spoken out against separation since the beginning of the 2011 uprising. His position appeared relatively moderate and echoed that of many Syrians, although his leadership is far from consensual within the Druze community of Suwayda, particularly because of his support for Bashar al-Assad until 2023. It should also be noted that he has been in open conflict for more than twelve years with the two other sheikhs of reason, Youssef Jarbou’a and Hammoud al-Hennawi.

In the first quarter of 2025, rallies continued in Suwayda’s Dignity Square, where they had been held regularly since the fall of 2023 in opposition to the Assad regime. By now, these demonstrations were an opportunity to celebrate the fall of the regime and engage in heated discussions about the future. While opinions were divided, particularly on the trustworthiness of Al-Jolani and his armed forces, the majority of participants expressed hope and joy, singing songs of the 2011 insurrection and waving almost exclusively the Syrian independence flag with three red stars, which had once again become the official flag of Syria.

The divide within the Suwayda community widened in February, as the central government held direct negotiations with certain local factions, notably the two controversial Druze sheikhs Laith al-Balous and Suleiman Abdul Baqi, to prepare for the activation of the Ministries of Interior and Defense in Suwayda. Leaders of the micro-factions Madhafeh al-Karameh (Guesthouse of Dignity) and Ahrar Jabal al-Arab (Free Men of the Arab Mountains), the two men have had a troubled history over the past ten years, straddling the line between armed rebellion and banditry. The first, son of the very popular founder of the Rijal al-Karameh (Men of Dignity) movement, Wahid al-Balous, was expelled from the movement in 2016 after his father’s death due to his lack of integrity (cases of theft and handling stolen goods), before seeking his place in several factions and finally isolating himself and establishing his own. The second was convicted in 2009 for murdering the young Christian Moses George Francis in an honor killing, before becoming a member of the National Defense Forces, the main pro-Assad militia, and then specializing in mediating kidnapping cases, his role as an intermediary allowing him to take a percentage of each ransom. Both men rose to prominence during the war against gangs that began in 2022, during which Laith al-Balous was seen executing several members of Raji Falhout’s gang, a mafia boss close to Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad’s military intelligence, in a public square (Dawar al-Mashnaqa). The images of this summary execution would later be manipulated to legitimize the violence committed against the Druze in 2025.Nevertheless, Al-Balous and Abdul Baqi regularly appeared in close company with senior government officials between February and April, and began to publicly advocate for the integration of factions into the national army, despite any coordination with all armed factions and components of local civil society. It should be noted that only the Rijal al-Karameh and Liwa al-Jabal (Mountain Brigade) factions—which at the time represented the majority position of Suwayda residents—coordinated with other civilian and armed components of the Druze community. During the same period, Colonel Bunyan al-Hariri, commander of the Syrian Army Division covering the three southern provinces of Syria (Suwayda, Deraa, Quneitra), visited armed groups in the neighboring province of Deraa to organize their integration into the national army. On February 19, he visited the Bedouin tribes of the Al-Lajat region, located between Suwayda and Deraa and known to be one of the strongholds of the Islamic State in the region. This area and its residents would play a key role in the July offensive.

In the days that followed, former officer Tareq al-Shoufi officially announced the existence of the Suwayda Military Council, which since December had been bringing together former military personnel and members of factions opposed to the government of Ahmad al-Sharaa and to integration into the national army. Stating its desire to establish a national army that is independent of all foreign influence and inclusive of all ethnic and religious groups, the movement was hoping to unite all Druze factions behind a single banner promoting secularism and federalism, based on the model of the Syrian Democratic Forces in northeastern Syria. A number of small local factions loyal to Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari pledged allegiance to the Military Council in the weeks that followed, although the sheikh’s support for the Council has not been confirmed at this stage. It should be noted that the Military Council’s interventions during the protests in Dignity Square appeared to be marginal provocations carried out by a small group of about 15 young men waving portraits of Sheikh al-Hajari and lacking any coherent political discourse. The Military Council was indeed rather poorly perceived, accused by many within the community itself of both bringing together former agents of Bashar al-Assad’s regime (“fulul”) and serving foreign interests. While it is true that former loyalists and gangsters have found shelter among these new rebel forces, this is not sufficient grounds to accuse either faction of embodying a loyalist force as such, as is the case with the “Coastal Shield” brigade led by former Alawite officers.

On March 1, 2025, government forces arbitrarily set up a checkpoint at the entrance to the predominantly Druze neighborhood of Jaramana, located on the southeastern outskirts of Damascus, prompting the Druze factions to set up a checkpoint nearby in response. Armed individuals affiliated with the Ministry of Defense then attempted to pass through the druze-maned checkpoint and were asked to surrender their weapons, provoking an altercation followed by a shootout that resulted in the death of one of them and the capture of a second, who was wounded in the shooting. The situation then escalated during an argument between officers from the Jaramana-Salmiyah police station and community representatives, resulting in the expulsion of the officers and the seizure of weapons from the police station. Laith al-Balous finally stepped in as a mediator to calm the conflict, while Israeli officials added fuel to the fire by threatening the Syrian government with military intervention if the Druze were to be targeted.

Immediately after these incidents, a small group in Suwayda took the initiative to raise an Israeli flag at the entrance to the city and broadcast a video statement calling for Israeli intervention, before local factions took down and burned the flag. The local controversy over the flags—revealing an increasingly polarized debate within the province over the attitude to adopt toward the central government—only intensified in the weeks that followed. On March 6, the Rijal al-Karameh movement announced in a statement that it had reached an agreement with the government through Laith al-Balous and Suleiman Abdul Baqi to reactivate the security forces in the province of Suwayda. Eight General Security vehicles were delivered that same day, further fueling controversy within the community, with some factions  threatening to burn the vehicles if they were deployed in the province.

It was at this point that the massacres of the Alawite population on the Syrian coast took place, resulting in the killing of more than 1,400 civilians, an event that cannot be separated from what would happen later in Suwayda. It should be mentioned in this regard that Bedouin tribes have already been used in these events by the government to act as auxiliary forces and compensate for the weakness of the army following Israel’s destruction of all the heavy weaponry left behind by the former regime. As well, sectarian hate speech, images of atrocities, and terror spread on social media and gradually took precedence over rational analysis of the situation. Hundreds of students from Suwayda were repatriated from university dormitories in Latakia and Tartus when the curfew imposed on the region was lifted. This evacuation operation was organized in particular through the intermediary of Suleiman Abdul Baqi, revealing the government’s desire to impose him as a mediator and legitimate guarantor of the protection of the Druze, despite his deplorable reputation in Suwayda. On March 8, he escaped an assassination attempt when his house was targeted by an RPG rocket.

During the second week of March, with the massacres committed on the Syrian coast still fresh in everyone’s minds, the government announced the signing of an agreement with Kurdish officer Mazlum Abdi for the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into the national army, while the government envoy to Suwayda, Mustafa Bakour, agreed with the Druze leadership to activate government forces in the province, on condition that its members be recruited exclusively from within the local community. Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari initially gave his agreement in principle—his nephew and spokesman Usama al-Hajari was among the signatories of a memorandum adopted on March 12—before declaring that he himself had not signed the document and accusing the government of being a terrorist entity in a video broadcast from his guesthouse in Qanawat. That same evening, his supporters raised the Druze unitarian flag at several roundabouts in the city of Suwayda and fired shots into the air to boast about their opposition to the use of the independence flag and submission to the central government.

At the same time, the Rijal al-Karameh movement opened a recruitment office in Mazraa in collaboration with Laith Al-Balous, enlisting nearly 800 members of Bedouin tribes. In parallel, nearly 4,000 former members of Assad’s security forces had their status settled. Throughout March and April, numerous talks and meetings took place between civic, religious, and military leaders in Suwayda, as well as with Governor Mustafa Bakour, during which the druze side reiterated its refusal to disarm local factions without serious security guarantees for minorities, as well as its agreement to the deployment of security forces affiliated with the central government, once again on the sole condition that its members be exclusively from the province.

On April 20, Culture Minister Mohammed Yassin Saleh, Ahmad al-Sharaa’s brother Jamal, and Sayf ad-Din Bulad, commander of the 76th Military Division, met with several Bedouin leaders formerly affiliated with the Assad regime, including Ibrahim al-Hafel (Uqaydat tribe) and Farhan al-Marsoumi (Marsama tribe) at the latter’s home on the outskirts of Damascus (Al-Moadamiyeh). This controversial visit was part of a series of negotiations and bribing involving Bedouin tribes with the aim of securing their allegiance. These tribes will play a decisive role in subsequent events.

Second phase: first warning and intimidation (April–June)

On April 27, a fake recording was circulated on social media in which an unidentified voice could be heard insulting the Prophet Muhammad, sparking a riot by Islamists at the University of Homs, led by petroleum engineering student Abbas Al-Khaswani. This Islamist agitator, identified as one of the armed perpetrators of the attacks on the Syrian coast two months earlier, delivered an inflammatory speech in which he called for violence against the Druze, Alawite, and Kurdish communities. Following this speech, dozens of people chanting sectarian and hateful slogans stormed the university campus and attacked non-Muslim students. The elderly Druze sheikh Marwan Kiwan, accused of being the author of the recording, quickly denied the accusation, while the de facto authorities in Damascus issued an unconvincing press release thanking the rioters for their efforts to defend their prophet, instead of holding them accountable for the dangerous unrest they had caused. Abbas Al-Khaswani was not arrested and returned to the university the next day, where he and his colleagues would continue to threaten the safety of other students.

Two days later, the authenticity of the recording was finally denied by the government, but it took no action to prevent subsequent events from unfolding. As a result, unidentified armed groups attacked the Jaramana neighborhood that same day, targeting its residents and local Druze self-defense factions. The General Security intervened alongside the groups that had previously attacked the neighborhood, themselves identified as Bedouins from the Al-Uqaydat tribe, originally from Deir Ez-Zor, so that it was uneasy to distinguish between them. Seventeen attackers were killed before being reported as members of the General Security, while local factions were designated as the main instigators of the clashes.On April 30, armed Islamist groups from Dera’a, Deir Ez Zor, and Ghouta attacked the towns of Sahnaya and Ashrafiyeh-Sahnaya in a pattern similar to that seen in Jaramana, targeting residents and local Druze self-defense factions. This time, 45 people were killed, most of them members of the Druze community. Among them, 10 civilians were summarily executed, including the mayor of the city, Hussam Warwar, and his son Haider. Although Warwar had been seen welcoming General Security forces a few hours before his execution. At the same time, Druze factions from Suwayda attempted to leave the governorate to rescue their community under attack in Sahnaya-Ashrafiyeh, but were ambushed near Braq, on the road to Damascus, by mixed groups of local tribes and Islamists from Dera’a and Deir Ez Zor, as well as members of the General Security. A video clearly shows them opening fire as they stand side by side. As a result, 42 Druze fighters were killed, with the community of Salkhad particularly affected, with 11 martyrs belonging to the Quwaat Sheikh al-Karami and Quwaat al-‘Alya self-defense factions, including the leader of the latter, Amjad Baali.

On May 1, the central authority in Damascus reiterated its pressure on the leaders of the Druze community to accept the disarmament of local factions, unjustly accused of being the source of the unrest. Israel took advantage of the situation to threaten Syria and bombed near the presidential palace in Damascus, allegedly to “send a warning” to the Syrian authorities in case of threats against the Druze. Following negotiations between the government and the Druze leadership, a five-point agreement was finally adopted, providing for the activation of the police and General Security in the governorate of Suwayda, on condition that its members all originate from the region, as well as the securing of the road to Damascus and a ceasefire in all areas affected by the clashes of recent days. It should be noted that during the day, Laith al-Balous escaped an assassination attempt while traveling in Shahba, before being heckled in his town of Mazraa for opening it up to several General Security vehicles. The latter were once again sent back out of the province.

On the night of May 1, mortar shells were fired at the towns of As-Sawara al-Kbira, Al-Thaala, Ad-Dour, ‘Ira, Kanaker, and Rsas in the province of Suwayda. All factions in Suwayda, comprising more than 30,000 fighters, were put on alert and deployed to strategic points throughout the governorate, while the General Security encircled the governorate that same evening, ostensibly to prevent any further attacks from Dera’a. This did not prevent armed groups from attacking the villages of Lubayn, Harran, Ad-Dour, and Jreen, located on the western border of the province, where they encountered strong resistance, resulting in the death of most of the attackers. The number of casualties is unknown, but the attackers were identified as belonging to local Bedouin tribes.

On May 2, an Israeli drone flying over Suwayda targeted a farm in Kanaker, killing four of its Druze inhabitants. One of them, Issam Azam, was known for actively supporting the protests in Dignity Square against the Assad regime. During the night, Israeli planes launched a series of strikes on military sites in Dera’a, Damascus, and Hama. On May 3, Khaldun Sayah Al-Mahithawi, a Druze lawyer involved in negotiating the release of another lawyer kidnapped north of Suwayda, was assassinated in Aqraba, near Jaramana, while the 11 martyrs of Salkhad were buried after a ceremony attended by thousands of people in their hometown.

On May 5, clashes between Bedouin tribes and Druze factions continued in the vicinity of al-Thaala and Harran in Suwayda, while rumors circulated that Druze factions were threatening mosques. Several imams from the region and representatives of local Bedouin tribes denied these rumors of sectarian threats by the Druze against Muslims, reaffirming peaceful coexistence within the governorate and the need to combat fake news and sectarian incitement on social media. The Druze factions have in fact deployed to protect Muslim religious sites from any individual sectarian initiatives. After the General Security withdrew from the town of As-Sawara al-Kbira, the Suwayda police entered the town accompanied by Governor Mustafa Bakur and found several houses burned and looted, as well as the Druze shrine. It should be noted that the only town where houses were looted and vandalized in Suwayda was also the only one where General Security forces had been deployed.

As part of the agreement signed on May 1, the government has set up several checkpoints on the road between Suwayda and Damascus, while Druze police officers have been deployed at the entrance to As-Sawara al-Kbira, the first village in the province. Eleven kilometers further north, at the strategic junction of the roads connecting Damascus, Suwayda, and Deraa, a checkpoint was entrusted to armed men belonging to Bedouin tribes in the region (the Al-Na’im tribe from the village of Al-Mtalleh and the Al-Lajat region), whose affiliation with government forces was uncertain: they were not wearing official uniforms and several of them were wearing masks and displaying ISIS symbols. At the same time, it was announced that three members of the Uqaydat tribe from Shuhayl (Deir Ez-Zor) had been appointed to senior positions: Hussein al-Salama as head of intelligence, replacing Anas Khattab; Amer Names al-‘Ali as president of the Central Control and Inspection Authority (anti-corruption); and Sheikh Rami Shahir al-Saleh al-Dosh as head of the Supreme Council of Tribes and Clans, an entity subordinate to HTS since 2019. These appointments came just as their tribe was one of the most involved in the deadly attacks against the Druze community in recent days.

Between May and July, numerous complaints were made about the Braq-Masmiyeh checkpoint, whose guards were accused of harassment, theft, and extortion against road users traveling to or from Suwayda. On several occasions, continuing criminal practices dating back to before the fall of the Assad regime, passengers were kidnapped or targeted by gunfire from armed Bedouin groups residing in Al-Mtalleh and Al-Lajat. As a result, the government’s May 1 commitment to secure the road between Damascus and Suwayda has not been honored and has been violated by members of the government forces themselves. During the same period, sectarian violence has increased, with members of religious minorities being murdered every week in different parts of the country, culminating in the attack on the Mar Elias Orthodox Christian Church in the Dweila neighborhood of Damascus on June 22, 2025. Five people from the Christian community of Kharaba, a village west of Suwayda, were among those killed in the explosion. It was later revealed that one of the attackers was a member of the Ministry of Defense.

Third phase: the invasion and massacres (July)

In early July, under the pretext of settling a dispute with the Bedouin groups in charge of the checkpoint, government forces interrupted road traffic for several hours, during which the security officials for Suwayda and Deraa, Ahmed al-Dalati and Shaher Jabr Omran (nom de guerre: Abu al-Baraa) traveled to Bedouin hamlets in the Al-Lajat region to reconcile two clans disputing control of the Braq-Masmiyeh checkpoint and offered to integrate several dozen of their members into the Interior Ministry forces.

On July 11, Druze merchant Fadlallah Dwara was kidnapped near the checkpoint, beaten, robbed of his vehicle, cargo, phone, and money, and then thrown onto the side of the road. The response was swift. The very next day, a Druze faction from Ariqa kidnapped Bedouins—who were not connected to Fadlallah Dwara’s kidnappers—prompting a retaliatory response from Bedouin clans in Suwayda, particularly those in the Al-Maqwas neighborhood, located at the eastern entrance to the city of Suwayda. At around 9 a.m. on July 13, they blocked the road to the mountains and kidnapped five Druze civilians.

1. The Southern Tribes Gathering starts the conflict

Alert issued by the Southern Tribes Gathering on July 13 at 4:18 p.m.

2. Government forces invade Suwayda

The head of military operations Hasan Abd al-Ghani announces the launch of the intervention, Bosra al-Harir, July 14, 6:30 p.m.

At least five of these divisions are led by (ex)-jihadists, while the 82nd Division contains elements likely to sympathize with ISIS. Several members of its units have been seen in videos in Suwayda wearing the organization’s emblem. A number of factors also confirm the presence of two units of the special forces with a notorious reputation: the Ali Bin Abi Talib brigade commanded by Abd al-Mun’im al-Dhaher (Abu Suleiman al-‘Iss) – who would get injured in the battle – and the “Red Bands” unit, whose leadership remains unclear to this day. The latter are trained by private military companies founded by foreign jihadists, notably Malhama Tactical, a group founded by Chechen Abdullah Tac. It should be pointed out that a Chechen fighter was taken prisoner by Druze factions, who interrogated him on camera.

In the middle of the afternoon, the Suwayda National Hospital announced that it had recorded 53 deaths and more than 200 injuries. While other towns in the province, such as Walgha, ‘Atil, Rima Hazem, and Rsas, were already being bombed and experiencing clashes, the advance of government forces was finally halted shortly before 6 p.m. when the Israeli air force carried out its first strike between Mazraa and Walgha, at the entrance to the University of Agricultural and Veterinary Studies, before following up with further strikes on other roads leading to Suwayda.

At dawn on July 15, intense military pressure combined with international diplomatic pressure forced Sheikh Al-Hajari to accept the deployment of government forces in the province and city of Suwayda and to call on the factions not to resist and to cooperate with them by handing over their weapons. Thus, at 8 a.m., Interior Ministry Colonel Ahmed al-Dalati announced the entry of government forces into Suwayda and the enforcement of a curfew, calling on Druze factions to lay down their arms. At 8:15 a.m., government forces entered the outskirts of Suwayda from Kanaker in the southwest, and thirty minutes later they reached the Omran roundabout in the northwest. Clashes broke out immediately afterwards and were quickly accompanied by acts of violence as armed groups with no clear affiliations spread throughout the city’s neighborhoods and proceeded to systematically destroy and loot shops and homes, as well as summarily execute numerous civilians.

At 10:50 a.m., an initial report already mentioned 24 executions of civilians, while at 12:20 p.m., news spread of the massacre of more than a dozen members of the Al-Radwan family in the guesthouse of their home, even as Ahmed al-Dalati had just declared a ceasefire with the aim of bringing the Druze leadership back to the negotiating table. Ahmad al-Dalati and Shaher Jabr Omran thus met around noon with representatives of various local religious groups and factions in the Druze shrine of Ain al-Zaman, located in the heart of the city, even as fighting and crimes continued to unfold in the surrounding neighborhoods.

An hour later, the first images of the atrocities were made public, while the attackers posted videos of their own crimes on social media in real time. Many videos show members of the government forces and Bedouin tribes staging scenes in which they beat civilians, forcibly shave their mustaches, and even summarily execute them before desecrating their corpses, calling them repeatedly “ya khanazir”, which means “you pigs!”. Entire families were executed in their homes or in public spaces, while many people were shot dead in their cars or targeted by snipers as they tried to flee the city. Among the victims were many elderly people and children. The youngest victim was three months old. They also left numerous inscriptions on walls, openly signing their names and claiming responsibility for their crimes. These numerous acts of violence were committed in most of the occupied neighborhoods of the city, even though a dozen journalists affiliated with the Ministry of Communication were present nearby, as well as Security Chief Ahmad al-Dalati, who appeared at around 2:20 p.m. on the roof of a vehicle in the middle of the Bedouin neighborhood of Al-Maqwas to announce its “liberation.”

Until dawn on July 17, government forces and their Bedouin auxiliaries fought with Druze factions for control of the city’s neighborhoods, while the Israeli air force carried out targeted strikes in and around Suwayda. The National Hospital neighborhood was the scene of intense fighting on several occasions over the two days: government forces targeted the hospital for the first time on July 15 at around 5 p.m., then again on the morning of the 16th, finally taking control of it at around 3 p.m. that same day. Members of the army and General Security killed the police officers in charge of security at the premises, then executed wounded patients and medical staff: CCTV footage shows the execution of nurse Mohammad Buhsas in the hospital lobby. When government forces began their withdrawal at dawn on the 17th, armed Bedouin groups remained in the city and were repelled or eliminated by Druze factions during the day. In several neighborhoods where they had remained over the previous 24 hours, numerous bodies of executed civilians were discovered.

Several sources confirm that on the morning of July 17, as Druze factions regained control of the situation, crimes were committed against Bedouin populations in several localities, who were subjected to forced expulsions, physical violence, and even killings, while a number of homes were set on fire. There are also indications that the Al-Hrubi mosque was vandalized, while satellite images confirm that destruction was carried out in Shahba and Breiki. Unfortunately, these localities remain inaccessible to independent investigators, and press reports of persecution against Bedouin populations are riddled with approximations and false testimony, making it impossible to distinguish truth from fiction.

3. The Syrian Council of Tribes and Clans comes to the rescue

The head of the Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans Abdul Moneim al-Naseef calls on all Bedouin tribes to converge on Suwayda to reinforce the Southern Tribes Gathering, Deir Ez-Zor, July 18, 12:50 a.m.

At this stage of our investigation, it has been confirmed that the following Bedouin tribes and clans actively participated in the assault on the Suwayda community:

31. Rifa’ah

32. Ruwalah

33. Sakhani

34. Sarhan

35. Sardiya

36. Saba’ah

37. Sabeila

38. Shamur

39. Sharabin

40. Waldah

41. Zubayd

However, it cannot be ruled out that members of other tribes participated individually or collectively in the attack, as at least 40 other tribe and clan names were mentioned in our sources by participants and members of these groups themselves. This would bring the number of participating clans and tribes to 81, out of a total of 211 Syrian clans and tribes listed in our database, which would therefore represent between 38 and 40% of the country’s tribes and clans.

It is also important to remember, as we have already pointed out, that the government forces themselves have recruited Bedouins on a massive scale. Furthermore, the rebel and jihadist groups that merged with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in January 2025 to place themselves under the command of the Ministry of Defense were already largely made up of Bedouins.

Fourth phase: siege and denial (July-present)

In the days following the ceasefire, journalists were kept out of the province, where government forces set up checkpoints and claimed that Druze factions were preventing anyone from entering, a claim refuted by a number of residents. The Civil Defense (“White Helmets”) organized a humanitarian corridor for people residing abroad from the south of the province to the neighboring town of Bosra al-Sham, until several incidents involving gunfire and passenger abductions interrupted operations.

On July 31, the Ministry of Justice announced the establishment of an Investigation Committee on the events in Suwayda, but like other institutions implemented by the de facto authority, it does not meet the conditions of impartiality and independence required to carry out these investigations. The representative of the commission of inquiry into crimes committed against the Alawites on the Syrian Coast in march, Yasser al-Farhan, who delivered his conclusions the day after the massacres in Suwayda (July 22), had earlier thanked the Bedouin tribes for their intervention on the coast, while Anas Ayrout, head of the Supreme Committee for the Preservation of Civil Peace in Syria, issued a statement on July 18 praising the tribes and congratulating them on their mobilization. Another member of this committee, Sheikh Ragheb al-Saifi from the Uqaydat tribe, has been identified as one of the coordinators of the attack on Suwayda. Finally, Al-Sharaa himself thanked the tribes for their “heroic commitment” in his public address on July 19, without ever considering them to be “outlaw gangs” that needed to be disarmed.

On October 12, the government organized a campaign called “Suwayda is ours and we are hers,” an inappropriate charity event intended to raise money for the province. The event was held in the martyred village of As-Sawara al-Kbira, a Christian village whose church was burned down and many of whose residents were murdered, in the presence of Mustafa Bakour, representatives of the tribes involved in the massacres, and Laith al-Balous and Suleiman Abdul Baqi. The latter are portrayed by the government as representatives of the Druze community and are subsequently called upon in diplomatic negotiations abroad, even though they played an active role in committing crimes against their own community. Suleiman Abdul Baqi, who, it should be remembered, himself murdered a young Christian for religious reasons, was promoted to “Head of Security for Suwayda” before being invited to Washington by members of the US Congress on January 22, 2026.

On December 17, the leader of the Southern Tribes Gathering, Rakan al-Khudeir, organized his “Victory Festival” in his stronghold of Al-Mtalleh—the Bedouin village where the violence began—to celebrate the anniversary of Assad’s fall, declaring that the Southern Tribes’ allegiance to the state was a national duty. Mustafa Bakour and several government representatives were present, as well as representatives of the Council of Tribes and Clans.

More than six months after the military assault, 34 villages remain occupied by government forces, who have made Mazraa the administrative center of the occupied area. Governor Mustafa Bakour is organizing the cosmetic rehabilitation of hundreds of burned houses in order to conceal the extent of the crimes committed, while nearly 190,000 residents remain displaced outside the area. Earth barriers cut off a number of roads and access to the occupied area remains hampered, while armed groups continue to use the villages of Mazraa, Walgha, and Al-Mansoura as a launching pad for regular raids and strikes against Druze positions, particularly the villages of Umm Zeytoun, Najran, Majdal, Remat Hazem, and the western suburbs of Suwayda city. Although the road to Damascus is officially reopened to trafic, movement is extremely limited and many men in the province are de facto housebound, as they have been for the past ten years, for fear of being associated with combatants and arrested at checkpoints.

All these factors do not bode well for the weeks and months ahead, with foreign governments seemingly agreeing to give carte blanche to the unelected president Ahmad al-Sharaa, who for many Syrians has never ceased to be the warlord Abu Mohammad al-Jolani.

Left: Map of the Suwayda province showing the attacked and occupied areas | Above: Map of Suwayda city neighborhoods.

Summary Abuses and Killings (Non-exhaustive list)

1. 1. On July 15 at around 9:45 a.m. in the town of Al-Thaala, located 10 km west of Suwayda city, nine civilians were executed in the courtyard of their home by men in military uniforms. Among them were two children aged 13 and 15. The victims are from Akhwan, Dahouk, and Aouj families.
   2. On July 15, four civilians, including a 16-year-old child, were executed in their home in the Al-Khudr neighborhood of the city of Suwayda. The victims were members of the Saleh and Mahasen families.
   3. On July 15, three civilians belonging to the Hamidan family, one of whom were disabled, were executed at their home in the city of Suwayda.
   4. On July 15, around noon, armed men forced their way into the Radwan family home and executed thirteen civilians from the same family in their guesthouse.
   5. On July 15, armed men entered the Arnous family’s apartment and forced three young men to jump from the balcony while shooting at them. The perpetrators filmed their actions. Prior to this, the father of the family was executed in the building. All four victims were members of the Arnous family.
   6. On July 15 at around 5:30 p.m. on Tishrin Square in the center of Suwayda, seven civilians, including one American citizen, were executed in the street after being abducted from their homes. The perpetrators filmed their actions. The victims were members of the Saraya family.
   7. On July 15, in the Nahda neighborhood of the city of Suwayda, six civilians from the Qarzab family were executed in their car as they attempted to leave the city.
   8. On July 15, near the Al-Khudr neighborhood of Suwayda, eight members of the Shuhayib family were executed on the side of the road leading to Al-Thaala.
   9. On July 16, at dawn in the National Hospital neighborhood of Suwayda twelve civilians were forcibly taken from their home to the ground floor of a building under construction located 140 meters South West from the entrance to the hospital and summarily executed on a pile of rubble and rubbish. The victims are from Dbeisi, Abu Maghdab, Shaarani, Zain, Hatem, Abu Faour, Qarqout, Abu Qaisar and Abu Fakhr families.
   10. On July 16 at 8:45 a.m. in the Al-Thawra neighborhood south of Suwayda city, five civilians were executed in and near their car as they attempted to leave the city. Three children were pulled from the vehicle before their relatives were executed and were kidnapped by the perpetrators. The scene was filmed by a surveillance camera. The victims were members of the Barbour, Musleh, Raef, and Ghanem families.
   11. On July 16 around 10:00 a.m. in the Al-Jawlan neighborhood of Suwayda, armed men broke into the Baeini – Abu Saadeh family home and executed four members of the family, including a teenager. Their bodies were found burned.
   12. On July 16, around 12:30 p.m. in the Al-Jaala neighborhood of Suwayda, four members of the Jarira family, including two 12-year-old children, were shot and killed in their car as they attempted to leave the city. A young girl survived by hiding in a ditch until dawn the next day.
   13. On the morning of July 16, in the old town of Suwayda, a group of men in military uniforms entered the Badr family home, where more than forty people had taken refuge, after throwing grenades inside. Twenty-three civilians were executed, some after being beaten and stabbed with knives. The victims are from Badr, Los, Kamal, Taqi, Shtay and Melhem families.
   14. On the morning of July 16, in the Al-Koum neighborhood of Suwayda (on the southern outskirts of the city), armed men broke into the Mezher family home and executed fourteen civilians. The victims are from Mezher, Halabi, Hamoud and Khatib families.
   15. On July 16, at the intersection of the main avenue (Route 110) and Al-Jandi al-Majhul Street, seven civilians were executed in the street after being abducted from their homes. The victims are from Mazhar, Ahmad, Ashqar, Hassoun and Abu Hamza families.
   16. During the day of July 16, a number of civilians were killed by sniper fire as they attempted to leave the city or seek shelter. Among them are several children. Non-exhaustive list of victims: Tala Al-Shufi (14 years old), Amer Hilal and her daughter Ghena (14), Qais Al-Nabwani (13), Dr Taalat Amer, Salama Al-Jaber…
   17. On July 17, in the village of Sahwet Blata, located 6 km southeast of the city of Suwayda, eleven members of the Gharz Ad-Din family were executed in their home. Among the victims was a three-month-old baby whose body was found in a cardboard box.
   18. On July 18, in the village of Walgha, located 4 km northwest of the city of Suwayda, five members of the Kfeiri family were executed in their home.
   19. On July 19, in the Mazraa neighborhood (Dawar Thaali) located northwest of the city of Suwayda, three members of the Sayyid family, including an 80-year-old disabled man, his wife, and their daughter, were executed and their bodies burned.

The history of the Yarmouk camp is a microcosm of the region’s history since the beginning of the Assad clan’s dictatorship, which can be described as national socialist. It provides a snapshot of the power relations and political loyalties that have led to the violent fracturing of Syrian and Palestinian societies since the mid-1950s. Yarmouk has also been a microcosm of the uprising and civil war that have ravaged Syria since 2011. Here is a comprehensive review of the chronology of the last fourteen years…

Non-exhaustive presentation of the camp

The Yarmouk refugee camp was established in 1957 on the outskirts of Damascus, covering an area of 2.11 square kilometers bordered to the north by Al-Midan district (Al-Qa’a and Al-Zahera neighborhoods), to the west by Al-Qadam district (Qadam Sharqi and Jouret Shreibati neighborhoods), to the east by Tadamon, and to the south by Yalda, Taqaddom, and Al-Hajar al-Aswad. Its residents fled Palestine in 1948, and some of them passed through Lebanon or Jordan before reaching Syria. The camp gradually expanded eastward after 1967, welcoming refugees from the Golan Heights (including Druze—25%, Turkmen, and Alawites—3%), most of whom settled in the neighboring district of Tadamon. Strictly speaking, the Yarmouk camp initially referred to the area bounded by the 30th Street to the west and Yarmouk Street to the east, then the entire area extending to Palestine Street (see map). In some articles and reports, the camp is incorrectly divided into two separate camps, “Yarmouk camp” and “Palestine camp,” but this division does not correspond to any administrative reality. Similarly, the districts of Al-Hajar al-Aswad and Taqaddom are sometimes included in the name “Yarmouk camp” because some of their residents were also refugees from Palestine.

In 2011, Yarmouk was the largest Palestinian refugee camp among the 12 camps in Syria. At the beginning of the uprising, Yarmouk had 351,500 Syrian residents and 171,880 Palestinian refugees (44,279 families). UNRWA administered 23 facilities there, including 16 schools, three medical centers, a Youth Cultural Center, an Educational Development Center, and two Community Centers [1]. In addition to the schools run by UNRWA, there were seven public schools. There were also 11 mosques in Yarmouk, as the population was almost exclusively Sunni Muslim.

The administrative management of the camp was entrusted to a municipality affiliated with the Ba’ath Party and Palestinian factions loyal to it, led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC). The main Palestinian factions present and active in Yarmouk at the start of the uprising were loyal to Bashar al-Assad’s regime:

• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), a splinter group of the PFLP founded in 1968, which left the PLO in 1974. Led by Ahmad Jibril, Talal Naji, and Anwar Raja;
• Palestine Liberation Army (PLA – Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Falastini), founded by the PLO in 1964, then subservient to the Syrian Ba’ath Party and expelled from the PLO in 1973. Led by Akram Muhammad al-Salti;
• Fatah al-Intifada (translated as “The Fatah Uprising”), a splinter group of Fatah founded in 1983 and expelled from the PLO the same year. Led by Saïd al-Mouragha “Abu Mussa” until 2013, then Ziad al-Saghir “Abu Hazim”;
• As-Sa’iqa (translated as “lightning strike”), the Palestinian branch of the Syrian Ba’ath Party founded in 1966. Led by Mohammed Qeis.
• Harakat Falasteen Hurra (translated as “Free Palestine Movement”), founded in 2003 and led by Yasser Qashlak and Saed Abd Al-Aal.

However, they did not represent the majority of Palestinians in Yarmouk and owed their existence solely to their loyalty to the regime, as other Palestinian movements were banned. Hamas, meanwhile, had enjoyed a presence in Syria since 1999 that was both largely symbolic, due to its membership in the “Axis of Resistance,” and closely controlled, due to its historical affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been violently persecuted by the regime since the 1980s.

[1] UNRWA Website – https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/syria/yarmouk-unofficial-camp

Map 1: Location of Yarmouk regarding Damascus (green square = Map 2)

Map 2: Neighborhoods and districts located around Yarmouk.

Map 3: Infrastructure of the Yarmouk camp.

Before 2011: The Premises.

The Palestinian presence in Syria predates the Assad dictatorship. The influx of refugees in 1948 occurred under the presidency of Shukri Al-Quwatli, two years after Syria had gained its independence. At that time, there were 85,000 Palestinian refugees on Syrian territory, but several successive waves would occur in 1967 from the Golan Heights following the Six-Day War, in 1970 from Jordan following the events of Black September, and in 1982 from Lebanon due to the Lebanese civil war. In 2011, there were 585,610 Palestinian refugees in Syria.

Initially involved with the Palestinians in the Six-Day War and at the beginning of the 1970 crisis (Black September), Syria quickly betrayed their cause under Hafez al-Assad. Its participation in the Yom Kippur offensive in 1973 was aimed more at recovering the Golan Heights lost in 1967 than at defending the Palestinian cause. And as in 1967 and 1970, the Syrian armed forces were defeated, killing hundreds of Palestinian fighters from the Palestine Liberation Army, who were used to serve the interests of the dictatorship. The Golan Heights were left to Israel as part of the disengagement agreements signed between the two countries in 1974.

On January 20, 1976, Syria’s Palestinian proxies, the Palestine Liberation Army and As-Sa’iqa, massacred more than 500 Christian civilians in Damour, bringing shame on the Palestinian resistance, then embodied by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and prompting Christian militias to call on Syria for help. A little over four months later, Assad sent his army into Lebanon in an incomprehensible strategy aimed at supporting the Christian Phalangists against the “Palestinian progressives” of the PLO led by Yasser Arafat and the Lebanese National Movement led by Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, thereby claiming to prevent Israeli intervention in Lebanon. Immediately after entering Lebanese territory, and after being stopped by the PLO in the Chouf, the Syrian army besieged the Palestinian camp of Tel al-Zaatar with the help of 3,000 Christian Phalangists. After a two-month siege, the Palestinian resistance surrendered and Assad allowed the Christian (fascist) militias to enter the camp on August 12, 1976. The militias proceeded to loot and burn homes, as well as rape and systematically massacre Palestinian civilians, executing more than 1,500 camp residents in one of the largest massacres of Palestinians since the Nakba.

From then until its withdrawal from Lebanon in April 2005, the Syrian army and the Assad regime would determine the fate of Lebanon, but also of the Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria. Following the Israeli intervention in Lebanon in 1982, the Syrian regime first allowed Iran to create, train, and arm Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, using its territory as a bridge between Iraq and Lebanon, before using Iranian militias as proxies in its bloody war against all Syrians from 2011 onwards, whether they were progressives or Islamists. At the same time, the PLO was expelled from Lebanon, marking the end of political freedom for Palestinians in Lebanon, whose situation became aligned with that of Palestinians in Syria. Treated as eternal foreigners and deprived of their civil rights, they were condemned to neutrality and economic dependence, while being dispossessed of their struggle for the liberation of Palestine, which was taken over by the Syrian state, the Iranian state, and their proxies, with Syria itself soon becoming Iran’s proxy, after having been that of Soviet Russia.

Now that we have set the context, let us turn to the recent history of Yarmouk.

2011–2012: Turmoil. Pro-Assad militias and the regime’s first bombs.

When the uprising broke out in March 2011, the residents of Yarmouk and its political factions initially maintained the position of neutrality that had been imposed on them for nearly 30 years. After an initial strike—which was violently suppressed—to protest the bombing of the Palestinian refugee camp in Dera’a in April, tensions gradually increased between June 2011 and July 2012.

On the occasion of the commemoration of the Nakba and the Naksa, the regime organized two demonstrations on the Golan border on May 15 and June 5, 2011, through the PFLP-GC, during which 26 young Palestinians from Yarmouk were killed by the Israeli army while trying to cross the security barriers. During the funerals held in Yarmouk on June 6, Assad was accused by Yarmouk residents of trying to divert attention from his crimes against Syrians, as well as from the controversial statements made by his cousin and key regime businessman Rami Makhlouf, who had just claimed that “the security of the Syrian regime was one with that of Israel.” The PFLP-GC, for its part, was held responsible for the tragic events that occurred on the Golan border, and in particular for sending the demonstrators into a trap after galvanizing and manipulating them to serve the regime’s false pro-Palestinian propaganda. The regime claimed that attacking it was tantamount to attacking the “Axis of Resistance” and serving the interests of American imperialism and Zionism. Consequently, the Syrian rebellion was equated with a Zionist conspiracy, and Syrian protesters and rebels were portrayed as agents of Western imperialism. Unfortunately, a large part of the Palestinian solidarity movement and the Western Left fell for this specious argument and continue to this day to support the Assad regime and its allies [1]. In any case, the Palestinians of Yarmouk were not deceived, and the funeral, which brought together 30,000 people, turned into a demonstration and surrounded the PFLP-GC headquarters “Al-Khalsa” located on the southern edge of Yarmouk. The guards opened fire, killing two protesters: Rami Siyam (14) and Jamal Ghutan. Hundreds of protesters then stormed the building and set it on fire, killing two members of the PFLP-GC before being repelled by regime forces and PFLP-GC reinforcements.

In August 2011, the regime bombed the Al-Ramel Palestinian refugee camp on the outskirts of Latakia, accusing its residents of supporting “terrorism” due to the strong anti-Assad activity in the camp. More than half of its 10,000 residents were forced to flee the camp by regime forces and their shabiha, who proceeded to loot their homes. In the wake of this, Yarmouk organized its first demonstration in solidarity with Al-Ramel on August 17, 2011, bringing together around 300 people. During the summer, nearly 70,000 displaced persons from various cities targeted by the regime were welcomed en masse into the mosques, schools, and public spaces of Yarmouk.

During 2012, demonstrations and strikes multiplied, echoing the main slogans of the Syrian revolution, while the army opened fire on the crowd and broke the locks of striking businesses to force them to resume their activities. The regime’s security services began to express concern about these protest movements, urging community leaders to silence them.

It should be noted that before the summer of 2012, Yasser Qashlak, a Palestinian millionaire loyal to the regime and founder and leader of the Free Palestine Movement, formed the «Al-Aqsa Shield Forces » (Quwaat Der’a Al-Aqsa), a group of mercenaries tasked with deterring the opposition from gathering, in particular by meeting at the exits of mosques and staging pro-regime demonstrations. At the end of the summer, Qashlak also financed the arming of 1,100 members of the armed wing of the PFLP-GC, the Jibril Jihad Brigades (Kataeb Jihad Jibril), 500 of whom went on to form the Popular Committees (Al-Lijan al-Sha’biyah), militias set up in Yarmouk and in various districts of the Damascus region to prevent the infiltration of Sunni rebel groups and thus counter the predictable offensive of the Free Syrian Army[2].

On July 13, 2012, Yarmouk was the starting point for a demonstration of several thousand people heading to the neighboring district of Tadamon to protest against its bombing, but also against the massacre of more than 150 civilians in Tremseh (Hama) by Assad’s shabiha and the death of Palestinian recruits in the war waged by the regime against its people. Once again, the army opened fire on the demonstration and killed 10 protesters.

The next day, the funeral, attended by 50,000 people, led to the encirclement of Yarmouk by armored vehicles, and the foreign minister threatened the Palestinian refugees, declaring that as guests they were subject to a duty of neutrality. This desire for neutrality was widely shared by residents and all Palestinian factions, who knew what dramatic consequences opening a new front with the regime in Yarmouk could bring.

[1] Read our publication “Western leftist comrades, you failed your Levantine fellows,” available at https://interstices-fajawat.org/western-leftist-comrades-you-failed-your-arab-fellows/ 

[2] Tom Rollins, Palestinian-Syrian Militarization in Yarmouk, Atlantic Council, July 19, 2017, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/palestinian-syrian-militarization-in-yarmouk/ 

2012–2013: The Explosion. The armed rebellion takes control of Yarmouk.

Map No. 3: Yarmouk – Situation after the FSA offensive, late 2012.

Hamas, which had supported the protests against the regime, was now offering its expertise to the rebels of the Free Syrian Army and Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis without publicly admitting it. This dangerous choice was motivated by the rise to power of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood—their patrons and sponsors—in Egypt, but it would very quickly lead to retaliation by the Syrian regime with the arrest and torture of Mamoun al-Jaloudi, commander-in-chief and bodyguard of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Khaled Meshaal, followed by the expulsion of Meshaal and other Hamas leaders from Damascus to Qatar, Cairo, and Gaza. [1] [2] It was also during this period that Jabhat al-Nusra began operating in the district alongside the FSA.

While the regime continued its daily bombardments since the summer, the escalation reached a breaking point in December when Palestinian militias loyal to the regime began to establish checkpoints around Yarmouk and to confront the Free Syrian Army militarily in al-Hajar al-Aswad and Yalda, where the latter had now established itself. It should be noted that the PFLP-GC had so far only used its weapons to intimidate and persecute camp residents, without ever confronting the armed opposition.

Starting on December 12, 2012, the regime initially banned trucks carrying materials from entering the camp. The next day, a strike targeted Al-Bassel Hospital, and then, on December 16, 2012, another air strike targeted the Abd Al-Qader Al-Hussaini mosque and the adjacent school, which were sheltering several hundred refugees from neighboring neighborhoods, killing 200 people in what was called the “MiG massacre” or “Abdul Qader Al-Hussaini massacre.” [3]

The very next day, hundreds of Free Syrian Army and Jabhat al-Nusra fighters took possession of Yarmouk, pushing the PFLP-GC and its allies to the northern end of the camp and declaring it a “liberated zone.” The regime then bombarded the camp heavily, forcing 80% of its residents, both Palestinians and internally displaced persons, to flee Yarmouk to Qudseya and Sehnaya. [4] The factions affiliated with the FSA at the time were Suqur Al-Joulan, Ababil Hawran, Jund Allah, Saraya al-Beyt, Ahfad Aisha, Abu Al-Harith Joulani, Imam Thahabi, Shuhada Al-Nour, and others.

The Suqur al-Joulan and Ababil Hauran factions began looting the homes of residents who refused to leave Yarmouk while squatting with their families in empty homes, creating tensions between residents and the factions present, while Jabhat al-Nusra gradually established Islamic law and persecuted Palestinian activists.

[1] Mohanad Hage Ali, Kill List, Carnegie Middle East Center, 14 mai 2018, accessible à https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2018/05/kill-list?lang=en

[2] Mamoon Alabbasi, How did Hamas’s military expertise end up with Syria’s rebels?, Middle East Eye, 23 mai 2015, accessible à https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/how-did-hamass-military-expertise-end-syrias-rebels

[3] Action Group For Palestinians in Syria, 9 Years On, Palestinians of Syria Remember Tragic ‘Mig Massacre’ in Yarmouk Camp, 16 décembre 2022, accessible à https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/post/13709/articles/9-years-on-palestinians-of-syria-remember-tragic-mig-massacre-in-yarmouk-camp

[4] Al-Arabiya, (ARABE) The Military Council of the Free Army storms the Yarmouk camp, 17 Décembre 2012, accessible àhttps://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/12/17/255640

2013–2015: The Siege. Pro-Assad militias take revenge on civilians.

Following its expulsion from Yarmouk, the PFLP-GC established a partial blockade at the checkpoint located at the northern entrance to the camp on the initiative of its leader Anwar Raja, preventing any food or medicine from entering for six months, but initially contenting itself with filtering the passage of people without prohibiting it, except on certain occasions. Food and medicine were then smuggled into the camp in small quantities from the south and sold inside at excessive prices.

Throughout the siege, demonstrations and symbolic actions were regularly organized inside the camp to call for the lifting of the siege and alert the international community. These were mainly initiated by the Yarmouk Coordination Committee, which at the same time set up an agricultural project called “Bassmat Kheir” to produce vegetables for the community. The alternative school “Al-Dimashkiya” also launched its educational activities during this period for children in the camp who had been deprived of education since the end of UNRWA activities, opening several alternative schools inside and near the camp.

During the first half of 2013, while Palestinian factions within the camp were fragmented into some twenty small groups with no power or influence, Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis obtained external support enabling it to arm itself and expel the criminal factions Suqur Al-Joulan and Ababil Hauran from the camp. The leader of Suqur Al-Joulan, Abu Ammar Bayan Muzail, had previously been arrested and identified as an agent of the regime. [1]

On July 18, 2013, the partial blockade of the camp turned into a total siege, with the regime and the PFLP-GC prohibiting all movement of goods and people. This led to a state of health crisis and advanced malnutrition among the camp’s residents, so much so that in October the imam of Yarmouk issued a fatwa authorizing the killing and consumption of dogs, cats, and donkeys. The level of famine was so high that even the fighters of the various factions were more concerned with survival than with fighting each other.

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, Hamas was considerably weakened and definitively withdrew its support for the Syrian-Palestinian rebels, before renewing its ties with Hezbollah and Iran. However, the Syrian regime did not reopen dialogue with Hamas, refusing to release its members from prison.

Meanwhile, on November 6, 2013, several of the main rebel groups present in the Damascus region formalized the creation of a military alliance independent of the FSA and placed under the umbrella of the Greater Damascus Operations Room. This included several factions active in Yarmouk and the surrounding districts (Al-Hajar al-Aswad, Yalda, Babbila, Beit Sahem): Ahrar al-Sham, Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis, Liwa Sham al-Rasul, Kataeb Sahaba, Liwa Shabab al-Hoda, Liwa al-Ummah al-Wahida, etc. [2]

On February 2, 2014, the regime arrested 27 people as they arrived at a checkpoint to receive food aid. On the same day, the Director of National Palestinian Civil Society, Fuad Omar Abu Basil, was kidnapped by the regime, and the next day, it was the turn of humanitarian worker Mahmoud Mu’ad to be arrested and disappear without a trace. Residents were regularly arrested or beaten by regime soldiers during distributions or while attempting to pass through checkpoints, particularly towards Yalda.

Contacts were established between the residents and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as well as the Fatah leadership in Ramallah, in order to initiate talks with the Arab League and the regime to end the siege and the accompanying reprisals against civilians. As part of these negotiations, the PLO secured food distributions in Al-Rijeh Square in the northern part of the camp. The main organizations distributing humanitarian aid in the camp at the time were the Palestine Charity Committee, the Nour Association for Relief and Development, the Jafra Foundation for Relief & Youth Development, and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society.[3]

The humanitarian distribution site quickly became the scene of rivalries and regular armed confrontations between factions, and residents waiting for aid were regularly targeted and wounded by sniper fire. On March 23, an anti-tank rocket (RPG) was fired at the crowd gathered to receive humanitarian aid in Al-Rijeh Square, killing seven people. The shooter, Mouaffaq Dawa, a member of the “Free Palestine Movement,” was nicknamed “The Butcher of Yarmouk” by residents and was also accused of rape. He was in charge of a checkpoint and food aid distributions. A few years later, when brought before German courts, he justified his actions as revenge for the death of his nephew. [4] [5]

That same month, a truce was agreed between the regime and the opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra.

In March 2014, Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis (100 to 300 fighters) and Liwa al-Asifa controlled 75% of the territory, where a number of small factions also remained, such as Free General Command (around 40 defectors from the PFLP-GC), Al-Zaatoot (around 50 Fatah members), Ahrar al-Yarmouk (around 50 members), Free Palestine Liberation Army (defectors from the PLA), Liwa Al-‘Ahda Al-‘Umariya, Zahrat al-Mada’en, the Ibn Taymiyyah battalion, Al-Kara’in (Fatah members), Sahran, Yarmouk Residents League, and Joint Palestinian Power.

At the same time, Palestinian members of Jabhat al-Nusra formalized their activities in the camp, joined by approximately 250 non-Palestinian Jabhat al-Nusra fighters from al-Hajar al-Aswad.

During 2014, five successive truces were signed between the various parties to the conflict, but none were respected and the regime continued to bomb the camp, destroying infrastructure and rendering it uninhabitable. [6] Each party blamed the other for the violence and the violation of the agreements, with Fatah accusing the PFLP-GC and the regime, while the latter accused Fatah and Jabhat al-Nusra. In July, eleven civilian groups and institutions in the camp called on all parties to take immediate action to resolve the humanitarian crisis, in particular by allowing food, medicine, and drinking water to enter and lifting the siege. The UN, the Palestinian Embassy in Syria, and the General Authority for Palestinian Arab Refugees were also called upon by the Yarmouk Civil Council, established in March, while campaigns and demonstrations organized by residents multiplied. To no avail.

On August 8, 2014, a civilian delegation tasked with ensuring the implementation of the conditions set out in the ceasefire agreements, namely the surrender of rebel fighters to the authorities in exchange for the neutralization of the conflict and the return of residents, was targeted by Jabhat al-Nusra, injuring one of its representatives and putting an end to the various attempts at talks.

From the second quarter of 2014 until the end of 2015, a series of car bombings and selective assassinations targeted a number of Palestinian activists and civil society actors inside the camp: Abu Al-Khalil (June 17, 2014), Baha Saqr (Yarmouk Residents League), Ahmed Al-Sahli (August 19, 2014), Abdullah al-Bader (August 20, 2014), Ali Al Hija (November 29, 2014), Mohammad Yousuf Areisha (Director of the Relief Office) December 20, 2014), Mohammad Qasim Tiraweya (Fatah, December 23, 2014), Abdallah Rezeq (January 12, 2015), Nemer Hussein (Yarmouk Civil Council, February 11, 2015), Firas Hussein Al-Najee (Basma Foundation, February 22, 2015), Yahya Abdullah al-Hourani Abu Suhaib (March 30, 2015), Mustafa Sharaan Abu Maaz (Palestine Charity Committee, July 13, 2015), Abu Diyaa Emara (July 27, 2015), Abu Ahmed Houari (Palestinian National Authority & Democratic Front, October 28, 2015). These assassinations took place in the context of daily rivalries and clashes between factions affiliated with Jabhat al-Nosra and other Palestinian factions, foremost among them Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis, which also suffered several assassination attempts against its leaders. [7] [8]

On September 9, 2014, the regime cut off the camp’s water supply before launching a series of strikes on Al-Rijeh Square and its surroundings, Al-Forn Al-Ali Street, the area around Al-Mansoura School, as well as the Safareyat Al-Karmel neighborhood and Al-‘Urubeh Street located south of the camp (Yalda and Taqqadom). These strikes were in response to an attempted attack by the FSA in the neighboring district of al-Zahira, near the checkpoint at the northern entrance to Yarmouk. Ten days later, residents launched a protest campaign called “Yarmouk Camp is thirsty. Yarmouk Camp calls out ‘We want to live’.”

In December 2014, Jabhat Al-Nusra released a video of the execution of two Yarmouk residents accused of “blasphemy.” [9] At the end of the month, Islamic State seized the Al-Zein neighborhood (Uruba Street) located on the southern edge of the camp, across 30th Street. [10]

At the beginning of 2015, there were only 17,000 to 20,000 residents in Yarmouk, including 3,500 children. [11] [12]

[1] Jaber Al-Murr, (ARABE) Damascus Top Spy is Out of Syria, Akhbar Alaan, 23 Novembre 2013, accessible à https://akhbaralaan.net/news/arab-world/2013/11/23/syria-free-army-bayan-mizel-regim-spy-damascus-hezbollah

[2] Aron Lund, The Greater Damascus Operations Room – Part 1, Carnegie Middle East Center, 18 Novembre 2013, accessible à https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2013/11/the-greater-damascus-operations-room-part-1

[3] Jafra Foundation: https://jafrafoundation.com/syria/  ; Nour Foundation for Relief Development: https://nour-foundation.net/

[4] Jaber Suleiman, Strategic Assessment (64): The Yarmouk Camp for Palestinian Refugees in Syria: Where Do We Go From Here?, Al-Zaytuna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 11 mars 2014, accessible à https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2014/03/11/strategic-assessment-64-the-yarmouk-camp-for-palestinian-refugees-in-syria-where-do-we-go-from-here/

[5] The New Arab, The Syrian survivors who brought the ‘Butcher of Yarmouk’ to justice speak, 21 Mars 2023, accessible à https://www.newarab.com/news/exclusive-butcher-yarmouk-testimony-survivors

[6] Sulafa Jabbour, (ARABE) A truce neutralizing Yarmouk camp brings a glimmer of hope to its residents, Al-Jazeera, 14 février 2014, accessible à https://shorturl.at/pDPSx

[7] Enab Baladi, (ARABE) Yarmouk camp. A series of assassinations reaches al-Sharaan, 13 Juillet 2015, accessible à https://www.enabbaladi.net/38449/#

[8] Fayez Abu Eid, Palestinian Activists Assassination at the Yarmouk Camp, in the best interest of who?, Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, 1 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/153/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/palestinian-activists-assassination-at-the-yarmouk-camp-in-the-best-interest-of-who

[9] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Activists Broadcast a Video of Refugees from the Yarmouk Camp Assassination by Al Nosra Front, 16 Décembre 2014, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/43/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/activists-broadcast-a-video-of-refugees-from-the-yarmouk-camp-assassination-by-al-nosra-front

[10] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Fears of ISIS Breaking into the Yarmouk Camp in Damascus, 3 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/164/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/fears-of-isis-breaking-into-the-yarmouk-camp-in-damascus

[11] Amnesty International, Squeezing the Life Out of Yarmouk, 16 avril 2014, accessible à https://www.amnesty.org.uk/yarmouk-camp-starvation-siege-syria#.VR_X__nF870

[12] UNRWA, We don’t know when it will end : The anguish of Yarmouk, 2 Février 2015, accessible à https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/features/%E2%80%98we-don%E2%80%99t-know-when-it-will-end%E2%80%99-anguish-yarmouk

Map No. 6: Yarmouk – Areas of influence in mid-2014

Year 2 of the siege

2015–2016: The Overwhelming Force. Takfiris rush into Yarmouk

On January 15, 2015, activists launched an appeal for help “Save the Palestinians of Syria,” demanding that the PLO, the UN, and the Red Crescent assume their responsibilities and intervene to end the 546-day siege imposed on the residents of Yarmouk, or at the very least secure the opening of a humanitarian corridor allowing civilians who wish to do so to leave the various camps besieged by the regime. [1] [2] At the same time, new skirmishes between the PFLP-GC and Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis between Palestine Street and Al-Rijeh Square once again led to the suspension of humanitarian aid, with civilians regularly being targeted by snipers. [3] [4]

On January 19, seven brigades affiliated with the FSA (Jaysh al-Islam, Ajnad al-Sham, Ahrar al-Sham, Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis, Quwaat al-Islah, Al-Hahy’a Al-Shara’iya Fiy Janub Dimashq, Muqatilu Al-Hajar Al-Aswad, etc.) issued a statement threatening the regime with a large-scale military response if it invaded the Yarmouk camp, as suggested by statements in the Lebanese press referring to the establishment of a brigade for this purpose, “Al-Yarmouk Brigade.” [5]

On January 26, Jabhat Al-Nusra executed a third resident of the camp accused of “blasphemy.” [6]

At the end of January, the children of Yarmouk organized a demonstration in front of the Youth Support Center under the banner “A Child’s Cry” to call for the lifting of the siege, while Fatah was criticized for organizing its movement’s anniversary in a restaurant a few kilometers from Yarmouk and more than a hundred camp residents were affected by an epidemic of jaundice. [7]

On March 11, 2015, the regime allowed a humanitarian convoy led by UNRWA chief Pierre Krahenbuhl to enter the camp after more than three months of interruption. [8] [9]

On March 30, 2015, Hamas leader Yahya Hourani (Abu Suhaib) was killed by a sniper, leading to the arrest of IS members by Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis. This event was the trigger for IS’s attack on Yarmouk the following day, during which a thousand IS fighters seized the camp from Al-Hajar al-Aswad with the help of Jabhat al-Nosra, which handed over the areas under its control. Three hundred Jabhat al-Nusra fighters had in fact broken their alliance with Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis and joined IS. [10] [11]

After a failed first assault on April 1, 2015, during which IS besieged the Diaspora Office (Maktab al-Shatat) held by Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis, the confrontation continued for two days along Nouh Ibrahim and ‘Atta az-Zeer streets, where IS faced both Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis and Jaysh al-Islam. ISIS finally seized 90% of the camp on April 4, prompting the regime to use 13 barrel bombs in a few days, whereas only two barrel bombs had been used on Yarmouk since the start of hostilities. Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis was then cornered on a narrow strip in the center of the camp, while the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada took advantage of this to seize the perimeter between the Municipality district and the Rujula mosque. [12] [13]

On April 6, 2015, Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis regrouped its forces in the south of the camp and launched an assault against ISIS, temporarily recapturing the Cultural Center area, Morocco Street, Al-Ja’ouneh Street, and the Martyrs’ Cemetery, momentarily controlling 40% of the camp. [14]

On April 7, 2015, a ceasefire was agreed, with ISIS ultimately controlling 95% of the camp. During the assault, five civilians were killed in the clashes, three were killed by shelling, two were beheaded by ISIS, and an eleventh was killed by an ISIS sniper. For its part, IS lost 40 of its fighters.

On April 8, 2015, 14 Palestinian factions met to attempt an alliance with regime forces against IS, but only the pro-Assad factions agreed to join forces with the regime.

On April 12, 2015, the Free Syrian Army and Jaysh al-Islam launched an offensive against ISIS and recaptured Al-Zeen Street between Yalda and Al-Hajar al-Aswad, but did not venture into Yarmouk, while Ahrar al-Sham remained entirely neutral towards ISIS.

On April 19, 2015, most of Jabhat al-Nosra’s fighters had joined ISIS, and Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis announced its dissolution, with some of its fighters joining the regime and others joining Jabhat al-Nosra, while a minority took refuge in the Yalda area controlled by the Free Syrian Army. In ten days of fighting, the regime dropped some 30 barrel bombs on Yarmouk, causing unprecedented damage to the camp and forcing 4,000 of its residents to flee to areas controlled by the FSA in Yalda (2,500), Babbila (1,000), and Beit Sahem (500). At the end of the fighting, IS controlled 80% of the camp and 23 Palestinian refugees had been killed since the beginning of the month. [15] [16] [17]

On April 22, 2015, ISIS withdrew to its stronghold in Al-Hajar al-Aswad and left the management of the camp to Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham. [18] In reality, the border between IS and Jabhat al-Nusra was extremely porous, and there was no clear way to distinguish between militants from one group and the other. In June 2015, around 75 children aged between 7 and 13 were recruited by Jabhat al-Nusra and trained in combat by IS in Al-Hajar al-Aswad before being used as foot soldiers for various military tasks, including observing enemy movements from checkpoints and carrying out suicide operations. [19]

On December 25, 2015, an initial agreement was signed between the regime and ISIS providing for the evacuation of its wounded fighters from the neighboring district of Al-Qadam to other regions of Syria. [20]

By the end of 2015, only 14,000 residents remained in Yarmouk, while a typhus epidemic was spreading throughout the camp.

[1] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Palestinian Activists Launch a Campaign Titled #Save_Palestinians_of_Syria, 15 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/254/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/palestinian-activists-launch-a-campaign-titled-save-palestinians-of-syria

[2] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Civil Committees at the Yarmouk Camp Launch a Distress Call, After the Siege Victims Number Raised to (160), 15 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/257/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/civil-committees-at-the-yarmouk-camp-launch-a-distress-call-after-the-siege-victims-number-raised-to-160

[3] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Shooting and Recriminations Causing Aids Suspension at the Besieged Yarmouk, 11 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/226/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/shooting-and-recriminations-causing-aids-suspension-at-the-besieged-yarmouk

[4] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Violent Clashes Suspend Aids Distribution at the Yarmouk Camp, 18 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/278/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/violent-clashes-suspend-aids-distribution-at-the-yarmouk-camp

[5] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Armed Brigades Threaten to Ignite the Southern Region in Case of Breaking Into the Yarmouk Camp, 19 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/285/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/armed-brigades-threaten-to-ignite-the-southern-region-in-case-of-breaking-into-the-yarmouk-camp

[6] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Al Nusra Front Executes a Young Man in the Yarmouk Camp in Charges of Cursing the Name of God, 26 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/340/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/al-nusra-front-executes-a-young-man-in-the-yarmouk-camp-in-charges-of-cursing-the-name-of-god

[7] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, “A Child’s Scream» a Protest for the Yarmouk Children to take the Siege Away, 30 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/371/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/a-child-s-scream-a-protest-for-the-yarmouk-children-to-take-the-siege-away

[8] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, The Civil Council in the Yarmouk Camp Demands the PLO to assume its responsibilities towards the camp, 3 Janvier 2015, accessible à http://actionpal.org.uk/en/post/161/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/the-civil-council-in-the-yarmouk-camp-demands-the-plo-to-assume-its-responsibilities-towards-the-camp

[9] Middle East Eye, Aid convoy enters Damascus camp for first time in months, 11 Mars 2015, accessible à https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/aid-convoy-enters-damascus-camp-first-time-months

[10] Valentina Napolitano, Yarmouk: a War of All Against All, Noria Research, 28 Mai 2015, accessible à https://noria-research.com/yarmouk-a-war-of-all-against-all/

[11] The Syrian Observer, Aknaf Commander: Nusra Front, Regime Complicit in ISIS Capture of Yarmouk, Zaman al-Wasl, 8 Avril 2015, accessible à https://syrianobserver.com/syrian-actors/aknaf_commander_nusra_front_regime_complicit_isis_capture_yarmouk.html

[12] Middle East Eye, IS takes control of 90 percent of Yarmouk, called ‘hell hole’ by UN official, 4 Avril 2015, accessible à https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/takes-control-90-percent-yarmouk-called-hell-hole-un-official

[13] Hanadi Al-Khatib, (ARABE) ISIS releases video on Yarmouk camp, the endless victim, Al-Arabiya, 28 Avril 2015, accessible à https://shorturl.at/BUSy8

[14] Tariq Hammoud, Situation Assessment: Yarmouk Refugee Camp: What Happens Next?, Al-Zaytuna Centre for Studies & Consultations, 25 Mai 2015, accessible à https://eng.alzaytouna.net/2015/05/25/situation-assessment-yarmouk-refugee-camp-what-happens-next/

[15] Ramzy Baroud, My missing family in Syria: Naming and shaming in Yarmouk, Middle East Eye, 13 Avril 2015, accessible à https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/my-missing-family-syria-naming-and-shaming-yarmouk

[16] Linah Alsaafin, Unravelling the media spin on Yarmouk, Middle East Eye, 17 Avril 2015, accessible à https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/unravelling-media-spin-yarmouk

[17] Abdulrahman al-Masri, ‘ISIS and Nusra are one’ in Yarmouk Camp, Middle East Monitor, 19 Avril 2015, accessible à https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20150419-isis-and-nusra-are-one-in-yarmouk-camp/

[18] Hamza Al-Mustafa, Yarmouk: the victim of IS-Nusra power struggles, The New Arab, 22 Avril 2015, accessible à https://www.newarab.com/opinion/yarmouk-victim-nusra-power-struggles

[19] Palestine Square, Lost Childhood: Palestinian Child Soldiers in Yarmouk, Institute for Palestine Studies, 21 Septembre 2015, accessible à https://www.palestine-studies.org/en/node/232371

[20] Kate Ng, Syria and Isis reach deal to end Yarmouk camp siege, as wounded militants begin safe passage back to strongholds, The Independent, 25 Décembre 2015, accessible à https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-and-isis-reach-deal-to-end-yarmouk-camp-siege-as-wounded-militants-begin-safe-passage-back-to-strongholds-a6786031.html

Map No. 8: Yarmouk – Offensive by Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra, April 2015

2016–2018: Decay. Birds of prey fight over the carcass.

In January 2016, relations between IS and Jabhat al-Nosra began to deteriorate. The latter was then confined to the western part of the camp, between 30th Street and Saffouriyeh Street.

In 2016, the millionaire Qashlak signed an agreement with Fatah al-Intifada for the “Free Palestine Movement” to gain control of a segment of the front line managed by the latter, in exchange for a substantial sum of money. He hoped to increase the symbolic power of his mercenaries, who were now on the front line in the fight against IS.

On July 8, 2016, the regime began negotiations with Jabhat al-Nusra with a view to evacuating it from Yarmouk to Idlib. At the end of the month, Jabhat al-Nusra changed its name to Fatah al-Sham.

In the following months, IS laid siege to Fatah al-Sham and issued an ultimatum to residents of the area under its control, ordering them to leave before it was completely sealed off. At the same time, IS evacuated the area around Al-‘Urubeh Street between Yalda and al-Hajar al-Aswad during clashes with the FSA and Jaysh al-Islam. [1]

ISIS thus transformed Yarmouk into a fortified camp, while paranoia increased on both sides. On December 4, 2016, Fatah al-Sham executed Mohamed Aboud, known as “Abu Ali Khamseen,” accused of collaborating with ISIS.

By the end of 2016, an additional 6,250 residents had fled Yarmouk.

In January 2017, Fatah al-Sham became Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

On May 8, 2017, around 50 HTS members, including 19 wounded, were evacuated by ambulance and bus to Idlib as part of the “Four Cities Agreement” initiated the previous year between the group and the regime. Three months later, the regime established a “new military zone” along its front with HTS, leading to the evacuation of several families and the conversion of their homes into military positions, while a Syrian Red Crescent mission escorted by the PFLP-GC was allowed to enter the HTS-held area on September 7. In addition, a truce was then in effect between the regime and IS. [2] [3]

On September 14, 2017, ISIS imposed a new siege on residents living in the HTS-controlled sector, which at the time had around 200 fighters, before launching an assault on Jaysh al-Islam and FSA factions (Liwa Sham al-Rasul, Jaysh al-Ababil, Kataeb al-Shuhada al-Islam, and the Islamic Union Ajnad al-Sham) south of Yarmouk, capturing the area where the hospital was under construction. At the same time, Jaysh al-Islam and the FSA signed a truce with the regime as part of the “de-escalation” agreements adopted in Cairo under the auspices of Egypt and Russia, which came into force on October 12. The next day, the regime resumed a series of airstrikes against IS positions in Al-Hajar al-Aswad, followed by skirmishes between Jaysh al-Islam and IS at the ‘Urubeh-Beirut checkpoint between Yalda and Yarmouk. [4] [5]

On November 11, 2017, the regime threatened the FSA with closing the Babbila-Sidi Miqdad checkpoint, the only link between the areas under regime control and the area under FSA control, if the FSA did not close the checkpoint Urubeh-Beirut was the only access point to the Yarmouk camp, which the rebels had reopened on November 4 but which could only be used by 10 to 15% of the population of Yarmouk, estimated at less than 8,000 people at the time. The FSA therefore temporarily closed access to the area controlled by ISIS, but reopened it in the following hours under pressure from Yarmouk residents who had taken refuge in Yalda. In response, the regime carried out its threats and closed the Babbila-Sidi Miqdad checkpoint on November 12, causing prices in the enclave to rise by 20%. It was not reopened until two months later. [6] [7]

On December 8, 2017, pro-regime militias launched an attack to recapture the Al-Rijeh district under HTS control, but to no avail. That same month, ISIS secured the signing of an initial agreement for the evacuation of 19 of its wounded fighters to the desert and Turkey, in exchange for easing the siege imposed on the district under HTS control to allow food to enter. [8] [9]

On December 13, ISIS launched an attack in Tadamon and seized a block of buildings controlled by the pro-regime militia Difa’a al-Watani for the first time since 2015, before the latter recaptured it and bombed Yarmouk for several weeks in retaliation. [10]

By the end of 2017, only 6,000 residents remained in Yarmouk.

[1] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, ISIS evacuates one of Yarmouk Streets from its Residents and starts Violent Clashes with the Opposition, 16 Août 2016, accessible à https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/post/3762/news-and-reports/isis-evacuates-one-of-yarmouk-streets-from-its-residents-and-starts-violent-clashes-with-the-opposition

[2] Al-Jazeera, Deal sees Nusra fighters evacuate from Syria’s Yarmouk, 7 Mai 2017, accessible à https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/5/7/deal-sees-nusra-fighters-evacuate-from-syrias-yarmouk

[3] Zaman Al-Wasl, Wounded Nusra fighters evacuated from Yarmouk camp, 8 Mai 2017, accessible à https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/25955

[4] The New Arab, Syrian rebel groups ‘agree to Damascus truce’ in Cairo, 12 Octobre 2017, accessible à https://www.newarab.com/news/syrian-rebel-groups-agree-southern-damascus-truce

[5] Tom Rollins, Escalation Threatens South Damascus “De-Escalation” Deal, Atlantic Council,  27 Octobre 2017, accessible à https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/escalation-threatens-south-damascus-de-escalation-deal/

[6] Ammar Hamou & Madeline Edwards, A ‘war of crossings’ in south Damascus as checkpoint closure cuts off encircled districts, Syria Direct, 13 Novembre 2017, accessible à https://syriadirect.org/a-war-of-crossings-in-south-damascus-as-checkpoint-closure-cuts-off-encircled-districts/

[7] Siege Watch, Ninth Quarterly Report on Besieged Areas in Syria, Janvier 2018, accessible à https://siegewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pax-tsi-siegewatch-9.pdf

[8] Zaman Al-Wasl, 19 ISIS fighters evacuated by regime from southern Damascus, some reached Turkey, 14 Décembre 2017, accessible à https://en.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/31704

[9] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, ISIS allows the besieged residents of west Yarmouk camp to enter food, 29 Décembre 2017, accessible à https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/post/6375/articles/isis-allows-the-besieged-residents-of-west-yarmouk-camp-to-enter-food

[10] Siege Watch, Ninth Quarterly Report on Besieged Areas in Syria, Janvier 2018, accessible à https://siegewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/pax-tsi-siegewatch-9.pdf

Map No. 10: Yarmouk – Areas of influence between 2016 and 2017

2018: Liquidation. The Islamists go for a bus ride.

On January 5, 2018, Jaysh al-Islam attempted a final offensive against ISIS from Yalda, without success.

Between 2016 and 2018, ISIS gradually imposed its totalitarianism and violence on the camp’s residents, banning the consumption or sale of cigarettes, breastfeeding, applause during weddings, ball games, photography, and the sale of wood for heating, while imposing strict dress codes for both women and men (length of trousers). IS also closed all schools within the camp (August 3, 2016) and prevented any school activities outside its control, while a curfew was imposed during prayer times, for which attendance at the mosque was mandatory. After finding that residents had circumvented the closure of schools in the camp, IS banned all students from attending alternative schools in adjacent towns (March 6, 2018), then forced all residents to attend Sharia law classes (April 16, 2018). Those who violated these rules were flogged, mutilated, or even executed: Musa al-Badawi, accused of being a spy for HTS (February 27, 2018); an unidentified man accused of insulting Allah (April 13, 2018); and Khaled Adnan Ahmed, accused of fighting alongside the regime (April 23, 2018).

In April, sensing increasing pressure from the regime, ISIS evacuated the Martyrs’ Cemetery neighborhood following clashes with the Free Palestine Movement in order to transform it into a military defense zone. [1] [2]

On April 19, 2018, the Syrian regime and its allies (PFLP-GC, Fatah al-Intifada, Liwa al-Quds, Difa’a Al-Watani, Jaysh At-Tahrir Al-Falasteen, Quwaat Der’a Al-Qalamun, etc.) launched a major offensive to recapture the outskirts of Damascus. This was accompanied by intensive and frenzied bombing of the Yarmouk, Tadamon, Hajar al-Aswad, and Yalda by the Russian air force (400 air strikes and the massive use of explosive barrels, mortar shells, and surface-to-surface missiles, including Russian UR-77 “Serpents Gorynysh” destroyers). 5,000 residents of Yarmouk fled to the Yalda-Babbila area, leaving fewer than 1,200 people behind. [3]

The next day, the air force violently struck Jaysh al-Islam positions between Yalda and Hajar al-Aswad, forcing it to withdraw from its front line with ISIS and allowing regime forces to move into the gap. At the same time, regime forces surrounded the camp and made several attempts to capture the area held by HTS with the support of heavy weapons and armored vehicles, but were held back. IS, for its part, fought fiercely on all fronts, against both HTS and regime forces and their allies. [4]

On April 27, a first group of 15 wounded Jaysh al-Islam fighters was evacuated to northern Syria as part of a transitional agreement with the regime, while negotiations continued for the complete evacuation of the area. At the same time, regime forces carried out 165 airstrikes on the area on the same day, burning down around 100 homes in Yarmouk and Tadamon.

On April 29, an agreement between the regime and HTS on the one hand, and the FSA on the other, provided for the imminent evacuation of HTS, Jaysh al-Islam, Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis, Sham al-Rasul, and Jaysh al-Ababil. The Uruba-Beirut checkpoint was transferred to Russian forces, while the Babbila-Sidi Miqdad checkpoint was partially reopened for civilians to pass through.

On May 1, 2018, the 150 HTS fighters and their families (425 people) were evacuated from Yarmouk first from the northern entrance of the camp, followed from May 3 to 7 by the 1,700 fighters from the FSA, Jaysh al-Islam, and Aknaf Beit al-Maqdis factions accompanied by their families (9,250 people out of the 17,000 planned), evacuated from Yalda, Babbila, and Beit Sahem to Al-Bab (Idlib) in seven convoys of 61 buses in total. In parallel with these evacuation operations, the regime continued its intense bombardment of IS positions. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

From May 8 to 13, around 20 residents of Yarmouk seeking to flee the bombing were held for several days by government forces at the Uruba-Beirut checkpoint, most of them over 60 years old, before the militias in charge of the checkpoint opened fire on the crowd, killing three people.

Finally, a new agreement, a secret one this time, between ISIS and the regime planned the evacuation of its 1,200 fighters still stationed in Yarmouk, along with their families (600 people). The evacuation was finally carried out on May 20, 2018, using around 50 buses to transport IS to the desert east of Suwayda. The regime thus regained full control of the Yarmouk camp and its surroundings after more than five years and ten months of clashes and bombings that left 80% of the camp’s buildings and infrastructure destroyed. [11] [12]

On May 22, 2018, the UN reported that an agreement to which it had not been party had led to the displacement of 400 Palestinian refugees to the province of Hama.

In May and June, the regime’s army organized the systematic looting of the camp’s infrastructure and buildings under the supervision of the infamous “Fourth Division,” arresting and summarily executing several residents who tried to resist, including two children: Rami Mohammed Salman (15) at the “Tabah” checkpoint and Mahmoud Bakr in Al-‘Urubeh Street [13]. Some buildings were also set on fire after being looted, as in Lubya, Safad, and Al-Ja’ouneh Streets [14] [15]. In addition, it imposed heavy fines (US$50 to US$150) for passing through the checkpoints, preventing hundreds of residents from accessing their homes [16]. At the same time, the regime prevented residents from recovering the bodies of at least 30 civilians killed during the bombings and left in the rubble [17]. It was not until 2019 that the regime allowed residents to return to Yarmouk.

In July, the Action Group for Palestinians of Syria counted 1,392 victims among its Palestinian residents during the period 2011-2018, their deaths resulting from bombing, siege, sniper fire, or torture in the regime’s prisons. [18]

Thus, Yarmouk was “liberated” by the Assad regime, a great defender of the Palestinian cause…

[1] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Fighting between ISIS and the Free Palestine Movement on the Martyrs’ sector axis in Yarmouk camp, 1 Mars 2018, accessible à https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/post/6700/action-group-for-palestinians-of-syria/fighting-between-isis-and-the-free-palestine-movement-on-the-martyrs-sector-axis-in-yarmouk-camp

[2] Waleed Abu al-Khair, ISIS in Yarmouk prepares for Syrian regime onslaught, Diyaruna, 13 Avril 2018, accessible à https://diyaruna.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_di/features/2018/04/13/feature-03

[3] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Victims and large-scale destruction after the hysterical bombardment of Yarmouk camp, 21 Avril 2018, accessible à https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/post/6981/victims-and-large-scale-destruction-after-the-hysterical-bombardment-of-yarmouk-camp

[4] Siege Watch, Tenth Quarterly Report Part 2 – The Culmination of “Surrender or Die”, Mai 2018, accessible à https://siegewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PAX-report-Siege-Watch-10b.pdf

[5] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Explosive barrels and air raids on Yarmouk camp, and violent clashes on all its axes, 7 Mai 2018, accessible à https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/post/7074/articles/explosive-barrels-and-air-raids-on-yarmouk-camp-and-violent-clashes-on-all-its-axes

[6] Maureen Clare Murphy, Armed insurgents evacuate Yarmouk, The Electronic Intifada, 1 Mai 2018, accessible à https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/maureen-clare-murphy/armed-insurgents-evacuate-yarmouk

[7] Ammar Hamou, Mohammed Al-Haj Ali & Tariq Adely, Parallel evacuations to begin in two besieged pockets as Syrian government moves to clear remaining rebels from capital, Syria Direct, 30 Avril 2018, accessible à https://syriadirect.org/parallel-evacuations-to-begin-in-two-besieged-pockets-as-syrian-government-moves-to-clear-remaining-rebels-from-capital/

[8] Ersin Celik, Evacuation convoy from Syria’s Yarmouk reaches Al-Bab, Yeni Safak, 4 Mai 2018, accessible à https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/evacuation-convoy-from-syrias-yarmouk-reaches-al-bab-3360548

[9] Burak Karacaoglu, Esref Musa & Mahmoud Barakat, 4th convoy leaves Syria’s Yarmouk under evacuation deal, Anadolu Agency, 7 Mai 2018, accessible à https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/4th-convoy-leaves-syrias-yarmouk-under-evacuation-deal/1137840

[10] Ersin Celik, Evacuations remain underway from Syria’s Homs, Yarmouk, Yeni Safak, 9 Mai 2018, accessible à https://www.yenisafak.com/en/world/evacuations-remain-underway-from-syrias-homs-yarmouk-3380935

[11] Middle East Eye, Syrian army moves into Yarmouk after IS evacuation deal, 21 Mai 2018, accessible à https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syrian-army-moves-yarmouk-after-evacuation-deal

[12] The Defense Post, Syrian army says Damascus ‘completely secure’ after taking Yarmouk camp from ISIS, 21 Mai 2018, accessible à https://thedefensepost.com/2018/05/21/syria-army-control-damascus-isis-ousted/

[13] Palestinian Refugees Portal, (ARABE) Camp de Yarmouk : Un deuxième enfant tué par les forces du régime après s’être opposé au « pillage », 26 Mai 2018, accessible à https://shorturl.at/eNev0

[14] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, (ARABE) 70 % des bâtiments et des quartiers du camp de Yarmouk sont détruits ; les pilleurs volent les câbles électriques souterrains, 29 Mai 2018, accessible à http://www.actionpal.org.uk/ar/post/9879

[15] Palestinian Refugees Portal, (ARABE) Camp de Yarmouk : Incendie des maisons et pillage du sous-sol, 4 Juin 2018, accessible à https://shorturl.at/D6iWk

[16] Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, (ARABE) « Des sucreries pour la libération », un nouveau mode de chantage de l’armée du régime contre les résidents du camp de Yarmouk, 31 Mai 2018, accessible à http://www.actionpal.org.uk/ar/post/9899

[17] Palestinian Refugees Portal, (ARABE) Camp de Yarmouk : Des corps sous les décombres des installations de l’UNRWA… Pourquoi n’intervenez-vous pas pour les récupérer? , 30 Mai 2018, accessible à https://shorturl.at/f0KaG

[18]

Photos of various evacuation operations carried out by HTS, factions associated with the FSA, and Islamic State.

Map No. 12: Yarmouk – Areas of influence between May 2 and May 7, 2018

Map No. 14: Yarmouk – Total takeover of Yarmouk by the regime on May 21, 2018

2024: Recovery. Yarmouk, a ghost town.

Over the next five years, only 15,300 residents, 80% of whom were Palestinian refugees, were able to return to their homes (4,500 families) or at least to the ruins of their former homes, after applying for permission to return. This permission was granted sparingly, only to those whose homes were deemed viable and who could provide proof of ownership or other documentation proving their previous residence. Those who had previously been arrested, convicted, called up for military conscription, or had links to the armed factions that had controlled the territory were excluded from the procedure, the latter criterion being entirely subjective and left to the discretion of the Fourth Division agents.

The Rehabilitation Oversight Committee estimated that 40% of the buildings were in good condition, 40% needed reinforcement and repairs, and 20% were completely destroyed and needed to be cleared and rebuilt.

The management of the camp was entrusted to the “General Authority for Palestinian Arab Refugees,” a body under the auspices of the Yarmouk branch of the Ba’ath Party, led by Ali Mustafa. This body was regularly criticized by residents for its inaction and corruption, one of the main problems being the prohibitive prices of real estate and the lack of rehabilitation of vital infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage). The 12 municipal employees were notably accused by residents of blackmail and corruption.

When the regime fell in December 2024, 736 Palestinians from Yarmouk had been taken prisoner and 1,530 killed out of the 1,600 Palestinians from Syria taken prisoner and 3,685 killed since 2011. Among them, 94 members affiliated with Hamas had been executed, including Mamoun Al-Jaloudi. [1] [2]

* * *

Yarmouk is a symbol. The Assad regime must be held primarily responsible for the annihilation of Syria’s largest Palestinian refugee camp, whose violent assault beginning in the second half of 2012 was a continuation of that of the Palestinian camps in Dera’a and Latakia a few months earlier. Contrary to what the regime’s propaganda has repeatedly claimed in order to discredit the popular opposition movements and the armed rebellion, the spread of takfiri/jihadist groups was not the cause and justification for its use of violence, but its consequence: in Yarmouk, Jabhat al-Nusra—along with its offshoots Fatah al-Sham and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – and the Islamic State took advantage of the vacuum and chaos left by the indiscriminate bombing at the end of 2012, followed by the exhaustion of the anti-Assad Palestinian self-defense militias during the two years of siege that followed, to seize a camp that had been transformed into a ghost town without encountering any resistance. And when their task of eliminating any possibility of future resistance was accomplished, the regime systematically moved them elsewhere by bus so that they could attack other rebel pockets or unyielding communities, as was the case with the Druze of Suwayda in July 2018. Throughout the process of destroying Yarmouk, the Palestinian militias loyal to Assad demonstrated their deep corruption and abject complicity in the regime’s crimes. This position, contrary to the interests of Palestinian civilians, can only be explained by these factions’ desire to preserve their existence and their political and military influence: none of them wanted to suffer the fate of Arafat’s Fatah and its fedayeen. Their survival depended on the regime as much as the regime’s survival depended on Iran and Russia. By allying themselves with the latter to crush Yarmouk, they placed themselves on the same level as Hezbollah and Bashar’s shabiha, serving the interests of their masters rather than those of the people. Paradoxically, the true defenders of the Palestinian people of Yarmouk, members of the Coordination Committees and micro-factions who did not give in to either the regime or the Islamists and fought alongside civilians from within the camp, have been virtually forgotten. It is now up for us to restore their memory.

The Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese, and Jordanian peoples are one, and everything that divides them is merely the result of Western colonialism and its maneuvers to prevent progressive Arab forces from prevailing over conservative forces. The point of junction between the four peoples lies on the slopes of the Golan Heights, and none of them can be liberated without the liberation of all. It is up to each of us to understand the meaning of this conclusion, at a time when the Zionist colonial army is seizing the Litani and Ruqqad valleys after having militarily annexed those of the Jordan and Arabah.

[1] The New Arab, Nearly 4,000 Palestinians ‘killed’ in Syria’s brutal war, 28 Mars 2018, accessible à https://www.newarab.com/news/nearly-4000-palestinians-killed-syrias-brutal-war

[2] The New Arab, Assad’s regime executed dozens of Hamas members without trial, intelligence documents reveal, 7 Janvier 2025, accessible à https://www.newarab.com/news/dozens-hamas-members-executed-assads-syria-prisons

REPORTS ABOUT YARMOUK:

• Palestinians of Syria, Between Bitterness of Reality and the Hope of Return – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Juin 2014.
• Palestinians of Syria, The Bleeding Wound – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Février 2015
• Yarmouk Siege has not ended – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, 23 Juin 2015
• Palestinians of Syria, Bloody Diary and Unheard Screaming – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria & Palestinian Return Center, Septembre 2015
• Yarmouk, the Full Truth – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Juillet 2015.
• Palestinians of Syria and The Closed Doors – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, 2017
• Status Report on Yarmouk Camp – The Carter Center, 14 Novembre 2017.
• Yarmouk, The Abandoned Pain – EuroMed Monitor, Juillet 2018.
• Yarmouk Camp set on Fire – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Democratic Republic Studies Center, Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, 22 Avril 2018.
• Status Report on the Conditions of Yarmouk Camp 2024 – Action Group for Palestinians in Syria, Décembre 2024.

The fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024 was an undeniable liberation for millions of Syrians, who suddenly and unexpectedly emerged from fifty years of totalitarian barbarism that had transformed Syria into a field of ruins doubling as a concentration camp archipelago, since which several hundred thousand civilians have disappeared or been forced into exile. However, six months after this historic overthrow, all signs suggest that beyond the coup, the promise of a better future is rapidly fading.

Liberation, not revolution

As early as December 9, Ahmed al-Sharaa proclaimed himself leader of the new Syria, categorically rejecting all forms of power-sharing, decentralization and federalism, while taking care never to use the term democracy, before declaring in an interview with Syria TV on December 15 – just one week after the fall of Assad – that it was now “crucial to abandon the revolutionary mentality”. It is legitimate to ask: When was Al-Sharaa ever revolutionary?

On December 29, Al-Sharaa asserted that no elections could be held for another four years, which is understandable given the deplorable situation of Syrian civil society, but not at all reassuring coming from a person who rejects the very concept of democracy, whatever its form. At the same time, he announced the forthcoming adoption of a new constitution at a hypothetical National Dialogue Conference, which would bring the transition period to a close. At this stage, the most optimistic were still waiting to “see what happens”.

On January 29, Al-Sharaa was appointed President of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Syrian General Command (embodied by himself) at a “Victory Conference”. The Syrian constitution and all the institutions inherited from the Baath Party and the Assad dictatorship were subsequently abolished. No one will regret them.

On February 12, Al-Sharaa set up a 7-member preparatory committee[1] to organize the National Dialogue Conference, which took 10 days to prepare and opened on February 24. It brought together 600 people – many of whom had been invited less than two days earlier by SMS – and excluded any representation from the Syrian Northeast Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces. The discussions lasted just one day, and objectively achieved nothing, apart from a superficial reaffirmation of the needs already formulated by everyone: transitional justice, respect for public and political freedoms, the role of civil society organizations in rebuilding the country, constitutional and institutional reform, respect for national sovereignty and the State monopoly on arms. To this was added a symbolic declaration condemning the Israeli incursion.

On March 2, Al-Sharaa set up a 5-member committee[2] to draft a proposed constitution, which was drawn up in 10 days and adopted on March 13 for a 5-year transitional period. The new constitution stipulates that the president must be of Muslim faith and makes Islamic jurisprudence a pillar of constitutional law, while pledging to “protect minorities”, as Bashar al-Assad had also pledged. Four days later, several hundred Alawite civilians were massacred on the coast.

On March 29, Al-Sharaa dissolved the provisional government led by Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir, replacing it with a Transitional Government and appointing 23 ministers[3], nine of them from HTS. With civil society insisting on respect for diversity and women’s rights, Al-Sharaa appointed the only woman in the government, also a Christian, to the post of Minister of Social Affairs. If he’d wanted to be cynical, he couldn’t have done a better job. In addition, all ministers are now appointed directly by the President, while the position of Prime Minister has been abolished. It should be pointed out that a presidential regime without a prime minister is not very different from a monarchy.

In less than three months, Ahmed al-Sharaa has subtly and without opposition established himself as head of state, implementing a presidential regime that can best be described as autocratic.

Political transition in the shadow of the Astana agreements

Since 1970, Syria has followed in the footsteps of its Russian sponsor. If we are familiar with the Russian system of power and analyze the Syrian system under Assad, we discover the same modes of predation, plunder and clan-based corruption, the same cynical contempt of the loyalist elites for the majority of the people, the same policy of abandonment and voluntary impoverishment of the country, but also and finally the same collective cult of the leader, Even if he clearly lacks charisma. Ironically, Assad came to power at the same time as Putin, becoming both his copy and his disciple. Since the start of the popular revolution in 2011, Assad has acted exactly as Putin does or would do in his own country in the event of an insurrection, by denying the very existence of the revolt and causing half the country’s population to die, disappear or flee, rather than engaging in any semblance of reform that might win back a modicum of popular support. Obstinacy and criminal denial are what Assad and Putin have most in common. The only real difference between them is that Putin has not yet experienced a full-scale popular uprising, and has therefore not had the opportunity to deploy his totalitarian know-how to the full.

In reality, nothing could be worse than the Assad regime, and the only valid comparison would be with the Stalinist dictatorship. The model remains Russian, always. Consequently, the shadow of Russia will not cease to hang over the lives of Syrians overnight. What’s more, it’s legitimate to think that Assad’s downfall could only have been achieved with Putin’s cooperation or consent. Before crying conspiracy, let’s recall a few facts we all know.

Russia has no friends, only clients, vassals and debtors. Syria has lived on Russia’s and then Iran’s credit for several decades, and their interventionism in the Syrian civil war was motivated by the need to repay the debts contracted by the Assad clan. Like the United States, Turkey and the Gulf petro-monarchies, each has placed its pawns on the Syrian chessboard, modifying alliances and geostrategic priorities according to circumstances and their fluctuating interests. Against their will, or even without their knowledge, Syrian communities and factions have become the proxies of a game that has quickly overtaken them. And any attempt to detect a logic based on polarized alliances, axes or camps with clear demarcations is bound to be misguided or mistaken. There are no friendships or solidarities between states, only opportunities and maneuvers.

From the outset of the popular uprising in 2011, Iran and Hezbollah were the first to intervene to protect the Syrian regime and keep control of the routes between Iraq and Lebanon, while developing their military-commercial hold in Syria. The USA, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, with logistical support from Jordan, Great Britain and Israel, intervened in parallel, supplying arms to nearly fifty groups linked to the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian opposition embodied by the Syrian Interim Government in exile (in Turkey), including Islamist groups linked to the al-Nosra Front and united from 2015 under the umbrella of the Army of Conquest. Qatar and Turkey are thus among the main creditors of the al-Nosra Front (2012-2017), then Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (2016-2017) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (2017-2025).

With the Russian intervention, the capture of Kobane and the Paris attacks by the Islamic State in 2015, the strategies of both sides have evolved. The Paris attacks, following on from Assad’s release of Islamist prisoners in 2011, largely contributed to the international community turning its gaze away from the regime’s barbarity to focus on the jihadist scarecrow. Each has thus justified its intervention in Syria by the fight against the Islamic State: the United States gradually withdrew its support for Salafist groups to redirect it in favor of the Kurdish YPG/YPJ, then the FDS, with a focus on the fight against the Islamic State, while Russia sent its Wagner mercenaries to recruit Syrians into the “ISIS hunters” battalion before sending them to secure the regime’s oil farms or serve as cannon fodder in Libya (which Turkey also did). But in reality, the Islamic State was struck with one hand and fed with the other by Turkey, Russia and the Assad regime alike, which never ceased to dispose of jihadist cells as it suited them, moving them from right to left to commit atrocities to divert attention from their own crimes and intrigues, destabilizing certain areas or populations that bothered them, or to legitimize the use of force where they lacked sufficiently valid reasons. The jihadist is a practical tool.

And contrary to popular belief, Russia, the United States and its allies (Jordan, Israel and Turkey) have not clashed militarily on Syrian soil[4]. On the contrary, in 2016 and 2017, the US, Russia and Turkey reached an agreement to set up joint air operations aimed at striking Islamic State and al-Nosra Front[5] [6]positions. Following on from this, Russia signed agreements with the USA, Israel and Jordan in 2017[7] [8] to keep the Islamists (Hezbollah and Islamic State) out of the Golan Heights and the Jordanian border, which led to the recapture of Deraa by the Syrian regime and Russia in 2018, culminating in the elimination of the Islamic State pocket in the Yarmouk basin and the surrender of the Deraa rebels as well as their integration into the normalization processes with Assad. It should be noted that all the agreements signed by Russia were signed with the consent of Bashar al-Assad[9]. Without going into further detail, it is quite clear that in the Syrian context there has never been any real duality between the “axis of evil” and the “axis of resistance”.

As early as 2015, two influential figures close to the Syrian and Russian regimes, Randa Kassis and Fabien Baussart, had begun suggesting the implementation of a peace process for Syria at a conference in Astana, Kazakhstan. After two years of fruitless talks in Geneva under the aegis of the UN, Astana finally established itself in 2017 as a negotiating space between Russia, Turkey, Iran, the Assad regime and a dozen Syrian rebel factions, led by Jaysh al-Islam, with the UN relegated to observer status. Russia and Turkey clearly showed their leadership in the discussions, with Russia even proposing a draft constitution for the future “Republic of Syria”, introducing a decentralized, federalist and secular system that would abolish Islamic jurisprudence as the source of law.  Turkey, the Arab League, the pro-Turkish opposition and Al-Assad were categorically opposed to any form of federalism. To better understand the content and outcome of these talks in the light of recent events, it may be useful to recall that Russia had proposed Assad’s resignation back in 2012, but that this proposal had been refused by the USA, Great Britain and France on the pretext that Assad was “about to be overthrown” (sic). It seems that Turkey has taken the lead over Russia in these negotiations between 2019 and 2023, before designing in its corner the modalities of the political transition in Syria. Russia has been stymied by Bashar Al-Assad’s obstinacy in believing himself invincible and obstructing any proposals for constitutional reform, particularly since his return to the international stage at the Arab League summit in Jeddah in June 2023.

On the eve of the regime’s fall, Russia, Turkey and Iran met in Doha in the presence of 5 members of the Arab League (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar) to declare the end of hostilities. In the wake of this, the Russian air force suddenly halted its strikes after nine years of incessant bombing, and Russian troops peacefully withdrew to their bases in Hmeimim and Tartus, where they remain to this day in application of the Doha agreements. Under these agreements, Russia gave Assad, his clan and his allies guarantees of security and amnesty in exchange for the general withdrawal of his army, while Iran negotiated the protection of Shi’ite holy sites. On the evening of December 7-8, Assad’s inner circle packed their bags, before being efficiently evacuated by plane from Syria to Russia and the Gulf States, including Bashar Jaafari, the main negotiator of the Astana agreements and Syria’s ambassador to Russia[10]. All without Israel shooting down their aircraft in flight, obviously.

As early as December 29, 2024, Al-Sharaa declared that Syria shared deep strategic interests with Russia, evacuating out of hand its manifest complicity with the Assad regime and the latter’s responsibility for the massacre of thousands of civilians since 2015[11].

At the end of January 2025, a Russian delegation led by Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Russian Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev came to Damascus to set the framework and criteria for further bilateral relations. Al-Sharaa then laid down its conditions, demanding financial compensation for the crimes committed and the extradition of Assad to Syria, knowing full well that Russia would never agree.

At the beginning of March, just as the massacres on the coast had driven hundreds of Alawite civilians to take refuge on the Hmeimim base, Russia hypocritically offered its help to stabilize the situation in Syria. The following month saw the beginnings of a new military cooperation with Turkey and Russia, with Al-Sharaa admitting that the bulk of Syria’s military equipment was supplied by Russia, that Syria remained dependent on numerous contracts with Russia in the food and energy sectors, and that its veto power at the United Nations posed a serious threat to the prospect of lifting the sanctions that were heavily affecting the country.

What we can conclude from all this data is that the destiny of the Syrians will remain intimately linked to the desiderata of Erdogan and Putin. We could call this constraint the “Curse of Astana”.

What about foreign jihadists?

First, a few biographical and contextual facts.

Ahmed al-Sharaa was born in 1982 in the same place as Osama bin Laden – Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – and lived in Syria between 1989 and 2003. Before the start of the American invasion of Iraq, he went to Baghdad, where he joined the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda, which its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had just founded after pledging allegiance to Bin Laden. Arrested in 2006, he then spent five years in American prisons. Released after bin Laden’s elimination on May 2, 2011, his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri sent al-Sharaa to Syria in August to establish the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, in collaboration with the Islamic State in Iraq then led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As fate would have it, at exactly the same time, Bashar al-Assad amnestied and released hundreds of Islamists from Sednaya prison, including a number of notorious militants[12] who simultaneously set up, within a quarter of their release, the main Salafist groups responsible for the fragmentation and subsequent Islamization of the Free Syrian Army (FSA): Liwa al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham.

In the world of Islamist armed groups, armed confrontations, wars of power, alliances of circumstance and recompositions have followed one another unceasingly, culminating in large-scale mergers in 2017 within the Syrian National Army (Jaysh al-Watani as-Suri) and the Levant Liberation Organization (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS), under the aegis of Turkey. These recompositions coincide with international negotiations within the framework of the Astana process mentioned above. This was the moment when a number of Islamist factions, faced with a stalemate in their trench warfare with the Assad regime, were prompted to change their strategy and adopt a nationalist and revolutionary rhetoric, while cleaning up on their most radical wings. Al-Sharaa’s associate and accomplice since 2011, Anas Hassan Khattab, held the position of HTS intelligence officer[13], a position he retains in the Syrian government. In this position he was responsible for eliminating HTS rivals in the Idleb pocket, notably Hurras al-Din and DAESH cells, an operation he carried out in collaboration with Turkish and US intelligence services.

Their jihadist approach was then gradually abandoned in favor of a political and technocratic management of the areas under their control, embodied in particular by the new Syrian Salvation Government. Clearly, Turkey and Russia exerted a major influence on the evolution of the Syrian rebellion at this time, even though the two main factions forming HTS did not participate in the Astana negotiations[14]. Nevertheless, no one is deceived by the role played by the two imperialists in this cynical game of chess.

At that time, Ahmed al-Sharaa was still Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, and whatever his populist strategy of “Syrianization” to become a credible interlocutor on the international stage, everyone knows very well that he could never have kept control of the situation without keeping at his side the jihadist dogs of war that have always formed the core of his troops. And among them, the hundreds of international jihadi hitmen whom he would need to thank should he win the final battle to topple Al-Assad.

This is precisely what happened after the fall of the regime. In late December 2024, Al-Sharaa appointed several Syrian and foreign jihadists[15] and war criminals from its inner circle to positions of authority in the new army, referring to the forthcoming dissolution of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group as a precondition for lifting sanctions against the HTS leadership and Syria. A month later, 18 armed factions declared that they were disbanding to join the new national army, although no official list of the factions concerned was made public.

In concrete terms, hundreds of criminals benefited from a general amnesty and the normalization of jihad. A month later, the transitional government announced that it was considering granting citizenship to foreign anti-Assad fighters who had lived in Syria for several years, a decision that would not prevent the lifting of sanctions against Syria, even though this appeared to be a central demand on the part of the United States.

Rewarding its mercenaries seems more important than finally alleviating the suffering of Syrians: normalizing international jihad or Syrian revolution, Al-Sharaa seems to have chosen. We can also read in the background that the new strongman of Damascus may not have a complete choice, and that after years of trying to purify his ranks of the most extremists following the wise advice of his Turkish godfather, nobody knows better than he does that the only way to continue reigning supreme over a furious horde is to keep it close to you and share pieces of the feast with it. Nor is he unaware that many jihadists want him dead, especially now that he’s shaking hands with all their sworn enemies.

To illustrate this nepotism, the provisional government announced a few days earlier that it had begun the process of revoking the citizenship of almost 740,000 foreign pro-Assad fighters, including Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans, Pakistanis and Lebanese. Where there’s a will, there’s a way. Rather than guaranteeing justice for all crimes committed against Syrians, Al-Sharaa’s decision confirms that all foreign mercenaries are not treated equally. Hence, his own can continue to persecute infidels and heretics in peace.

Sectarianism and tribalism: the twin scourges of Syria

When Turkey whispered in Al-Sharaa’s ear that federalist demands must not be given free rein, it was a clear message not only to the armed Kurdish factions, but also to all other armed and political forces drawn from minorities. Everyone immediately thought of the Alawites and the Druze. The former have no armed factions attached to communal demands, apart from the remnants of the regime who are still hiding here and there, but who neither represent nor protect their community. The latter, on the contrary, benefit from powerful community self-defense structures embodied by more than twenty factions committed to protecting the integrity, interests and cultural identity of their community, while enjoying solid solidarity networks among Druze communities abroad, particularly in occupied Palestine, Lebanon and among the diaspora in the rest of the world.

For the new authority in Damascus, the three communities represent a considerable balance of power and diplomatic stakes, and even a threat to the hegemonic, centralized and mono-confessional state project defended by Al-Sharaa and its main international sponsors: Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Russia, the United States and Israel are on the lookout to exploit the three communities’ demands for autonomy or decentralization, while Europe and the UN are eternally applying the same paternalistic schemes that would have us believe that minorities need protectors – and therefore a protectorate – even though a majority of the populations we’re talking about don’t wish to be chaperoned or protected by foreign powers. But whatever the true opinion of the various populations, the sectarianism that the Assad regime has promoted for several decades continues to prevail over any egalitarian or democratic consideration. Conspiracy theories, binary analyses and even analyses clearly based on sectarian or xenophobic biases combine with the aggressive propaganda of the various imperialisms to produce a constant media noise in which it is impossible to see clearly and keep a cool head. In contrast to 2011, when instant communication was still relatively undeveloped, social networks are now joining the traditional media in conveying and giving resonance to the most implausible rumors, which are nonetheless credible enough to incite anyone to violence and denial of the crimes committed. This is how, when the regime fell, the paranoid fantasies of the West about the massacre of minorities came true in part, like self-fulfilling prophecies, but less suddenly than predicted.

Before continuing, it is absolutely essential to distinguish between the scenario of the Syrian Coast massacres in early March and the violent confrontations targeting the Druze community in early May. In the former case, it was the remnants of the deposed regime, united in groups called the “Coastal Shield Brigade”, the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria” and the “Syrian Popular Resistance”[16], who initiated the confrontation with the central authority in Damascus. Several sources suggest that these groups, made up of war criminals and torturers who remained loyal to Assad, were supported by Russia and/or Iran in an attempt to foment a takeover of power on the coast, or even beyond. In any case, these few hundred remnants launched a coordinated offensive against checkpoints, government buildings and hospitals, seizing entire districts in the towns of Jableh, Baniyas and Qardaha and indiscriminately attacking civilians and the Security forces who had arrived to put an end to the insurgency. In the bosom of General Security and in response to its call for volunteers on Telegram[17], thousands of radical fighters more or less affiliated to Salafist groups, themselves more or less affiliated to the Syrian National Army and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, rushed to the coast with the intention of punishing loyalists as well as the entire Alawite civilian community from which they hail. Among these, there are still groups that have not disbanded, and are even hostile to Al-Sharaa, but regard General Security as one of the armed wings of the Sunni community seeking revenge. The loyalist insurrection and the ensuing ethno-confessional cleansing resulted in the massacre of between 823 and 1659 civilians and the death of around 260 fighters on each side[18], with both sides participating in the massacre of civilians.

In the second case, it all started with the broadcasting of a false recording insulting the Prophet Mohammed and attributed to a Druze clerick, Marwan Kiwan. From a polemic on social networks, the situation quickly evolved into a sectarian and xenophobic riot at Homs University, initiated by petro-engineering student Abbas Al-Khaswani, who had taken part in the bloody offensive against the Alawite community the previous month. This student was filmed delivering a hate speech against the Druze, Alawites and Kurds, followed by a mob of students circulating around the university grounds, randomly attacking seemingly non-Muslim students. The transitional government initially thanked the rioters for their religious zeal in defense of the Prophet, before timidly denying the authenticity of the audio recording. In the 48 hours that followed, armed groups stormed the predominantly Druze (and Christian) towns of Jaramana, Sahnaya and Ashrafiyet-Sahnaya, although it is not clear who these groups were composed of. However, a number of corroborating sources point the finger at networks of Bedouins and Islamist fighters from Deir Ez-Zor, Dera’a and Ghouta. In response, Druze factions in Suwayda mobilized and a convoy set off on the road to Damascus to support local factions in Sahnaya. The convoy was then ambushed, resulting in the death of more than forty Druze fighters, before a further ten villages in the Suwayda region were attacked for three days by groups from Dera’a and the region’s Bedouin tribes. General Security finally deployed its forces all around the governorate to prevent further groups from entering from Dera’a, but this stranglehold on the region was accompanied by pressure on Druze leaders to agree to the disarmament of factions and the entry of General Security forces into Suwayda, which was refused. In exchange, an agreement was reached on the activation of the police and General Security in the governorate, on the sole condition that all its members be from the region. When General Security withdrew from the only village it had occupied, residents found their homes and holy places burnt and looted. Two days after the end of hostilities, dozens of Suwayda students left their universities in Damascus and Homs, while the road to Damascus remains threatened by armed groups who have fired on vehicles and placed a checkpoint under their control, while General Security seemed powerless or complicit. At the same time, the transitional government has surprisingly appointed three Bedouin tribal leaders from Deir Ez-Zor to head the intelligence, anti-corruption and supreme council of Syrian tribes and clans[19]. It’s legitimate to wonder whether this is voluntary gratification or the result of blackmail and pressure tactics exerted by the powerful Bedouin tribes of the Al-Uqaydat confederation to reclaim a slice of the cake.

What these events say about Syria today is that you can’t remain President of Syria without, on the one hand, exacerbating intra-community prejudices and tensions in order to retain control over the regions, and, on the other, being endorsed by the country’s most reactionary forces and their allies abroad. It also demonstrates that Syrian society has not yet healed, nor is it likely to do so in the near future, from the diseases of sectarianism and the clanism that goes with it. After decades of intellectual regression and depoliticization accomplished with the whip of the Ba’ath’s national socialism, Syria has gradually returned to its pre-existing tribal and feudal reflexes. In this fertile breeding ground, the Islamic model – which rejects secularism, democracy and popular representation – once again gives free reign to the heads of large families (sheikhs), warlords and other Emirs, whose ability to impose a balance of power will determine their proximity to this power and their legitimacy in sharing its usufruct. Al-Sharaa’s own seizure of power demonstrated that all it takes to be legitimate is to be the strongest. And whoever can demonstrate military strength as well as loyalty will be duly thanked. This is what the leaders of the armed groups who fought for the fall of the regime have obtained, and who have agreed to dissolve their groups within the national army. It’s also what the Al-Uqaydat confederation may have just obtained, after responding to the call to teach the “heretics” of Suwayda a lesson, while agreeing to withdraw once the government had obtained an initial compromise from the Druze leaders.

The virile, archaic adventure of crossing the desert to subjugate unsubmissive neighbors in order to demonstrate allegiance to the sultan and his pashas reflects a return to the feudal model that preceded the French colonial mandate. What distinguishes it, and gives the current situation an all the more terrifying dimension, is the persistence of the racist and genocidal dehumanization practices introduced by the Western colonialists, adapted to the local context by the jihadists[20] since the 1980s and brought to a climax by the Assad dictatorship. Perhaps the most notable expression of these new modes of virilist terror is the filming of Alawite men barking while Druze men have their moustaches shaved, before taking them away in shackles to an unknown destination. In truth, there is nothing to distinguish this racist practice from that of Israeli soldiers against Palestinian Arabs, which reinforces the idea that it is indeed an import from the West. Thus, a significant part of the younger generation of Sunni Muslims who did not participate in the 2011 revolution but grew up during the civil war seem to be following a similar path of fascization to that of Bashar’s shabiha[21], notably by flooding news feeds and social networks with sectarian publications and comments advocating revenge and murder in the name of defending their allegedly threatened ethno-confessional identity. The paranoid logic of believing that everyone around you wants to destroy you naturally induces a reflex of withdrawal into oneself and around the charismatic leader who is supposed to guarantee your protection. So it’s not surprising to see Al-Sharaa presented by Sunni Muslims – especially the younger ones – as the providential hero of a revolution carried out exclusively by and for their community, while other communities are denied their participation in the revolution against Assad. The Revolution of all Syrians appears to have been hijacked by apologetic and mystical discourses presenting HTS’s seizure of power as a divine achievement, likened to the return of the Umayyads for some, or the Ottomans for others.  It’s the Ummah rewarded. We shouldn’t be surprised, therefore, that Al-Sharaa celebrated its victory at the Umayyad Mosque, and that old takfirist Imams such as Sheikh Adnan al-Arur – who is known for systematically peppering his sermons with interfaith hatred – are invited back to Syria after years of exile and welcomed there as masterminds of a Sunni revolution that would have prevailed over “45 years of minority rule[22]”. Meanwhile, in the shadows, a majority of moderate, progressive and pacifist Sunni Muslim Syrians – including the federalist Kurds – are once again essentialized by the extremism of a minority that agitates in the spotlight, and holds power by force of arms.

The ultra-confessional interpretation of social and political relations by fundamentalist clerics, to which members of the government and their supporters continue to belong, leads to dangerous simplifications that result in the Assad family being absolved of responsibility for its dictatorship by an entire community, the Alawites, or even all the minorities associated with them: Shi’ites, Druze, Ismailis or even the Murshidis[23], of whom hardly anyone ever hears, but of whom a dozen members have been executed since December by “unidentified individuals” in Latakia, Hama and Homs.  Similarly, several hundred civilians, including children and women, have been murdered since the fall of the regime, particularly in the Homs countryside where some villages have seen several of their residents executed on the same day by armed groups intervening as part of or alongside the “security operations” carried out by General Security[24]. So it’s not a revolution that has been taking place in Syria since December 2024, but the revenge of 50 – 60% of Syrians against everyone else. As a result, we can better understand the new authority’s reluctance to implement the transitional justice mechanisms needed to complete the revolution: not only is this not a priority, since it would highlight the persecution of all communities without exception, but also because it would lead to many of the new authority’s representatives themselves being incriminated and prosecuted for their crimes [25].

No transitional justice, no peace

The demand for justice was pounded out by the collectives of families of the disappeared from the very first hours after the fall of the regime, when the world was pretending to discover for the first time the extent of the horror it had represented. Syrian society, which has suffered violence without being in a position to inflict it, is unanimous: no social peace or regime that respects Syrians can exist without transitional justice. If Syrian communities are to heal from half a century of dictatorship and live together once again, the representatives of the new government have no choice but to arrest as quickly as possible all the dignitaries of the regime and all those who actively participated in the disappearance, torture and murder of tens of thousands of Syrians. Obviously, when we refer to justice, we’re not speaking of summary executions, show trials, closed-door hearings and public killings that reproduce the traumas generated by Takfirist barbarism, but of transparent justice that respects the fundamental principles of the right to defense and the dignity of the accused. Avenging blood and humiliation with blood and humiliation is not what Syrian society needs. On the contrary, in order to regenerate itself and emerge from the cycle of violence, it needs to demonstrate fairness and integrity, but also severity, towards those who have shown nothing but sadism and cruelty towards it. The objective must remain resilience, not the mere primary satisfaction of revenge instincts.

It is also clear that the systematic prosecution of all members of the deposed regime’s army and militias is not possible and would be an extremely dangerous undertaking, leading to large-scale purges and endless settling of scores. A very instructive interview with the Director of the Syrian National Network for Human Rights, Fadel Abdul Ghani, published by the Syrian media Enab Baladi[26], describes the transitional justice process that could potentially be implemented in Syria. In it, Abdul Ghani distinguishes between a judicial component and a civil component, the latter taking the form of “Truth and Reconciliation” commissions. He estimates the number of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity linked to the former regime at 16,200, 90% of whom would be military personnel, and considers that only first- and second-rank army officers could be concerned by criminal proceedings, while third- to sixth-rank officers would be included in the program of reconciliation commissions. Non-military officials, including businessmen, would not be exempt from prosecution.

It is currently impossible to know whether this coherent framework has been accepted and implemented by the new authorities. Beyond the brief communication from the Ministry of the Interior on its Telegram feed at the time of their arrest, there is no transparent mechanism for determining the fate of those under investigation. No special court has been mentioned, nor any judicial deadline. For the past four months, the self-proclaimed government has shown a deplorable lack of commitment to this issue, and the impunity enjoyed by some of the former regime’s high-ranking criminals is helping to erode Syrians’ confidence. The diplomatic evacuation of the Assad clan to Russia and the United Arab Emirates was already a first betrayal of the Syrians and the Revolution. The appointment of a whole series of takfirists and war criminals to positions of responsibility, while promising foreign takfirists access to citizenship, was a second.

Beyond these highly flawed decisions taken in the name of short-term stability, the new authority has also arrested a number of notorious criminals from the former regime, only to release them due to “lack of evidence”, “ regularizing” their situation or even granting them outright amnesty. The best example is undoubtedly that of the Commander-in-Chief of the National Defense Forces (Quwat ad-Difa’a al-Watani), Fadi Ahmad aka “Fadi Saqr”, who is directly responsible for numerous massacres, the best known of which is that of Tadamon in April 2013, or that of Talal Shafik Makhlouf, Commander-in-Chief of the Republican Guard and Director of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces, responsible for the murders of numerous demonstrators during the peaceful protests in Douma, Harasta, Nawa and Dera’a in 2011. To these can be added the cases of Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, former Minister of Communications and then Prime Minister, and Mohammad al-Shaar, former Minister of Interior[27], as well as a number of other high-ranking figures in the repressive apparatus of the Assad regime, who have since benefited from so-called “regularization” measures in exchange for their collaboration. Thus, on February 7, 2025, the residents of Tadamon reacted angrily to Fadi Saqr’s visit to the scene of his own crimes in the company of General Security officials, with the stated aim of “coming clean” by denouncing his former accomplices[28].  Two months later, the authorities were conspicuous by their absence from the commemoration of the April 16 massacre, while no security perimeter or forensic investigation of any significance has been set up on the block of buildings that served for several years as the National Defense’s “execution zone”, and where mass graves still undoubtedly exist. On the contrary, Fadi Saqr was appointed to head a reconciliation commission sent to the Syrian coast following the massacres of early March, a position from which he negotiated the release of former Assad regime officers arrested on that occasion. To say the least, empathy and consideration for the trauma of victims and survivors are not hallmarks of the new authorities. More recently, other notorious servants of the ousted regime have continued to make public appearances and use their privileged social position, even ostentatiously appearing alongside representatives of the new authorities[29].

Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the new authorities ostensibly disregarded the file on prisoners and the disappeared[30], leaving families without support or answers[31], while neglecting for many weeks to protect the archives of over 800 security services and places of detention, before finally deciding to partially restrict public access[32]. The al-Marjeh square in Damascus, where relatives of the disappeared used to meet in the weeks following the fall of the regime to support each other and gather information, was suddenly cleared of hundreds of photos of the disappeared in January as part of a vast clean-up campaign initiated by the Civil Defense and entitled “Damascus, we’re back”, while a collective called ‘The Hands of Mercy’ caused a scandal by covering the inscriptions left by inmates on the walls of a prison with paintings in praise of the revolution, with the prior approval of the authorities. The indifference and negligence of the latter, or even their eagerness to wipe the slate clean, is not reassuring, even if the most optimistic find good reason to persuade themselves that it’s normal and natural for things to take time, that the authorities are doing their best or that the processes underway offer encouraging signs. With five months to go since the fall of the regime, this persistence in relativism and lack of critical judgment regarding the carelessness, but also the nature and liabilities of most of the representatives of the new state apparatus, has become almost naïve and reckless. As for the relatives of victims and missing persons, they continue to be animated by the same hope that has enabled them to survive all these years. Nothing is really being done, in action or in words, to enable them to find peace.

Syria, a deprived society in the grip of Islamist neo-conservatism

The disastrous state in which Assad has left the country testifies not only to the incredible resistance and resilience of the Syrian people, but also to the inestimable capacity of human beings to survive in the most abominable circumstances. When we look at the Syrian economy, we realize just how devastated the country is and how much its infrastructure has been destroyed. And when we say destroyed, the word is inadequate: Syria is a hollowed-out, rusting wreck whose skeleton was already beginning to be eaten away before the fall of the regime. The regime’s soldiers were selling furniture and looted goods to feed themselves, and when the end came, they didn’t even wait for the enemy to approach before abandoning their weapons and uniforms, while the population was already rushing into all public buildings to loot absolutely everything they could. What’s most astonishing about the Syria afterwards is the absolutist nature of the looting: it’s not just the furniture that’s been taken away, but also the cables, pipes, doors, windows, tiles and bricks that have been ripped out, and now also the metal beams, bricks and breeze-blocks that make up the very structure of the buildings. Let’s not even mention vehicles (including tanks) and trees, which have been methodically removed or chopped up, transforming the entire public domain into a wild wasteland. And if you look closely at the cities and districts razed to the ground by the bombs, you’ll see that every single building in ruins has been absolutely stripped of every single small object, as if every single one of the thousands of apartments demolished in this way had been conscientiously purged of everything it contained. This was carried out by the regime’s own agents and soldiers, as certain districts were off-limits until the fall of Assad. Between Damascus and the governorate of Suwayda, the looters went so far as to knock down high-voltage pylons, cutting them up and severing the power cables that supply thousands of homes with electricity. Everywhere, it’s hallali[33] and the smallest piece of the beast has a value.

Looting is one of the main afflictions plaguing the new Syria. The phenomenon existed before the fall of the regime and cannot be blamed on the new authorities, although it has only increased and absolutely nothing seems to have been done to put a stop to it or to protect the infrastructure. The only progress that could put an end to this self-sabotage by the Syrian population itself is the restoration of a stable economy, or at least a perceptible improvement in it. Yet it seems that the Syrian Central Bank has decided to apply a risky method, restricting liquidity[34] while refusing to intervene on the exchange rate[35] and curb illegal speculation on the Syrian pound, resulting in intense exchange rate volatility and considerable money losses for Syrians, in a country where 90% of the inhabitants continue to live below the poverty line.  The main beneficiaries are speculators, while neither local investment and production nor exports have increased. The government does not print new currency, nor does it intervene to limit currency exchange to official exchange offices, with hundreds of small traders resorting to this activity to make a profit. Meanwhile, markets have begun to be flooded with low-priced products from Turkey and elsewhere, threatening the already fragile local production[36], while Syrians’ incomes have not seen any significant rise and the unemployment rate exceeds 25%. The new government seems to be relying exclusively on foreign investment. The current situation therefore foreshadows the capitalist predation to come, and with it another form of widespread looting, which will benefit speculators rather than the mass of Syrians. The pattern is well known: just look at the situation in Lebanon and Greece.

From this opportunistic perspective, international diplomacy did not wait two weeks to resume its normal course, as capitalist predators from the Arabian Peninsula and Europe were the first to flock to the presidential palace in Damascus with a view to restoring economic relations with Syria as quickly as possible and making the greatest possible profit from the new regional situation. On December 23, 2024, Qatar was the first foreign state after Turqui[37] to send a delegation to Syria to meet the new Syrian authorities, while Al-Sharaa made his first foreign visit on February 2, 2025, with a much-publicized trip to Saudi Arabia, during which he visited Mecca and introduced his partner Latifa al-Droubi to the world, before flying directly to Turkey[38].  Beyond the show, these visits testify to the desire to place Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the forefront of Syrian foreign policy. The two states plan to take back control of the energy sector by reviving electricity production fuelled almost exclusively by fossil fuels from the Gulf. That’s going to burn lots of gas[39]. Both began by delivering tons of humanitarian aid to Syria the day after their first official meetings, and also pledged to pay Syria’s $15 million debt to the World Bank, which foreshadows major investments: nothing is free. Germany and France were then the first European states to show up at the ex-jihadist’s door on January 3, 2025[40], followed by Italy on the following January 10, the three countries having been the main beneficiaries of Syrian oil exports[41] on the eve of the 2011 revolution.  They were also the first to implement the suspension of asylum procedures for Syrians the day after the fall of the regime, and to advocate the lifting of sanctions against Syria, while France was the first European country to welcome Al-Sharaa on May 7, 2025, despite his continued blacklisting as a terrorist suspect. For Macron, the state of exception is a mode of government, and signing juicy contracts is worth turning a blind eye to the suffering of the Syrian people. All that al-Sharaa has been asked to do is to make a few symbolic statements in favor of the protection of human rights and justice. But like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a declaration is not binding and remains a mere promise whose primary aim is to buy social peace, and to deceive the most credulous liberals. Syria’s economic partners will never bother to make the restoration of trade relations conditional on the strict implementation, under international supervision, of a democratic system representative of Syria’s diversity, and of transitional justice excluding the death penalty and inhuman and degrading treatment. Instead, as mentioned earlier, we’ll just demand an oral commitment from Al-Sharaa to “protect minorities” and “neutralize the Islamic State”, as has already been the case for a decade with Bashar al-Assad. No big deal.

In the capitalist system, it’s all about deals and compromises. The conclusions of the commission of inquiry into the massacres on the Syrian coast can wait a few more months, until the sanctions against Syria are lifted and al-Sharaa can quietly retract its promises once international trade is restored. We are currently witnessing a historic transition towards a fusion of economic liberalism and societal conservatism, such as occurred in the United States under George Bush and his son George W. Bush, but in its Islamic version already in power in Saudi Arabia. So we shouldn’t be surprised if Syria’s fate depends on the relationship between Ahmed al-Sharaa, Donald Trump and Mohammed Ben Salman. Our article is timely, as all three are scheduled to meet in Saudi Arabia in a few days’ time…

Sharia is capitalism-compatible, and so is Ahmed al-Sharaa.

NOTES:

[1]  Maher Alloush (1976, Homs), writer and researcher specializing in political, social and economic issues, as well as Transitional Justice, Hassan al-Daghim (1976, Idleb), graduate in Islamic studies and comparative jurisprudence, Mohammed Mustat (1985, Aleppo), graduate in electronic engineering, political science and Islamic studies, Youssef al-Hijar, Mustafa al-Moussa, pharmacist and member of HTS, Hind Kabawat (1974, India), Master’s degree in Law and International Relations and Houda Atassi, civil engineer with degrees in Architecture and Information Technology.

[2] Abdul Hamid al-Awak, PhD in Constitutional Law; Yasser al-Huwaish, recently appointed Dean of the Faculty of Law at Damascus University; Ismail al-Khalfan, PhD in International Law; Mohammad Reda Jalkhi, PhD in International Law; Bahia Mardini, the only female journalist with a PhD in Law.

[3] Anas Khattab (1987, Rif Dimashq), Minister of Interior; Murhaf Abu Qasra (1984, Hama), Minister of Defense; Asaad al-Shaibani (1987, Al-Hasakeh), Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates; Mazhar al-Wais (1980, Deir Ez-Zor), Minister of Justice; Mohammed Abu al-Khair Shukri (1961, Damascus), Minister of Awqaf; Marwan al-Halabi (1964, Quneitra), Minister of Higher Education; Hind Kabawat (1974, India), the only woman, Minister of Social Affairs and Labor; Mohammed al-Bashir (1984, Idleb), Minister of Energy; Mohammed Yisr Barnieh, Minister of Finance; Mohammad Nidal al-Shaar (1956, Aleppo), Minister of Economy and Industry; Musaab Nazzal al-Ali (1985, Deir Ez-Zor), Minister of Health; Mohammed Anjrani (1992, Aleppo), Minister of Local Administration and Environment; Raed al-Saleh (1983, Idleb), Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management; Abdul Salam Haykal (1978, Damascus), Minister of Communications and Information Technology; Amjad Badr (1969, As-Suwayda), Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform; Mohammed Abdul Rahman Turko (1979, Afrin), Minister of Education; Mustafa Abdul Razzaq (1989), Minister of Public Works and Housing; Mohammed Yassin Saleh (1985), Minister of Culture; Mohammed Sameh Hamedh (1976, Idleb), Minister of Youth and Sports; Mazen al-Salhani (1979, Damascus), Minister of Tourism; Mohammad Skaf (1990), Minister of Administrative Development; Yaarub Bader (1959, Latakia), Minister of Transport; Hamza al-Mustafa, Minister of Information.

[4] Except by proxies.

[5] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/deal-for-joint-military-action-with-us-in-syria-could-elevate-russia-as-well-as-defeat-isis-a7237256.html

[6] https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/russia-and-turkey-agree-deal-coordinate-strikes-syria-1427197601

[7] https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/jordan-and-the-us-russia-deal-in-southern-syria/

[8] https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Israel-Reacts-to-US-Russian-De-Escalation-Agreement-in-Syria.aspx

[9] See the history of Ahmad Al-Awda’s 8th Brigade – https://middleeastdirections.eu/new-publication-med-the-eighth-brigade-striving-for-supremacy-in-southern-syria-al-jabassini/

[10] He is currently still in charge.

[11] Between 4356 and 6456 civilians killed according to airwars.org; 8763 civilians killed according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

[12] Zahran Alloush (founder of Liwa al-Islam in September 2011, which became Jaysh al-Islam in 2013); Ahmad Issa al-Sheikh (founder of Suqour al-Sham in September 2011); Abu Khalid al-Suri and Hassan Aboud (founders of Ahrar al-Sham December in 2011).

[13] Anas Hassan Khattab is also said to be a liaison officer for the Turkish intelligence service (MIT). He is believed to be operating under the control of MIT officer Kemal Eskintan, known to jihadists under the pseudonym Abu Furqan, himself under the orders of Hakan Fidan, then Ibrahim Kalin, heads of Turkish intelligence from 2010 to 2023 and since 2023. After 15 years of close collaboration, Ibrahim Kalin and Hakan Fidan were the first foreign officials to visit Damascus after the fall of the Assad regime. The former was seen praying with Al-Sharaa at the Umayyad Mosque on December 12, 2024, while the latter celebrated Turkey’s victory with Al-Sharaa on the heights of Qassiun on December 22, 2024.

[14] Opposition leaders present in Astana include Mohammed Alloush (Jaysh al-Islam – Army of Islam), Fares Al-Bayoush (Jaysh Idleb al-Harr – Free Army of Idleb), Nasser al-Hariri (Syrian National Coalition of Opposition Forces and the Syrian Revolution), Abu Osama Joulani (Southern Front, made up of 58 rebel factions). Eleven other groups are taking part in the negotiations.

[15] Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib a.k.a. » Abu Hussein al-Urduni » (Jordanian, General de brigade) ; Omar Mohammed Jaftashi a.k.a. » Mukhtar al-Turki » (Turc, General de brigade) ; Abd al-Aziz Daud Khudaberdi a.k.a. » Abu Mohammed al-Turkistani » ou » Zahid » (Chinese ouïghur, General de brigade) ; Abdel Samriz Jashari  a.k.a. » Abu Qatada al-Albani » (Albanais, colonel) ; Alaa Muhammad Abdul Baqi (Egyptian, colonel) ; Moulan Tarson Abdul Samad (Tadjik, colonel) ; Ibn Ahmad al-Hariri (Jordanian, colonel) ; Abdulsalam Yasin Ahmad (Chinois Ouïghur, colonel) …

[16] The leaders of these groups are, respectively, former Assad Republican Guard commander Moqdad Fteha, former head of the Syrian Arab Army’s 4th Armored Division Ghiath Dalla and Mundir W.

[17] Realizing the scale of voluntary participation in the offensive – and no doubt the genocidal chaos that ensued from the very first hours of clashes – the Authorities subsequently announced that this support was no longer necessary.

[18] Figures vary according to the two main sources: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).

[19] Hussein al-Salama as head of intelligence, replacing Anas Khattab, Amer Names al-‘Ali as chairman of the Central Control and Inspection Authority (anti-corruption) and Sheikh Rami Shahir al-Saleh al-Dosh as head of the Supreme Council of Tribes and Clans. All three hail from the town of Al-Shuhayl in the governorate of Deir Ez Zor, which has a population of less than 15,000.

[20] Which are nothing other than an Arab-Muslim version of European fascism.

[21] The chabiha are the regime’s supporters, henchmen and mercenaries, most of whom have been integrated into the National Defense Forces and other paramilitary groups.

[22] In the words of Syria’s new Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani during his speech at the 9th Donors for Syria Conference in Brussels on March 17, 2025.

[23] The Murshidis are a recent religion founded in 1923 in the Latakia region by Salman al-Murshid. This religion derives from Alawism, and its members exist only in Syria, where they are estimated to number between 300,000 and 500,000.

[24] See our mapping of incidents listed by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights on the home page of our website: https://interstices-fajawat.org/fr/accueil/

[25] As is already the case for the Jaysh al-Islam faction, whose members Majdi Nema aka Islam Alloush and Essam Al-Buwaydani aka Abu Hammam were arrested and prosecuted in international legal proceedings before being granted diplomatic immunity.

[26] https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/02/transitional-justice-in-syria-steps-to-diffuse-tension/

[27]  https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/02/former-syrian-interior-minister-mohammad-al-shaar-surrenders-to-authorities/

[28] In the wake of this controversial visit, General Security quietly arrested the commander of the local branch of the National Defense Forces, Ghadeer Salem, then – with more media noise – three of his subordinates, Mundhir Al-Jaza’iri, Somar Mohammed Al-Mahmoud and Imad Mohammed Al-Mahmoud.

[29] These include : Farhan al-Marsumi, chief of a Bedouin tribe in Deir Ez Zor, actively involved in drug trafficking to Iraq in collaboration with Maher al-Assad’s 4th Division and Iranian militias; Agnès Mariam de la Croix, Mother Superior of the Carmelite monastery of “Saint-Jacques le Mutilé” in Homs, an accomplice and active propagandist for the Assad regime; Dr. Tammam Al Yousef, cardiac surgeon and brother of Brigadier General Ali Mu’iz al-Din Youssef al-Khatib, head of the Idleb air force intelligence service, suspected of corruption and embezzlement in cooperation with the Assad regime; Safwan Khair Beyk aka “Safwan Shafiq Jaafar”, mafia boss from Jableh and leader of the National Defense Forces, linked to the Assad family through Bashar al-Assad’s cousins, Mundhir al-Assad and Ayman Jaber – Source: Zaman al-Wasl – https://www.zamanalwsl.net/

[30] The number of missing is estimated between 96,000 and 158,000, including enforced disappearances attributed to the Assad regime, the Islamic State, the Syrian Democratic Forces, armed opposition factions, the Syrian National Army and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

[31] It was only through public appearances and rallies in the three months following the fall of the regime that the families of the disappeared represented by The Syria Campaign obtained an appointment with Al-Sharaa in February 2025 – https://diary.thesyriacampaign.org/my-father-is-still-missing-join-wafas-struggle-to-uncover-the-truth-about-syrias-disappeared/

[32] As early as December 20, 2024, the Association of Detainees and Missing Persons in Sednaya Prison (ADMSP), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry set up by the UN Human Rights Council urged the transitional government to take steps to protect the archives and evidence of mass atrocities – https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-preserve-evidence-mass-atrocities-enar

[33] The hallali is the decisive moment in hunting when the impatient or excited herd of hounds rushes to the exhausted prey to put an end to the hunt.

[34] Withdrawals from ATMs have been frozen, while a large number of civil servants are no longer receiving their salaries.

[35] The exchange rate fluctuated between 10,000 and 12,000 pounds per dollar during the first four months of 2025, compared to a rate of 14,750 pounds before the fall of the regime, 15,000 the day after and an exceptional drop to 8,000 at the beginning of February – ttps://www.sp-today.com/en/currency/us_dollar/city/damascus

[36] https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/02/turkish-goods-undermine-local-products-in-syria

[37] The Turkish embassy in Damascus reopened on December 14 after a 12-year interruption in diplomatic relations, and its foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, officially visited Al-Sharaa on December 22, on the eve of Qatar’s visit.

[38] Syria’s relationship with Turkey must be distinguished from its relationship with Qatar and Saudi Arabia. While the former is characterized more by a form of military and strategic dependence, implying a form of colonial extension and Turkish security hold over Syria, the latter is primarily economic.

[39] The Deir Ali power plant is expected to generate 400 megawatts daily by burning natural gas supplied by Qatar via Jordan.

[40] Ahmad al-Sharaa remains on the international terrorism list with his war name of “Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani”, but the promise of a $10 million reward for his capture has been revoked by the USA.

[41] The main importers of Syrian crude oil in 2010 were Germany (32%), Italy (31%), France (11%), the Netherlands (9%), Austria (7%), Spain (5%) and Turkey (5%).

With the Assad regime having just fallen and the issue of disarming the Druze and Kurdish communities making headlines, it is worth recalling the highly political history of the Druze community in Syria and Lebanon. Here are a few key points.

The Druze are a religious community attached to a heterodox creed of Ismaili Shi’ite Islam, which originated in Egypt under the leadership of Imam Hamza ibn Ali ibn Ahmad in the early 11th century. The Druze faith takes its name from the preacher Muhammad ad-Darazi, although some of his followers do not recognize Ad-Darazi and he was disowned by Hamza ibn Ali before being executed on the orders of the caliph Al-Hakim bi-amr Allah. The Druze prefer to define themselves as “Muwahideen” (Unitarians) or “Banu Ma’ruf” (Children of Maarouf), although the origin of this term remains uncertain.

The Druze religion, like Sufism, takes a philosophical and syncretic approach to faith, recognizing neither the rigid precepts nor the prophets of Islam. Although this belief spread to Cairo under the Fatimid caliphate of al-Hakim, who was deified by the Druze, it was soon persecuted by the rest of the Muslim community after al-Hakim’s death in 1021, and so the Druze were exiled to Bilad el-Cham (present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine), particularly to Mount Lebanon and the Hauran. But it was around the beginning of the 19th century that the Druze community in Hauran gained strength, after a large part of the community had been expelled from Mount Lebanon by the Ottoman authorities. The Hauran mountain was then named jebel al-Druze.

Today, Suwayda governorate is home to the majority of the world’s Druze community, some 700,000 people. The Lebanese Druze are the second largest community, numbering 250,000. In Syria, several Druze settlements also exist in Jebel al-Summaq (Idlib, 25,000 people), Jebel al-Sheikh and al-Juwlan (Quneitra, 30,000 people) and Jaramana (Damascus suburbs, 50,000 people). Finally, outside Syria and Lebanon, the largest Druze communities are to be found in occupied Palestine (Galilee and Mount Karmel, 130,000), Venezuela (100,000), Jordan (20,000), North America (30,000), Colombia (3,000) and Australia (3,000).

The Druze community is structured along traditional clan lines, with large families exerting a dominant influence. Until the mid-18th century, Hauran (or Jabal Druze) was dominated by the Hamdan family, whose hegemony was challenged in the 1850s by Al-Atrash family. The conflict between the two families and their respective allies between 1856 and 1870 was finally settled by the intervention of the Ottoman authorities, who divided the region into four sub-districts, the largest of which was that of Al-Atrash family, comprising 18 villages out of the 62 in Hauran at the time.

Sultan al-Atrash

…then against French colonialism

Sultan al-Atrash first clashed with the French in 1922, when his host, Lebanese Shi’ite rebel leader Adham Khanjar, was arrested at his home in his absence. Sultan demanded his release, then attacked a French convoy believed to be carrying the prisoner. In retaliation for the attack, the French demolished his house and ordered his arrest, but Sultan took refuge in Jordan, from where he led raids against the French forces. Temporarily pardoned and allowed to return home, he led the Syrian revolt of 1925-1927, declaring revolution against the French occupiers. Initially victorious, the Great Syrian Revolt was finally defeated by the French army and Sultan was sentenced to death. He took refuge in Transjordan, before being pardoned again and invited to sign the Syrian Independence Treaty in 1937. He received a hero’s welcome in Syria, a reputation he retains to this day. When the treaty failed to secure Syria’s independence in May 1945, the Syrians once again revolted against the French occupiers, who sent in the army and killed around a thousand Syrians. In Hauran, the French army was defeated by the Druze under the command of Sultan al-Atrash, before the British intervention that put a definitive end to the French mandate on April 17, 1946.

Editor’s note: the commitment of the Al-Atrash family must be seen in the context of Arab conservatism and nationalism, which did not challenge traditional clan, patriarchal and authoritarian structures. However, their constant opposition since the 19th century to foreign imperialism and the abusive authority of central powers made them precursors in the anti-colonial struggles of the second third of the 20th century. Their struggle can also be seen as carrying within it the seeds of community struggles for autonomy and self-defence, which will be discussed in Suwayda in the recent period (years 2010-2020). Sultan al-Atrash is also known for his stance in favor of multiculturalism and secularism.

Resistance to Israeli colonialism

When the British transferred their domination of Palestine to Zionist settlers in Europe and America, and the latter began ethnically cleansing the Palestinians from December 18, 1947, Sultan al-Atrash called for the formation of the Arab Liberation Army of Palestine. Under the command of future Syrian president Adib Shishakli, this army entered Palestine from Syria on January 8, 1948, as part of the First Arab-Israeli War.

Only a year apart, on May 1, 1949, Druze intellectual and political leader Kamal Jumblatt founded the Progressive Socialist Party, then he called for the first convention of Arab Socialist Parties in May 1951 and began to establish links with the Palestinian Left Resistance, embodied by the Fedayeen movement. Jumblatt then turned the PSP into an armed movement integrated into the Lebanese National Movement, a coalition of 12 left-wing parties and movements founded in 1969 to support the Palestine Liberation Organization, itself created five years earlier and then led by Yasser Arafat. Jumblatt is the leader of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM).

The entire period between 1952 and 1975 was characterized by growing sectarian tensions between secular left-wing movements – anti-imperialist and pro-Palestinian – and the pro-Western Christian Maronite elites, who dominated the Lebanese political landscape at the time. From 1970 onwards, these tensions were heightened by the significant increase in the number of Palestinian fighters in Lebanon, following their expulsion from Jordan, and leading to a considerable increase in the influence of Palestinian movements in the country. These tensions culminated in the massacres of Palestinian civilians by Christian Phalangists (Kataeb) at Ain el-Rummaneh on April 13, 1975 (30 dead) and at Karantina (between 1,000 and 1,500 dead), followed by the massacre of Christian civilians at Damour (150 to 580 dead) in January 1976.

Editor’s note: We are not here to idealize Kamal Jumblatt’s character, and we believe that leaders should never be heroes. However, we do not believe that Kamal Jumblatt is guilty of any crimes, nor that he has propagated feelings of hatred based on the ethnic or religious affiliation of his opponents, contrary to what has been conveyed by certain media affiliated to the Lebanese right. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any armed movement has at one time or another been associated with or directly involved in the commission of crimes or acts of vengeance. This was notably the case with the Palestinian armed factions, and therefore their allies, as in Damour in January 1976. It’s also important to admit when a leader betrays the interests of his community, as in the case of Kamal Jumblatt’s son, Walid Jumblatt. His political choices following his father’s death and up to the present day are relatively dubious, and he does not seem to us to be worthy of his father’s political legacy.

Armed resistance to authoritarian centralism in Damascus

Amira Abu Bahsas

He was joined by his brother Fadlallah Zein Ad-Din in July 2012. Denounced by informers, they are besieged and Khaldun is killed with 16 other of their companions in Tall al-Maseeh on January 13, 2013. His brother announced his death in a statement ten days later. The Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon organized a ceremony in their honor, and he became the symbol of the revolutionary and opposition movement in Suwayda. On March 21, 2013, his wife Amira Abu Bahsas publicly declared that she too would join her late husband’s battalion, becoming the first woman from Suwayda to join the Free Syrian Army.

During anti-regime demonstrations in Suwayda between 2023 and 2025, Khaldun Zein Ad-Din’s portrait is displayed in Dignity Square, where his parents Sami and Siham actively participated in the protests.

Another form of resistance to Assad’s dictatorship emerged in 2013 in Suwayda, following the forced recruitment of several dozen young men from the region. An influential sheikh in the community, Waheed al-Balous, refused to accept the community’s participation in the war against other Syrians and opposed forced recruitment. He founded the Men of Dignity Movement (“Rijal al-Karami”), which gained in popularity over the years and prevented the conscription of between 30,000 and 50,000 young men from Suwayda.

In 2015, Balous openly denounced the dictatorship, leading to his assassination in a double bomb attack on September 4, 2015. On the evening of his death, riots broke out in the region and the statue of Hafez al-Assad that had stood in Dignity Square was removed. It was never replaced. His brother Raafat, wounded in the attack, temporarily replaced him before giving up his position. Waheed al-Balous’s sons, Laith and Fahd, created a splinter group from Rijal al-Karami, the Sheikhs of Dignity (Sheikh al-Karami), which they intended to be politically more radical than their father’s movement. Despite frequent disagreements, the two movements continued to carry out joint actions, even as Rijal al-Karami drew closer to another major faction, the Forces of the Mountain (Quwwat al-Jabal). In December 2024, they joined the Southern Room for Military Operations, which also included other Druze factions and took part in the liberation of Damascus.

Fahd al-Balous

Editor’s note: While here too we must refrain from idealizing one faction or another, we nevertheless consider that Rijal al-Karami and associated groups have, in recent years, embodied the Druze community’s imperative for self-defense and self-determination. Whether in the face of attempts by the regime’s army to impose itself by force or coercion, in the face of Islamist aggression or in the face of the predation of the gangs that have proliferated in the region, these factions have succeeded in protecting the civilian population and the general interest without committing exactions or abuses of power. Their leaders have generally answered the call of threatened communities and taken a clear stand against any outside force threatening community security. They also acted as protectors of popular demonstrations and revolts, before spontaneously joining the offensive against the regime in December 2024.

Suwayda at the heart of the revolutionary path from 2011 to 2025

Beyond the few emblematic examples of armed resistance to the authoritarian centralism of Damascus, civil society in Suwayda has never ceased to take a critical or hostile stance towards central power and the Assad dictatorship. Contrary to unfounded rumors that regularly portray the Druze as loyal to the regime, numerous examples demonstrate that the community has always succeeded in reconciling its tradition of resistance with a refusal to take sides in a conflict that very early on became confessionalized – with a very large Islamic religious component within the Free Syrian Army as early as 2012 – and which would have resulted in its annihilation.

Samih Choukheir

Naila al-Atrash

It is also necessary to know more about the structure of Druze society to understand that the population is not necessarily subservient to the decisions of a political or spiritual leadership. In Suwayda, religious leadership is embodied by three sheikhs, the “Aql Sheikhs”: Hamoud Al-Henawi, Hikmat Al-Hajari and Youssef Jarboua. The political positions of these three sheikhs are neither identical nor immutable, and their relationship with the Assad regime has varied according to periods and events.

Following the assassination of Waheed al-Balous and the attack on Suwayda by the Islamic State in 2018, the dissensions between the three sheikhs became even more aggravated. Initially neutral or relatively loyal to the Assad regime, they began to become more critical, particularly sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, who took a clearer stance against the regime and gradually established himself as the charismatic leader of the community.

Editor’s note: The positions taken by the spiritual leadership are not binding on the Druze community, which is predominantly secular and does not follow its commandments as may be the case for other religious communities that accept that religion dictates social and political life. Regularly, Druze sheikhs have publicly declared that they support and follow the community’s choices. More recently, Hikmat al-Hajjari’s cautious yet firm stance on Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government, and in particular on the disarmament of factions, has been much criticized by many people, often ignorant of or hostile to the ways of the Druze community, or even hostile to the Druze in general, out of nationalism or religious zeal. Within the community, his positions are also criticized by supporters of factional disarmament, who see it as the main cause of violence within society and seem to trust (a little too much) in the new Islamist central power not to (re)become a threat to the Druze minority…

The Druze, Israel and the Islamists

Muafak Tarif et Benyamin Netanyahu

The other Druze community colonized by Israel is that of the Golan Heights, occupied during the Six-Day War in 1967 and officially annexed in 1981. Of the 130,000 Syrians living in the Golan before the invasion, only 25,000 Druze now live on the plateau, in five communes: Majdal Shams, Buq’ata, Mas’ade, Ein Kenya and al-Gager. However, the Druze of the Golan have never accepted assimilation, and almost 80% of them still refuse to take Israeli citizenship.

Israeli leaders persist in trying to win the sympathy of the Golan Druze and never miss an opportunity to claim that they support Zionism, but reality contradicts the propaganda. When, on July 27, 2024, Hezbollah fired a rocket at a soccer field in Majdal Shams, killing 12 children from the community, the opportunistic visits of Benyamin Netanyahu and Bezamel Smotrich to the site and to the funeral were refused by the residents, who booed and branded them murderers.

Finally, when in December 2024 the Israeli army crossed the 1967 border and invaded the Druze villages of Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh), Zionist as well as anti-Zionist (and campist) propaganda shared the same false information claiming that the residents of Hadar village were in favor of their annexation by Israel. This rumor was initiated by Nidal Hamade, a pro-Hezbollah Lebanese propagandist exiled in France, who posted on his X account a decontextualized video showing a Druze man declaring that he wanted Hadar annexed.

Yet on the same day, representatives of Hadar’s Druze community published a video containing a statement affirming their refusal to be occupied by Israel and denying the false accusations against the Druze.

Unfortunately, rumors often spread more widely than their denials…

Hadar residents’ statement, December 13, 2024, Al-Araby TV

In the weeks leading up to the Islamic State’s bloody attack on Suwayda in July 2018 (258 dead and 36 hostages), Assad ostentatiously withdrew all his troops from the region. Then, after the attack, when the population criticized him for not having intervened immediately to block the road to the Islamic State, he responded that it was the fault of the Druze who refused to send their young men into the army. But worst of all, the Islamic State fighters had been transported by bus from Yarmouk (a Palestinian camp on the outskirts of Damascus) to the Suwayda desert a month before the attack as part of a surrender agreement. And, as if that weren’t enough, in November of the same year, a new agreement was signed with the Islamic State resistance pocket in the Yarmouk basin (on the border with Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights) for a new humanitarian evacuation to the desert in exchange for the release of the Druze hostages taken by the Islamic State after their attack on Suwayda. It should be noted that these two agreements between the regime and the EI were organized under the patronage of the Russians, who had at the same time made a commitment to Israel to keep any threat from Islamists, including Hezbollah, away from its border.

We discuss the attack on Suwayda by the Islamic State in more detail in our first article published in October 2023: «In Southern Syria, the uprising of Dignity has begun«

And to conclude: As Islamists have often been the useful idiots of imperialism on all sides, it should come as no surprise that the Druze of Suwayda are in no hurry to hand over their weapons to the new power in Damascus, since Ahmad al-Sharaa has been the representative of the two Islamist movements, DAESH and Jabhat Al-Nosra, which have violently attacked the Druze over the past decade. And that certainly doesn’t make them Israel’s allies, whatever supporters of Iran and Israel may think.

In the age of social media and information for all and by all, it’s more than ever necessary to build up a reliable list of resources on the subjects you want to analyze and understand. Particularly when it comes to international geopolitics.

This note was prepared by «Interstices-Fajawat«. As an initiative connected to Syrian society, we have put together this note to share our sources of information on Syria. We do not claim that these sources are all impartial or neutral, as we believe that neutrality is often synonymous with blindness or complicity. We ourselves have our own bias regarding our beliefs in revolution and internationalism from below.

Wherever possible, we have indicated the biases and partialities we have identified. We have chosen to retain in the list resources whose analysis we do not share, because they are nonetheless well-informed and transmit first-hand information, which just needs to be taken with great care.

TO READ AND FOLLOW US :

WEBSITES

At the top of the list, the first two categories contain most of the sources whose opinions we share, and which we recommend.

News and Analysis Websites :

• Al Jumhuriya (EN & AR) – based in Germany, Independant Syrian-led – https://aljumhuriya.net/ar/article_types/english/
• Daraj (EN & AR) – based in Lebanon, Independant Lebanese-led – https://daraj.media/en/
• Raseef 22 (EN & AR) – based in Lebanon, Independant Lebanese-led – https://raseef22.net/english/countries/207-syria
• Megaphone News (AR) – based in Lebanon, Independant Lebanese-led – https://megaphone.news/
• Syria Untold (EN) – based in Germany, Independant Syrian-led – https://syriauntold.com/en/
• From the Periphery (EN) – based in UK, Independant & International Media Collective – https://fromtheperiphery.com/
• Antidote Zine (EN) – based in the US, Independant – https://antidotezine.com/
• The Fire This Times (EN) – based in UK – Independant – https://thefirethesetimes.com/

Personnal Blogs (opinions & academic research) :

• Leila Al Shami (EN) – https://leilashami.wordpress.com/
• Elia Joseph Husseini-Ayoub (EN) – https://eliaayoub.com/
• Robin Yassin Kassab (EN) – https://qunfuz.com/
• Yassin al-Haj Saleh (EN) – https://yassinhs.com/
• Zyad Majed (FR & EN) – https://vendredis-arabes.blogspot.com/
• Joseph Daher (FR & AR) – https://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/
• Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi (EN) – https://aymennjawad.org/

Syrian-led Advocacy & Media NGO Websites :

• Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (EN & AR) – based in UK – https://www.syriahr.com/en/
• Pro-Justice (EN & AR) – based in the US – https://pro-justice.org/
• The Day After (EN) –  – https://tda-sy.org/
• Action Group For Palestinians of Syria (EN & AR) – based in UK (Syrian Palestinian) – https://www.actionpal.org.uk/en/
• Syria Direct (EN) – based in Germany – https://syriadirect.org/
• Wanabqa (EN) – based in Canada – https://www.wanabqa.com/
• SIRAJ (EN) – based in France  – https://sirajsy.net/
• The Syrian Archive (EN) – based in the US – https://syrianarchive.org/

Local or specialized information websites :

• Creative Memory of the Syrian Revolution (AR, EN, FR) – based in France, Syrian/Palestinian-led NGO (Amaken) – https://creativememory.org/
• The Syria Report (EN) – Syrian-led – https://syria-report.com/
• Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently (EN & AR) – Syrian-led, anti-SDF bias – https://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/
• Al Marsad (EN) – based in occupied Syria (Golan), Syrian-led – https://golan-marsad.org/
• Suwayda24 (AR) – based in Syria, Syrian-led – https://suwayda24.com/ + https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24
• Rojava Information Center (EN) – based in Syria, pro-PYD bias – https://rojavainformationcenter.org/
• Hawar News Agency (multinlingual) – based in Syria, Syrian-led, pro-PYD bias – https://hawarnews.com/en/
• Rudaw (multilingual) – based in Iraq, pro-KDP bias – https://www.rudaw.net/
• Kurdistan 24 (multilingual) – based in Iraq, KDP owned – https://www.kurdistan24.net/en
• Rojinfo (FR) – based in France, pro-PYD bias – https://rojinfo.com/

General news websites :

• Enab Baladi (EN & AR) – based in Turkey, Syrian-led – https://english.enabbaladi.net/
• The Syrian Observer (EN) – based in Turkey, Syrian-led – https://syrianobserver.com/
• The New Arab (EN) – based in UK, Qatar owned – https://www.newarab.com/tag/post-assad-syria
• Middle East Eye (EN) – based in UK, Qatar owned – https://www.middleeasteye.net/
• Middle East Monitor (EN) – based in UK, Qatar owned – https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/
• Al Majalla (EN) – based in UK, Saudi owned – https://en.majalla.com/
• Syria TV (AR) – based in Turkey, Qatar owned – https://www.syria.tv/
• Al-Hal (AR) – based in the US – https://7al.net/
• Les clés du Moyen Orient (FR) – based in France – https://www.lesclesdumoyenorient.com/
• Orient XXI (FR) – based in France, Independant (NGO) – https://orientxxi.info/fr/mot1.html

ESSENTIAL FACT CHECKING WEBSITE 

Verify Syria (AR & EN) – based in Turkey, Syrian-led NGO 

https://verify-sy.com/

SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS (ex-Twitter/X & Instagram)

⚠️ Some of these accounts can share sometimes BIASED or ACRITICAL (sectarian, pro-Sharaa/HTS, pro-SDF/PYD, western…) content ⚠️

Syria Civil Defense – @syriacivildefence
Syria Mobilization Hub – @thesyriahub
Syria Pixel – @syria_pixel
Syria TV – @syr_television
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression – @scmsyriancenter
Syrian Emergency Task Force – @syrianetf / @ualr_setf
Syrian Eyes – @syrianeyesteam
Syrian Feminist Lobby – @syrianfeministlobby
Syrian Hub Official – @syrianhubofficial
Syrian Network for Human Rights – @snhr
Syrian Print Archive – @syrianprintarchive_
Syrian Revolution Archive – @syrian_revolution_archive
Syrian Revolution Story – @syrian.revolution.story
Syrian Road to Justice – @road2justicesy
Syrian Solidarity Campaign – @syria_solidarity_campaign
Syrian Spot – @syrianspot
Syrian Women For Democracy – @cswdsyr
Syrians for Palestine – @syrians4palestine
Syrians For Truth & Justice – @syrians_for_truth_and_justice
Ta’afi Syria – @taafi.syria
Tastakel Organization – @tastakel
The Fire These Times – @firethesetimes
The New Arab – @thenewarab
The Syria Campaign – @thesyriacampaign
The White Helmets – @the_whitehelmets
Verify Syria – @verify.sy
Vive Levantine – @vivelevantine
Wanabqa – @wanabqa
Yarmouk Camp – @yarmouk.camp

BOOKS

👷🏽‍♀️🔧 🚧 – work in progress, please help us by sharing with us books about Syria written by progressive Syrians –

DOCUMENTARIES (with our rating ⭐️⭐️⭐️)

We find it unfortunate that most of these testimonies are inaccessible to the general public and restricted to discretionary festivals where only the intellectual elites and concerned people can see them, while the Humans in question suffer and die most often in the shadows. We respect copyright, but would nevertheless like to acquire all these films, so if you know how to download or buy them, please don’t hesitate to contact us:

collective@interstices-fajawat.org

2003 – A FLOOD IN BAATH COUNTRY by Omar Amiralay ⭐️⭐️⭐️

The movie examines the flood’s devastating impact on a Syrian village. With its powerful and daring critique of Syria’s political regime and the tribal politics that hold it together, the film foreshadows the wave of democracy currently sweeping the Arab world, with citizens finally rising up to demand a fundamental change in their countries’ leadership.

2014 – SYRIA : CHILDREN ON THE FRONTLINES by Marcel Mettelsiefen & Anthony Wonke ⭐️⭐️

The story of five young children whose lives have been changed forever by the civil war in Syria.

2014 – THE LAST ASSIGNMENT by Rashed Radwan ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

On November 20, 2013, Iraqi freelance cameraman Yasser Faisal al-Jumaili crossed the Turkish border into Syria with his trusted Syrian fixer Jomah Alqasem. The Syrian war had been raging for two-and-a-half years and now saw the various rebel groups splitting one from another, mostly around ideological differences. The assignment was to access the groups and build a picture of who these men were, away from rhetoric, both on and off duty on the frontlines. For 13 days in Syria, the two reporters filmed the men behind the frontlines: fighters with the Free Syrian Army, Al-Tawhid Brigade, Al-Nusra Front, Ahrar Al-Sham, and even ISIL.

2014 – THE CAVE by Feras Fayyad

Deep beneath the surface in the Syrian province of Ghouta, a group of female doctors have established an underground field hospital. Under the supervision of paediatrician Dr. Amani and her staff of doctors and nurses, hope is restored for some of the thousands of children and civilian victims of the ruthless Syrian civil war.

2015 – SALAM NEIGHBOUR by Zach Ingrasci & Chris Temple

Two filmmakers fully embed themselves in a Syrian refugee camp, providing an intimate look at the world’s most dire humanitarian crisis.

2015 – A SYRIAN LOVE STORY by Sean McAllister ⭐️⭐️

Filmed over 5 years, A Syrian Love Story charts an incredible odyssey to political freedom. For Raghda and Amer, it is a journey of hope, dreams and despair: for the revolution, their homeland and each other.

2016 – HOUSES WITHOUT DOORS by Avo Kaprealian

Aleppo-Armenian filmmaker Avo Kaprealian shows the life of an Armenian family that has fled to Beirut during clashes in the New Village district of Aleppo, Syria, in 2015. Kaprealian documented the destruction in the district and the civilians who faced hardships. He managed to shoot footage from the balcony of his house […]

2016 – THE WHITE HELMETS by Orlando von Einsiedel ⭐️⭐️

As daily airstrikes pound civilian targets in Syria, a group of indomitable first responders risk their lives to rescue victims from the rubble.

2017 – LAST MEN IN ALEPPO by Feras Fayyad ⭐️⭐️⭐️

Volunteers Khaled, Mahmoud, and Subhi rush toward bomb sites while others run away. They search through collapsed buildings for the living and dead. Contending with fatigue, dwindling ranks, and concerns for their families’ safety, they must decide whether to stay or to flee a city in ruins.

2017 – CITY OF GHOSTS by Matthew Heineman ⭐️⭐️⭐️

The anonymous activists who exposed ISIS atrocities in Raqqa. Follows their undercover operations, exile, and risks taken to reveal the ruthless realities under ISIS rule. The story of «Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently»:

https://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/

2017 – HELL ON EARTH: THE FALL OF SYRIA AND THE RISE OF ISIS by Sebastian Junger & Nick Quested

A look at the current state of Syria amidst war and chaos in 2017, featuring stories of survival and observations by political experts from around the world.

2019 – FOR SAMA by Waad al-Kateab and Edward Watts ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

In a time of conflict and darkness in her home in Aleppo, Syria, one young woman kept her camera rolling — while falling in love, getting married, having a baby and saying goodbye as her city crumbled. The story before «Action For Sama»:

https://www.actionforsama.com/

2021 – OUR MEMORY BELONGS TO US by Rami Farah ⭐️⭐️

Three Syrian activists are reunited on a theatre stage in Paris. 10 years after the revolution, they revisit traumas and memories of a ferocious war.

2022 – THE LOST SOULS OF SYRIA by Garance Le Caisne & Stéphane Malterre ⭐️⭐️

In 2013, a Syrian official flees with 27,000 photos of corpses tortured to death in the country’s prisons since 2011. One year later, the photos of the Caesar Report reveal to the world the horror of the crimes of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.

2024 – MY MEMORY IS FULL OF GHOSTS by Anas Zawahri

Like a visual elegy, My Memory Is Full of Ghosts explores a reality caught between past, present and future in Homs, Syria. Behind the self-portrait of an exsanguinated population in search of normality, emerge memories of the city, haunted by destruction, disfigurement and loss. A deeply moving film, a painful echo of the absurdity of war and the strength of human beings.

Apart from the accomplices of the Assad regime and the civilian populations still being targeted in the North and East of Syria, all Syrians are happy with the liberation of Syria thanks to the offensive of the Syrian rebels and the support of many Syrian communities who were only waiting for a signal to participate in the liberation.

After 58 years of one of the most ferocious dictatorships, and not 13 or 24 years as suggested by the Western media, Syrians needed at least 48 hours to breathe and share their infinite happiness, their cries, their joy, but also their tears of relief and sorrow too long contained.

Many abroad have not respected this need, continuing to infantilize Syrians and scorn their democratic and secular aspirations, constantly brandishing the Islamist threat in front of our faces since the start of the rebel offensive (which we refuse to reduce to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, because hundreds of other factions have joined the operation).

We didn’t need to be told. We were among the first to suffer this threat, which has been with us for years, but we also know that jihadist criminal groups didn’t just spring up. They were born out of the chaos produced by decades of colonization, armed invasion and indiscriminate bombing.

Having celebrated, Syria’s progressive forces must now act fast and not relax too early. The threats of a reactionary and fundamentalist backlash are real.

That’s why we want to share a few essential demands with you, to be widely disseminated within ALL Syrian communities and passed on to those who will ensure the political transition in Syria.

We must:

END THE VIOLENCE

• Put an immediate end to all military intervention in the areas of Idleb, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor and Hasakeh and implement ceasefire agreements between rebel forces and YPG/SDF armed forces;
• Condemn and put a definitive end to foreign bombing raids on Syrian soil;
• Demand the liberation of Syrian territories and civilian communities held hostage by neighboring states and armed groups serving their interests, in particular Israel and Turkey in the Golan, Quneitra, West Damascus, Idleb, Aleppo, Raqqa and Hasakeh regions;
• Disarm non-Syrian armed fighters and ask them to leave the country, return home or apply for asylum in Syria, to be considered in the light of serious investigations into the crimes committed by the armed groups to which they belonged;
• Guarantee access to Syrian territory for humanitarian NGOs and journalists;

IMPLEMENT A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROCESS:

• Protect and analyze the archives of the Assad regime’s security services, then make them available for consultation by those concerned, to enable grieving and reparation for the crimes, as well as prosecution of the perpetrators;
• Protect and allow full access to the lists of detainees and victims of the Assad regime for the families of victims searching for missing persons;
• List those complicit in slanderous denunciations and protect their identity to prevent personal vengeance and ensure fair judicial procedures, which may involve transformative and restorative, rather than punitive, modes of justice;
• Arrest and detain in humanitarian conditions all army, security service or armed militia personnel suspected of direct involvement in the commission of crimes against civilians and war crimes;
• Prevent any public humiliation or execution, and initiate justice processes that respect international conventions against the death penalty;
• Enable the establishment of alternative systems of conflict resolution and justice, allowing defendants to choose under which justice system they wish to be tried, while prohibiting the use of penalties involving corporal punishment or the death penalty;

GUARANTEE POLITICAL TRANSITION:

• Prevent the establishment of a political regime based on religious or ethnic affiliations, to prevent a sectarian division of Syria;
• Prevent the use of symbols of armed groups, as well as flags associated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and other Islamist groups, in the public institutions of the new political regime;
• Organize a political transition to a confederal regime allowing egalitarian and non-segregative representation of the different ethno-religious communities of Syrian society that represent at least 1% of Syrian society: Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Christian Arabs, Druze, Alawites, Kurds and Assyrians. Ethnic communities representing less than 1% of the Syrian population must be given proportional representation in order to ensure respect for their specific identities and related rights: Turkmen, Circassians, Bedouins, Armenians, Mizrahim Jews, Yezids, Palestinians, Romanis, Aramaic/Syriacs;
• Freeze all cooperation with a neighboring state that does not guarantee full freedom for populations belonging to at least one of the above-mentioned Syrian communities;
• Restore full and unrestricted political and religious freedoms, as well as freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of the press;
• Guarantee the freedom and protection of the rights of women and sexual minorities;

Without the implementation of all these demands, the self-determination of Syrians is not guaranteed, and the resurgence of authoritarian powers is to be feared. We must mobilize en masse to prevent history repeating itself and autocratic or reactionary ambitions compromising the democratic and secular Syrian revolution.

We must therefore loudly proclaim our solidarity with the Palestinian, Lebanese and Kurdish peoples in the face of oppression and unjustified violence. It’s not a question of supporting armed groups who carry their voice, but of sending a clear message to our brother peoples and to civilians who don’t deserve to suffer the repercussions of colonial wars.

We only want peace and democracy in Syria and the surrounding region.

Fajawat Initiative