CHRONICLE WRITTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH FRENCH COLLECTIVE/MEDIA “CONTRE ATTAQUE“
Our previous chronicle was published at a time when a large-scale military operation was being launched by HTS in Homs and Tartus regions to arrest a number of former officers and henchmen loyal to the deposed Assad regime. These militiamen, who had taken refuge in the predominantly Alawite coastal regions (the religious minority from which the Assad clan is descended), had in fact begun issuing threats and agitating the population against a backdrop of fake news, accusing HTS of having deliberately attacked and set fire to a sacred site for the Alawites in Aleppo. Although the holy site was indeed attacked on December 5 during the first assaults against the regime, HTS immediately condemned the action and promised to punish those responsible, which is quite different from what Assad’s nostalgic supporters claim, alleging that HTS was organizing ethnic cleansing of the Alawites. In fact, this cleansing has not taken place, even though images of violence have circulated, showing militiamen from the deposed regime being mistreated when arrested. At the same time, Alawite religious and civil leaders met with HTS officials and issued statements invalidating rumors of persecution.
These sectarian tensions make us forget that the majority of Syria’s Alawite population was also suffering under Assad’s dictatorship, and that an attempted insurrection started from the Alawite community in August 2023 (August 10th Movement: https://en.majalla.com/node/297431/politics/alawite-protest-movement-emerging-syrias-coastal-areas ; https://syriadirect.org/where-does-latakia-stand-on-suwaydas-movement/ ), immediately put down by the regime. For the past two weeks, we’ve also been struggling on social networks (when we clearly have other things to do) with Western and/or pro-Assad accounts spreading disinformation and rumors about the persecution and massacre of Christians in Syria, which is simply not true. It seems that part of the world doesn’t want to leave Syrians in peace and finds interest or pleasure in circulating images of atrocities, which deny our need to heal from decades of trauma. Our nightmares make their fantasies. To sort out what’s true from what’s not, and to deal with the rumors, we invite anyone to follow the @VeSyria / https://verify-sy.com/en account.
Still on the security front, Al-Shara’a continued to reward his lieutenants with responsibilities within the new military apparatus. A list of some 50 appointments to the new Ministry of Defense was made public, including at least seven foreign fighters, three of them Uighurs, one Turk, one Jordanian, one Egyptian and one Albanian. The Minister of Defense and the Head of Intelligence have also been appointed, all from HTS and the multiple Islamist factions that constitute it.
On the political front, the transitional authority has made progress. Last week, Ahmed Al-Shara’a (aka Al-Joulani) appointed the first woman to the government, Aisha Aldebs, as head of women’s affairs. What appeared to be an encouraging sign was immediately tarnished by her first, extremely conservative statements, which for the past week have sparked strong polemics in Syrian society, as well as virulent reactions in the media. In the aftermath, Al-Shara’a seems to have wanted to adjust the balance by appointing other women to positions of responsibility: Maysaa Sabrine, as Governor of the Syrian Central Bank, Diana Elias Al-Asmar (Christian) as Director of the Damascus University Children’s Hospital, and finally Mohsena Al-Maithawi (Druze), as Governor of the Suwayda region, which was a request from the Druze community. At the same time, freelance journalist Mohammed Al-Faisal was appointed spokesman for the transitional government.
Beyond this, Al-Shara’a also announced deadlines for the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of elections, stating that it would take between 3 and 4 years to guarantee the implementation of UN Resolution 2254 for a democratic transition in Syria. Given the catastrophic state of Syrian society and institutions, these timescales seem realistic, although there is still considerable concern about how the transitional government will manage public affairs over this long period. While Shara’a has rejected the federalist option and justified his choice of appointing only officials close to HTS, he has nevertheless reassured his interlocutors and detractors by promising the future dissolution of HTS within the framework of the National Conference for Dialogue due to begin on January 5. A preliminary meeting of the conference was held on December 28, but it was roundly criticized for the low participation of women (3 out of more than 100 people) and young people, as well as for the superficiality of the exchanges that took place. The way in which participants are chosen and invited remains vague. The Madaniyya network, made up of over 150 Syrian civil society organizations committed to the principles of the 2011 revolution, and which has already met with a number of foreign delegations, is waiting, for example, to be taken into consideration by the transitional government and the national conference for dialogue.
One of the blind spots in this transition is therefore still the condition of women, as well as that of the thousands of detainees and forcebley disappeared people plus their relatives, who have not been offered any concrete support or any prospect of justice or reparation. Many associations and human rights groups have begun to denounce the fact that prisons and their archives have not been put under protection over the past two weeks, and have been subject to destruction and theft. This obvious negligence raises questions about the new government’s real desire to dig deep into the secrets of the deposed regime. Silence, too, on the fate of the Syrian communes occupied by Israel and Turkey, as well as that of the Druze community of Suwayda, which has enjoyed de facto autonomy for several years now and has so far neither been invited nor solicited by the new central authority in Damascus. Silence again on Russian military bases, whose total withdrawal is not mentioned, despite the fact that Russia has spent the last ten years bombing and participating in the massacre of Syrian communities. Al-Shara’a, on the other hand, has declared its desire to respect Russian strategic interests in the region, a priori on a level with those of Israel and the United States.
In conclusion, one of the main “Gordian knots” in post-Assad Syria remains the fate of the Kurdish population, and more specifically that of the autonomist Rojava project. The Syrian Democratic Forces are struggling to contain the onslaught of pro-Turkish militias on the banks of the Euphrates, and have even driven them back to the outskirts of Manbij, while the autonomous administration of north-eastern Syria has entered into negotiations with HTS, even considering demilitarization and the reunion of the SDF within the new national army. But not without serious guarantees from the new government in Damascus…