The Druze of Lebanon and Syria, a long history of insubordination

The Druze are a religious community attached to a heterodox creed of Ismaili Shi’ite Islam, which originated in Egypt under the leadership of Imam Hamza ibn Ali ibn Ahmad in the early 11th century. The Druze faith takes its name from the preacher Muhammad ad-Darazi, although some of his followers do not recognize Ad-Darazi and he was disowned by Hamza ibn Ali before being executed on the orders of the caliph Al-Hakim bi-amr Allah. The Druze prefer to define themselves as “Muwahideen” (Unitarians) or “Banu Ma’ruf” (Children of Maarouf), although the origin of this term remains uncertain.

The Druze religion, like Sufism, takes a philosophical and syncretic approach to faith, recognizing neither the rigid precepts nor the prophets of Islam. Although this belief spread to Cairo under the Fatimid caliphate of al-Hakim, who was deified by the Druze, it was soon persecuted by the rest of the Muslim community after al-Hakim’s death in 1021, and so the Druze were exiled to Bilad el-Cham (present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine), particularly to Mount Lebanon and the Hauran. But it was around the beginning of the 19th century that the Druze community in Hauran gained strength, after a large part of the community had been expelled from Mount Lebanon by the Ottoman authorities. The Hauran mountain was then named jebel al-Druze.

Today, Suwayda governorate is home to the majority of the world’s Druze community, some 700,000 people. The Lebanese Druze are the second largest community, numbering 250,000. In Syria, several Druze settlements also exist in Jebel al-Summaq (Idlib, 25,000 people), Jebel al-Sheikh and al-Juwlan (Quneitra, 30,000 people) and Jaramana (Damascus suburbs, 50,000 people). Finally, outside Syria and Lebanon, the largest Druze communities are to be found in occupied Palestine (Galilee and Mount Karmel, 130,000), Venezuela (100,000), Jordan (20,000), North America (30,000), Colombia (3,000) and Australia (3,000).

The main Druze families and clans in the 19th century

The Druze community is structured along traditional clan lines, with large families exerting a dominant influence. Until the mid-18th century, Hauran (or Jabal Druze) was dominated by the Hamdan family, whose hegemony was challenged in the 1850s by Al-Atrash family. The conflict between the two families and their respective allies between 1856 and 1870 was finally settled by the intervention of the Ottoman authorities, who divided the region into four sub-districts, the largest of which was that of Al-Atrash family, comprising 18 villages out of the 62 in Hauran at the time.

Zuqan al-Atrash

Rebellion against Turkish-Ottoman authority…

 

In 1878, the semi-autonomy acquired by the Hauran was called into question by Ottoman military intervention, which sought to put an end to the conflicts between the Druze and their neighbors in the plain (now Daraa). The Ottoman authorities imposed a new form of governance under the leadership of Ibrahim al-Atrash, and the payment of taxes to the Druze community, particularly to peasants. Between 1887 and 1910, a series of conflicts ensued, first between the region’s peasants and Al-Atrash family, then between Ibrahim’s brothers – Shibli and Yahia – and the Ottoman authorities. In 1909, the revolt against the Ottomans led by their nephew Zuqan al-Atrash failed at the battle of Al-Kefr, and he was executed the following year. His son Sultan took over at the time of the great Arab revolt of 1918…

During the 1914-1918 war, Ottoman rule left Jabal Druze relatively undisturbed. Sultan al-Atrash forged links with the pan-Arab movements involved in the great Arab revolt of the Hijaz (Saudi Arabia) and raised the Arab flag on the fortress of Salkhad, south of the Suwayda region, and on his house in Al-Qurayya. He sent a reinforcement of 1,000 fighters to Aqaba in 1917, then joined the revolt himself with 300 fighters at Bosra, before seizing Damascus on September 29, 1918. Sultan became a general in Emir Faisal’s army and Syria gained independence. This was short-lived, however, as Syria was occupied by the French in July 1920. Jabal Druze became one of the five states of the new French colony.

Sultan al-Atrash

Sultan al-Atrash

…then against French colonialism

 

Sultan al-Atrash first clashed with the French in 1922, when his host, Lebanese Shi’ite rebel leader Adham Khanjar, was arrested at his home in his absence. Sultan demanded his release, then attacked a French convoy believed to be carrying the prisoner. In retaliation for the attack, the French demolished his house and ordered his arrest, but Sultan took refuge in Jordan, from where he led raids against the French forces. Temporarily pardoned and allowed to return home, he led the Syrian revolt of 1925-1927, declaring revolution against the French occupiers. Initially victorious, the Great Syrian Revolt was finally defeated by the French army and Sultan was sentenced to death. He took refuge in Transjordan, before being pardoned again and invited to sign the Syrian Independence Treaty in 1937. He received a hero’s welcome in Syria, a reputation he retains to this day. When the treaty failed to secure Syria’s independence in May 1945, the Syrians once again revolted against the French occupiers, who sent in the army and killed around a thousand Syrians. In Hauran, the French army was defeated by the Druze under the command of Sultan al-Atrash, before the British intervention that put a definitive end to the French mandate on April 17, 1946.

Editor’s note: the commitment of the Al-Atrash family must be seen in the context of Arab conservatism and nationalism, which did not challenge traditional clan, patriarchal and authoritarian structures. However, their constant opposition since the 19th century to foreign imperialism and the abusive authority of central powers made them precursors in the anti-colonial struggles of the second third of the 20th century. Their struggle can also be seen as carrying within it the seeds of community struggles for autonomy and self-defence, which will be discussed in Suwayda in the recent period (years 2010-2020). Sultan al-Atrash is also known for his stance in favor of multiculturalism and secularism.

الدين لله، والوطن للجميع

Religion is for God, Homeland is for everyone

Resistance to Israeli colonialism

 

When the British transferred their domination of Palestine to Zionist settlers in Europe and America, and the latter began ethnically cleansing the Palestinians from December 18, 1947, Sultan al-Atrash called for the formation of the Arab Liberation Army of Palestine. Under the command of future Syrian president Adib Shishakli, this army entered Palestine from Syria on January 8, 1948, as part of the First Arab-Israeli War.

Kamal Jumblatt

Only a year apart, on May 1, 1949, Druze intellectual and political leader Kamal Jumblatt founded the Progressive Socialist Party, then he called for the first convention of Arab Socialist Parties in May 1951 and began to establish links with the Palestinian Left Resistance, embodied by the Fedayeen movement. Jumblatt then turned the PSP into an armed movement integrated into the Lebanese National Movement, a coalition of 12 left-wing parties and movements founded in 1969 to support the Palestine Liberation Organization, itself created five years earlier and then led by Yasser Arafat. Jumblatt is the leader of the Lebanese National Movement (LNM).

The entire period between 1952 and 1975 was characterized by growing sectarian tensions between secular left-wing movements – anti-imperialist and pro-Palestinian – and the pro-Western Christian Maronite elites, who dominated the Lebanese political landscape at the time. From 1970 onwards, these tensions were heightened by the significant increase in the number of Palestinian fighters in Lebanon, following their expulsion from Jordan, and leading to a considerable increase in the influence of Palestinian movements in the country. These tensions culminated in the massacres of Palestinian civilians by Christian Phalangists (Kataeb) at Ain el-Rummaneh on April 13, 1975 (30 dead) and at Karantina (between 1,000 and 1,500 dead), followed by the massacre of Christian civilians at Damour (150 to 580 dead) in January 1976.

Syrian President Hafez al-Assad – whose Ba’ath party had until then supported the Palestinian left and its allies – took up the cause of the Christian Falangists and proposed an agreement involving the reduction of Palestinian influence in Lebanon. The PLO refused, and in March 1976, Kamal Jumblatt went to Damascus to express his disagreement to Hafez al-Assad. The following month, the LNM and the PLO took control of 80% of Lebanon, but in June the Syrian army intervened in Lebanon. During the summer, the Christian militias who had been besieging the Palestinian camp of Tell al-Zaatar since the beginning of the year, massacred between 2,000 and 3,000 civilians with Syrian military support. At the end of a six-month confrontation with the PLO and the LNM, a temporary ceasefire was signed, establishing the long-term occupation of Lebanon by the Syrian army and leading to the gradual – then definitive ten years later (1987) – annihilation of the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon.

On March 16, 1977, Kamal Jumblatt was assassinated by gunmen hired by Hafez al-Assad’s brother, Rifaat. Many left-wing personalities attended his funeral, and Yasser Arafat delivered a powerful eulogy for his ally and friend.

Excerpt from the film “Greetings to Kamal Jumblatt”, Maroun Bagdadi, 1977, 57 mm

Editor’s note: We are not here to idealize Kamal Jumblatt’s character, and we believe that leaders should never be heroes. However, we do not believe that Kamal Jumblatt is guilty of any crimes, nor that he has propagated feelings of hatred based on the ethnic or religious affiliation of his opponents, contrary to what has been conveyed by certain media affiliated to the Lebanese right. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that any armed movement has at one time or another been associated with or directly involved in the commission of crimes or acts of vengeance. This was notably the case with the Palestinian armed factions, and therefore their allies, as in Damour in January 1976. It’s also important to admit when a leader betrays the interests of his community, as in the case of Kamal Jumblatt’s son, Walid Jumblatt. His political choices following his father’s death and up to the present day are relatively dubious, and he does not seem to us to be worthy of his father’s political legacy.

Armed resistance to authoritarian centralism in Damascus

 

When the 2011 revolt against Bashar al-Assad broke out, Syria’s Druze joined the rest of the Syrian population in demonstrating in the streets of Suwayda and Jaramana, the Druze community district of Damascus.

And when the armed struggle took over from the peaceful demonstrations, Druze officer Khaldun Zein Ad-Din defected from the regime’s army on October 31, 2011. He publically declared his allegiance to the Free Syrian Army and created the “Sultan Basha al-Atrash” batallion, made up of 120 Druze fighters.

Khaldun Zein Ad-Din

Fadlallah Zein Ad-Din

He was joined by his brother Fadlallah Zein Ad-Din in July 2012. Denounced by informers, they are besieged and Khaldun is killed with 16 other of their companions in Tall al-Maseeh on January 13, 2013. His brother announced his death in a statement ten days later. The Progressive Socialist Party of Lebanon organized a ceremony in their honor, and he became the symbol of the revolutionary and opposition movement in Suwayda. On March 21, 2013, his wife Amira Abu Bahsas publicly declared that she too would join her late husband’s battalion, becoming the first woman from Suwayda to join the Free Syrian Army.

During anti-regime demonstrations in Suwayda between 2023 and 2025, Khaldun Zein Ad-Din’s portrait is displayed in Dignity Square, where his parents Sami and Siham actively participated in the protests.

Amira Abu Bahsas

Another form of resistance to Assad’s dictatorship emerged in 2013 in Suwayda, following the forced recruitment of several dozen young men from the region. An influential sheikh in the community, Waheed al-Balous, refused to accept the community’s participation in the war against other Syrians and opposed forced recruitment. He founded the Men of Dignity Movement (“Rijal al-Karami”), which gained in popularity over the years and prevented the conscription of between 30,000 and 50,000 young men from Suwayda.

دم السوري على السوري حرام

A Syrian must not shed the blood of another Syrian

In 2015, Balous openly denounced the dictatorship, leading to his assassination in a double bomb attack on September 4, 2015. On the evening of his death, riots broke out in the region and the statue of Hafez al-Assad that had stood in Dignity Square was removed. It was never replaced. His brother Raafat, wounded in the attack, temporarily replaced him before giving up his position. Waheed al-Balous’s sons, Laith and Fahd, created a splinter group from Rijal al-Karami, the Sheikhs of Dignity (Sheikh al-Karami), which they intended to be politically more radical than their father’s movement. Despite frequent disagreements, the two movements continued to carry out joint actions, even as Rijal al-Karami drew closer to another major faction, the Forces of the Mountain (Quwwat al-Jabal). In December 2024, they joined the Southern Room for Military Operations, which also included other Druze factions and took part in the liberation of Damascus.

Waheed al-Balous

Raafat al-Balous

Laith al-Balous

Fahd al-Balous

Editor’s note: While here too we must refrain from idealizing one faction or another, we nevertheless consider that Rijal al-Karami and associated groups have, in recent years, embodied the Druze community’s imperative for self-defense and self-determination. Whether in the face of attempts by the regime’s army to impose itself by force or coercion, in the face of Islamist aggression or in the face of the predation of the gangs that have proliferated in the region, these factions have succeeded in protecting the civilian population and the general interest without committing exactions or abuses of power. Their leaders have generally answered the call of threatened communities and taken a clear stand against any outside force threatening community security. They also acted as protectors of popular demonstrations and revolts, before spontaneously joining the offensive against the regime in December 2024.

Suwayda at the heart of the revolutionary path from 2011 to 2025

 

Beyond the few emblematic examples of armed resistance to the authoritarian centralism of Damascus, civil society in Suwayda has never ceased to take a critical or hostile stance towards central power and the Assad dictatorship. Contrary to unfounded rumors that regularly portray the Druze as loyal to the regime, numerous examples demonstrate that the community has always succeeded in reconciling its tradition of resistance with a refusal to take sides in a conflict that very early on became confessionalized – with a very large Islamic religious component within the Free Syrian Army as early as 2012 – and which would have resulted in its annihilation.

Few remember that the people of Suwayda were involved in the 2011 uprising right from the start. As mentioned in our first article, the Suwayda Lawyers’ Guild organized one of the first public demonstrations in March 2011, and as elsewhere in Syria, the Jabal Druze took to the streets in the weeks that followed. To give just a few strong and symbolic examples, let’s recall that one of the main songs of the revolution is “Ya Heif!” (يا حيف – “What a Shame!”), composed and sung by Druze singer Samih Choukheir (Listen by clicking here).

Samih Choukheir

At the beginning of this text, we also mentioned the influence of the Al-Atrash family in the region. Sultan al-Astrash’s daughter, Muntaha al-Atrash, took an early stand against Ba’athist tyranny. In 1991, she publicly tore up a photo of Hafez al-Assad to denounce his involvement with the Coalition in the Iraq war. Saved from prison by her father’s reputation, she joined the Sawaseya Human Rights Organization, becoming its spokeswoman in 2010. At the start of the revolution, she visited rebel areas and publicly called on the Syrian people to join the revolution, before receiving death threats serious enough to convince her to stop appearing in public.

Her daughter Naila al-Atrash, a university drama teacher with close ties to the Syrian Communist Party, was regularly threatened by the regime for her activities, which were deemed subversive. Dismissed in 2001, placed under house arrest in 2008, she took part in the beginning of the 2011 revolt by organizing support groups for people displaced and affected by the conflict, before leaving Syria in 2012. To this day, Naila remains an active supporter of the liberation of Syrians.

Muntaha al-Atrash

Naila al-Atrash

Finally, since the assassination of Waheed al-Balous in September 2015, the resistance and revolt against the Assad regime has continued to take shape. It has taken the form of an armed resistance embodied by several popular militias, as mentioned above, but has also largely developed in civil society, with the multiplication of demonstrations and actions that have increased in intensity and regularity since 2020, also as a consequence of the explosion in prices and the cost of living.

To reread in detail the unfolding of these revolts, read our first article published in October 2023:In Southern Syria, the uprising of Dignity has begun”.

It is also necessary to know more about the structure of Druze society to understand that the population is not necessarily subservient to the decisions of a political or spiritual leadership. In Suwayda, religious leadership is embodied by three sheikhs, the “Aql Sheikhs”: Hamoud Al-Henawi, Hikmat Al-Hajari and Youssef Jarboua. The political positions of these three sheikhs are neither identical nor immutable, and their relationship with the Assad regime has varied according to periods and events.

Following the assassination of Waheed al-Balous and the attack on Suwayda by the Islamic State in 2018, the dissensions between the three sheikhs became even more aggravated. Initially neutral or relatively loyal to the Assad regime, they began to become more critical, particularly sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, who took a clearer stance against the regime and gradually established himself as the charismatic leader of the community.

Hikmat al-Hajari

Hamoud al-Henawi

Youssef Jarboua

Editor’s note: The positions taken by the spiritual leadership are not binding on the Druze community, which is predominantly secular and does not follow its commandments as may be the case for other religious communities that accept that religion dictates social and political life. Regularly, Druze sheikhs have publicly declared that they support and follow the community’s choices. More recently, Hikmat al-Hajjari’s cautious yet firm stance on Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government, and in particular on the disarmament of factions, has been much criticized by many people, often ignorant of or hostile to the ways of the Druze community, or even hostile to the Druze in general, out of nationalism or religious zeal. Within the community, his positions are also criticized by supporters of factional disarmament, who see it as the main cause of violence within society and seem to trust (a little too much) in the new Islamist central power not to (re)become a threat to the Druze minority…

The Druze, Israel and the Islamists

 

This last chapter is essential in view of recent events concerning the Druze communities in Syria and Palestine, and the controversies and rumors that have accompanied them. The two most persistent misconceptions concern the Druze’s supposed loyalty to the Assad regime on the one hand, and their supposed sympathy for Israel on the other. If we have invalidated the first theory in the preceding chapters, it seems to us that we need to add some more recent information than that concerning Kamal Jumblatt’s time to invalidate the second as well.

It should first be pointed out that the Druze communities of Palestine (Mount Carmel and Galilee) were integrated by the Israeli colony in 1948, in the wake of the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians (Nakba). As such, the Palestinian Druze have Israeli citizenship and are subject to compulsory military conscription. Many of them have now accepted this assimilation to the point of supporting the Zionist project and its genocidal policy towards other Palestinians. Their spiritual leader Muafak Tarif is a perfect example of integrationism, cultivating a friendly relationship with the colonial administration and its representatives. He is also quite close to Benyamin Netanyahu.

Muafak Tarif et Benyamin Netanyahu

Location of Druze communities in the Levant

The other Druze community colonized by Israel is that of the Golan Heights, occupied during the Six-Day War in 1967 and officially annexed in 1981. Of the 130,000 Syrians living in the Golan before the invasion, only 25,000 Druze now live on the plateau, in five communes: Majdal Shams, Buq’ata, Mas’ade, Ein Kenya and al-Gager. However, the Druze of the Golan have never accepted assimilation, and almost 80% of them still refuse to take Israeli citizenship.

Israeli leaders persist in trying to win the sympathy of the Golan Druze and never miss an opportunity to claim that they support Zionism, but reality contradicts the propaganda. When, on July 27, 2024, Hezbollah fired a rocket at a soccer field in Majdal Shams, killing 12 children from the community, the opportunistic visits of Benyamin Netanyahu and Bezamel Smotrich to the site and to the funeral were refused by the residents, who booed and branded them murderers.

Finally, when in December 2024 the Israeli army crossed the 1967 border and invaded the Druze villages of Mount Hermon (Jabal al-Sheikh), Zionist as well as anti-Zionist (and campist) propaganda shared the same false information claiming that the residents of Hadar village were in favor of their annexation by Israel. This rumor was initiated by Nidal Hamade, a pro-Hezbollah Lebanese propagandist exiled in France, who posted on his X account a decontextualized video showing a Druze man declaring that he wanted Hadar annexed.

Yet on the same day, representatives of Hadar’s Druze community published a video containing a statement affirming their refusal to be occupied by Israel and denying the false accusations against the Druze.

Unfortunately, rumors often spread more widely than their denials…

Hadar residents’ statement, December 13, 2024, Al-Araby TV

For both sides, perpetuating this lie is useful: where Israel has an interest in legitimizing the occupation of Syria’s Arab lands by claiming that its inhabitants want it, the pro-Iranian camp has a clear advantage in keeping alive the myth that Syria’s minorities needed Assad and Hezbollah to protect them from Islamists, otherwise they would turn to Israel. This binarity of analysis feeds on the same campist and feudal logic of thought: “If you don’t place yourself under my protection, then you deserve to be oppressed by my enemy”. And for both sides, the Islamist scarecrow is used to justify the subjugation of civilian populations, insecurity and fear of barbarism (terror) being the colonial powers’ main resources for legitimizing their violations of the conventions and laws of war.

Assad, for his part, has never ceased to present himself as the protector of minorities, using Islamists as pawns to, on the one hand, disrupt the popular revolt against his regime, and, on the other, inflict terror among minorities when and where he needed to in support of his prophecy: “It’s either me, or chaos”. In the weeks leading up to the Islamic State’s bloody attack on Suwayda in July 2018 (258 dead and 36 hostages), Assad ostentatiously withdrew all his troops from the region. Then, after the attack, when the population criticized him for not having intervened immediately to block the road to the Islamic State, he responded that it was the fault of the Druze who refused to send their young men into the army. But worst of all, the Islamic State fighters had been transported by bus from Yarmouk (a Palestinian camp on the outskirts of Damascus) to the Suwayda desert a month before the attack as part of a surrender agreement. And, as if that weren’t enough, in November of the same year, a new agreement was signed with the Islamic State resistance pocket in the Yarmouk basin (on the border with Jordan and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights) for a new humanitarian evacuation to the desert in exchange for the release of the Druze hostages taken by the Islamic State after their attack on Suwayda. It should be noted that these two agreements between the regime and the EI were organized under the patronage of the Russians, who had at the same time made a commitment to Israel to keep any threat from Islamists, including Hezbollah, away from its border.

We discuss the attack on Suwayda by the Islamic State in more detail in our first article published in October 2023: “In Southern Syria, the uprising of Dignity has begun

And to conclude: As Islamists have often been the useful idiots of imperialism on all sides, it should come as no surprise that the Druze of Suwayda are in no hurry to hand over their weapons to the new power in Damascus, since Ahmad al-Sharaa has been the representative of the two Islamist movements, DAESH and Jabhat Al-Nosra, which have violently attacked the Druze over the past decade. And that certainly doesn’t make them Israel’s allies, whatever supporters of Iran and Israel may think.

It’s not complicated: A note to help you understand Syria

In the age of social media and information for all and by all, it’s more than ever necessary to build up a reliable list of resources on the subjects you want to analyze and understand. Particularly when it comes to international geopolitics.

This note was prepared by “Interstices-Fajawat“. As an initiative connected to Syrian society, we have put together this note to share our sources of information on Syria. We do not claim that these sources are all impartial or neutral, as we believe that neutrality is often synonymous with blindness or complicity. We ourselves have our own bias regarding our beliefs in revolution and internationalism from below.

Wherever possible, we have indicated the biases and partialities we have identified. We have chosen to retain in the list resources whose analysis we do not share, because they are nonetheless well-informed and transmit first-hand information, which just needs to be taken with great care.

TO READ AND FOLLOW US :

📌 𝕏 (ex-Twitter) – https://x.com/IntersticesFaj

WEBSITES

At the top of the list, the first two categories contain most of the sources whose opinions we share, and which we recommend.

News and Analysis Websites :

 

Personnal Blogs (opinions & academic research) :

 

Syrian-led Advocacy & Media NGO Websites :

 

Local or specialized information websites :

 

General news websites :

 

ESSENTIAL FACT CHECKING WEBSITE 

Verify Syria (AR & EN) – based in Turkey, Syrian-led NGO 

https://verify-sy.com/

SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS (ex-Twitter/X & Instagram)

⚠️ Some of these accounts can share sometimes BIASED or ACRITICAL (sectarian, pro-Sharaa/HTS, pro-SDF/PYD, western…) content ⚠️

Local JOURNALISTS  / ANALYSTS / ACTIVISTS :

Matar Ismaeel – @RevoreporterSy
Joseph Daher – @JosephDaher19
Robin Yassin-Kassab – @qunfuz2
Hassan Ridha – @sayed_ridha
Leila Al-Shami – @LeilaShami
Rim Turkmani – @Rim_Turkmani
Mohammad Hassan – @mohammed_nomad
Firas Kontar – @fkontar78
Rami Jarrah – @RamiJarrah
Mazen Hassoun – @HassounMazen
Nedal Al-Amari – @nedalalamari
Ibrahim al-Assil – @IbrahimAlAssil
Qalaat Al Mudiq – @QalaatAlMudiq
Aymenn J Al-Tamimi – @ajaltamimi
Hassan I. Hassan – @hxhassan
Jenan Moussa – @jenanmoussa
Hussam Hammoud – @HussamHamoud
Abd alhade alani – @abdalhadealani
Rami Safadi – @RamiSafadi93
Vlogging Syria – @timtams83
Suhaib Zaino – @suhaib_zaino
Qusay Noor – @QUSAY_NOOR_
“Osama” – @OsamaSHL
“Karim” – @Idlibie
Tawfiq Ghailani – @SyriaNewsMan
Ivan Hassib – @Ivan_Hassib
Karim Franceschi – @karimfranceschi
Evin Cudi – @FreedomKurds
ScharoMaroof – @ScharoMaroof

FOREIGN JOURNALISTS/ANALYSTS :

Cédric Labrousse – @CdricLabrousse
Thomas Van Linge – @ThomasVLinge
Charles Lister – @Charles_Lister
Wladimir van Wilgenburg – @vvanwilgenburg
CJ Werleman – @cjwerleman
C4H10FO2P – @markito0171

MEDIA & SYRIAN NGOs :

ACT for the Disappeared – @actforthedisappearedlb
Action For Sama – @actionforsama
Al Swaida Al Thawra – @alswaidaalthawrah
Aljumhuriya – @aljumhuriya_net
Association Of Detainees & The Missing in Sednaya Prison – @sednayamissing
Based Syria – @based_syria
Caesar Families Association – @caesarfamilies
Daraj Media English – @darajmediaenglish
Dawlaty – @dawlatysy
Don’t Suffocate the Truth – @donotsuffocatetruth
Eye On Syria – @eyeonsyriaeng
Families For Freedom – @families4freedomsyria
Free Syria’s Disapeared – @freesyriasdisappeared
From the Periphery Media – @fromtheperipherymedia
Half of Syria – @halfofsyria
Horan Free League – @horanfreemedia1
Jadaliya – @jadaliyya
Jusoor for Studies – @jusooren
La Cantine Syrienne de Montreuil – @lacantinesyriennedemontreuil
Live Updates Syria – @liveupdatesfromsyria
Madaniya Network – @madaniyanetwork
Megaphone News – @megaphonenews
Middle East Eye – @middleeasteye
Middle East Institute – @middleeastinst
Middle East Matters – @middleeastmatters
Raseef 22 – @raseef22en
Release Me – @release_me0
Revoleft Syria – @revoleftsyria
Rojava Information Center – @rojavaic
Scholars for Syria – @scholars4syria
SOAS Syria Society – @soassyriasoc
Street Archives Syria – @streetarchivessyria

Syria Civil Defense – @syriacivildefence
Syria Mobilization Hub – @thesyriahub
Syria Pixel – @syria_pixel
Syria TV – @syr_television
Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression – @scmsyriancenter
Syrian Emergency Task Force – @syrianetf / @ualr_setf
Syrian Eyes – @syrianeyesteam
Syrian Feminist Lobby – @syrianfeministlobby
Syrian Hub Official – @syrianhubofficial
Syrian Network for Human Rights – @snhr
Syrian Print Archive – @syrianprintarchive_
Syrian Revolution Archive – @syrian_revolution_archive
Syrian Revolution Story – @syrian.revolution.story
Syrian Road to Justice – @road2justicesy
Syrian Solidarity Campaign – @syria_solidarity_campaign
Syrian Spot – @syrianspot
Syrian Women For Democracy – @cswdsyr
Syrians for Palestine – @syrians4palestine
Syrians For Truth & Justice – @syrians_for_truth_and_justice
Ta’afi Syria – @taafi.syria
Tastakel Organization – @tastakel
The Fire These Times – @firethesetimes
The New Arab – @thenewarab
The Syria Campaign – @thesyriacampaign
The White Helmets – @the_whitehelmets
Verify Syria – @verify.sy
Vive Levantine – @vivelevantine
Wanabqa – @wanabqa
Yarmouk Camp – @yarmouk.camp

BOOKS

👷🏽‍♀️🔧 🚧 – work in progress, please help us by sharing with us books about Syria written by progressive Syrians –

DOCUMENTARIES (with our rating ⭐️⭐️⭐️)

We find it unfortunate that most of these testimonies are inaccessible to the general public and restricted to discretionary festivals where only the intellectual elites and concerned people can see them, while the Humans in question suffer and die most often in the shadows. We respect copyright, but would nevertheless like to acquire all these films, so if you know how to download or buy them, please don’t hesitate to contact us:

collective@interstices-fajawat.org

1974 – EVERYDAY LIFE IN A SYRIAN VILLAGE by Omar Amiralay ⭐️⭐️⭐️

The first documentary to present an unabashed critique of the impact of the Syrian government’s agricultural and land reforms, Everyday Life in a Syrian Village delivers a powerful jab at the state’s conceit of redressing social and economic inequities.

2003 – A FLOOD IN BAATH COUNTRY by Omar Amiralay ⭐️⭐️⭐️

The movie examines the flood’s devastating impact on a Syrian village. With its powerful and daring critique of Syria’s political regime and the tribal politics that hold it together, the film foreshadows the wave of democracy currently sweeping the Arab world, with citizens finally rising up to demand a fundamental change in their countries’ leadership.

2013 – RETURN TO HOMS by Talal Derki ⭐️⭐️⭐️

A look behind the barricades of the besieged city of Homs, where for nineteen-year-old Basset and his ragtag group of comrades, the audacious hope of revolution is crumbling like the buildings around them.

2014 – SYRIA : CHILDREN ON THE FRONTLINES by Marcel Mettelsiefen & Anthony Wonke ⭐️⭐️

The story of five young children whose lives have been changed forever by the civil war in Syria.

2014 – THE LAST ASSIGNMENT by Rashed Radwan ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

On November 20, 2013, Iraqi freelance cameraman Yasser Faisal al-Jumaili crossed the Turkish border into Syria with his trusted Syrian fixer Jomah Alqasem. The Syrian war had been raging for two-and-a-half years and now saw the various rebel groups splitting one from another, mostly around ideological differences. The assignment was to access the groups and build a picture of who these men were, away from rhetoric, both on and off duty on the frontlines. For 13 days in Syria, the two reporters filmed the men behind the frontlines: fighters with the Free Syrian Army, Al-Tawhid Brigade, Al-Nusra Front, Ahrar Al-Sham, and even ISIL.

2014 – HAUNTED by Liwaa Yazji 

When the bomb comes the first thing we do is to run away, later we remember and think of everything we left behind. We did not bid farewell to our homes, memories, photos, identities and life that passed. It is about how homes haunt the life of the souls that were living in them, as much as they themselves haunt the houses.

2014 – OUR TERRIBLE COUNTRY by Mohammad Ali Atassi & Ziad Homsi ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

How to make a film on violence without directly showing or reproducing it? The film Our terrible country attempts to respond to this approach by taking us on the perilous journey of Yassin Haj Saleh, a well-known Syrian intellectual and dissident, and young photographer Ziad Homsi who travel together in an arduous, dangerous route from the liberated area of Douma, Damascus to Raqqa in northern Syria, only to find themselves eventually forced to leave their home country for a temporary exile.

2014 – SILVERED WATER, SYRIA SELF PORTRAIT by Wiam Bedirxan & Ossama Mohammed ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

A look at first-hand video accounts of violence in modern-day Syria as filmed by activists in the besieged city of Homs.

2014 – THE CAVE by Feras Fayyad

Deep beneath the surface in the Syrian province of Ghouta, a group of female doctors have established an underground field hospital. Under the supervision of paediatrician Dr. Amani and her staff of doctors and nurses, hope is restored for some of the thousands of children and civilian victims of the ruthless Syrian civil war.

2014 – LETTERS FROM YARMOUK by Rashid Masharawi ⭐️⭐️⭐️

Messages captured at the Yarmouk refugee camp in moments of extreme complexity; messages siding with life in the face of death; moments of love in a time of war and questions of homeland and exile.

2015 – SALAM NEIGHBOUR by Zach Ingrasci & Chris Temple

Two filmmakers fully embed themselves in a Syrian refugee camp, providing an intimate look at the world’s most dire humanitarian crisis.

2015 – 7 DAYS IN SYRIA by Janine Di Giovanni & Robert Rippberger ⭐️⭐️⭐️

In the most dangerous country in the world for journalists, Newsweek Middle East editor, Janine di Giovanni, risks it all to bear witness, ensuring that the world knows about the suffering of the Syrian people.

2015 – A SYRIAN LOVE STORY by Sean McAllister ⭐️⭐️

Filmed over 5 years, A Syrian Love Story charts an incredible odyssey to political freedom. For Raghda and Amer, it is a journey of hope, dreams and despair: for the revolution, their homeland and each other.

2016 – THE WAR SHOW by Andreas Dalsgaard & Obaidah Zytoon ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

A Syrian radio DJ shares her experiences in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring.

2016 – HOUSES WITHOUT DOORS by Avo Kaprealian

Aleppo-Armenian filmmaker Avo Kaprealian shows the life of an Armenian family that has fled to Beirut during clashes in the New Village district of Aleppo, Syria, in 2015. Kaprealian documented the destruction in the district and the civilians who faced hardships. He managed to shoot footage from the balcony of his house […]

2016 – BORN IN SYRIA by Hernán Zin

Since civil war started in Syria in 2011, an estimated 9 million Syrians have fled their homes, half of them children. These children have fled unimaginable horror: the indiscriminate bombings of Bachar Al Assad’s government, and ISIS’ raping and beheading, only to find themselves trapped in makeshift camps or closed borders. We witness the journey of these refugees to the promised land of Europe.

2016 – THE WHITE HELMETS by Orlando von Einsiedel ⭐️⭐️

As daily airstrikes pound civilian targets in Syria, a group of indomitable first responders risk their lives to rescue victims from the rubble.

2016 – TADMOR / PALMYRA by Monika Borgmann & Lokman Slim ⭐️⭐️

Amidst the popular uprising in Syria that began in 2011, a group of former Lebanese detainees of the Assad regime decides to break their long-held silence about the horrific years they spent imprisoned in Tadmor, Palmyra, one of the Syrian government’s most dreaded prisons.

2017 – LAST MEN IN ALEPPO by Feras Fayyad ⭐️⭐️⭐️

Volunteers Khaled, Mahmoud, and Subhi rush toward bomb sites while others run away. They search through collapsed buildings for the living and dead. Contending with fatigue, dwindling ranks, and concerns for their families’ safety, they must decide whether to stay or to flee a city in ruins.

2017 – CRIES FROM SYRIA by Evgeny Afineevsky ⭐️⭐️⭐️

An attempt to re-contextualize the European migrant crisis and ongoing hostilities in Syria, through eyewitness and participant testimony. Children and parents recount the revolution, civil war, air strikes, atrocities and ongoing humanitarian aid crises, in a portrait of recent history and the consequences of violence.

2017 – CITY OF GHOSTS by Matthew Heineman ⭐️⭐️⭐️

The anonymous activists who exposed ISIS atrocities in Raqqa. Follows their undercover operations, exile, and risks taken to reveal the ruthless realities under ISIS rule. The story of “Raqqa is Being Slaughtered Silently”:

https://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/

2017 – OF FATHERS AND SONS by Talal Derki ⭐️⭐️⭐️

Talal Derki returns to his homeland where he gains the trust of a radical Islamist family, sharing their daily life for over two years. His camera focuses on Osama and his younger brother Ayman, providing an extremely rare insight into what it means to grow up in an Islamic Caliphate.

2017 – HELL ON EARTH: THE FALL OF SYRIA AND THE RISE OF ISIS by Sebastian Junger & Nick Quested

A look at the current state of Syria amidst war and chaos in 2017, featuring stories of survival and observations by political experts from around the world.

2018 – THIS IS HOME by Alexandra Shiva

The lives of four Syrian families, resettled in Baltimore and under a deadline to become self-sufficient in eight months.

2019 – FOR SAMA by Waad al-Kateab and Edward Watts ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

In a time of conflict and darkness in her home in Aleppo, Syria, one young woman kept her camera rolling — while falling in love, getting married, having a baby and saying goodbye as her city crumbled. The story before “Action For Sama”:

https://www.actionforsama.com/

2020 – AYOUNI by Yasmin Fedda

Noura and Machi search for answers about their loved ones – Bassel Safadi and Paolo Dall’Oglio, who are among the over 100,000 forcibly disappeared in Syria.

2021 – OUR MEMORY BELONGS TO US by Rami Farah ⭐️⭐️

Three Syrian activists are reunited on a theatre stage in Paris. 10 years after the revolution, they revisit traumas and memories of a ferocious war.

2021 – LITTLE PALESTINE: MEMORY OF A SIEGE by Abdallah Al-Khatib ⭐️⭐️⭐️⭐️

After the Syrian Revolution, Al-Assad’s regime besieges the district of Yarmouk, largest Palestinian refugee camp in the world. Yarmouk is cut off. The director records the daily deprivations while celebrating the people’s courage.

2022 – THE LOST SOULS OF SYRIA by Garance Le Caisne & Stéphane Malterre ⭐️⭐️

In 2013, a Syrian official flees with 27,000 photos of corpses tortured to death in the country’s prisons since 2011. One year later, the photos of the Caesar Report reveal to the world the horror of the crimes of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime.

2023 – UNDER THE SKY OF DAMASCUS by Talal Derki

In Damascus, a collective of young female actors comes together to research the topic. They plan to use the moving anonymous statements of countless women to create a stage play that will break taboos.

2024 – MY MEMORY IS FULL OF GHOSTS by Anas Zawahri

Like a visual elegy, My Memory Is Full of Ghosts explores a reality caught between past, present and future in Homs, Syria. Behind the self-portrait of an exsanguinated population in search of normality, emerge memories of the city, haunted by destruction, disfigurement and loss. A deeply moving film, a painful echo of the absurdity of war and the strength of human beings.

14 Years of Revolution: How the Syrian People Prepared for Justice – by Lily RADWAN

When I was 10 years old, I was first introduced to the concept of freedom with the beginning of the Syrian revolution.

I come from a Syrian family from the city of Homs but I never lived in Syria. Like a lot of people, I visited the country many times and fell in love with it, and as I grew older, I chose to shape all my studies around understanding how I can contribute to the revolution and holding the Assad regime accountable for its crimes, to echo the values of Syrians’ demand for freedom. Now, I study a Masters in Transitional Justice.

Throughout my studies, I at times felt isolated from the diaspora justice process for Syria as I felt ‘not Syrian enough’, a feeling I am sure many members of the Syrian 2nd generation diaspora feel. Now that the Assad regime has finally fallen, I am searching for the best way to contribute to the rebuilding of our country, as a member of the diaspora and as a Syrian person that cares.

I want this article to be a place to start mapping the work that has already been done by the Syrian civil society, to avoid duplication and to continue the conversation on transitional justice for our country.

 A defaced portrait of ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad stands in a ransacked government security facility, in Damascus, on December 8, 2024. (Photo by Rami al SAYED / AFP) (Photo by RAMI AL SAYED/AFP via Getty Images).

A defaced portrait of ousted Syrian president Bashar al-Assad stands in a ransacked government security facility, in Damascus, on December 8, 2024. (Photo by Rami al SAYED / AFP) (Photo by RAMI AL SAYED/AFP via Getty Images).

Ultimately, I want to  answer the question that any young, passionate or (re-)politicised Syrian may ask: Assad has fallen, but what can we do for our country now?

What is Transitional Justice: A Personal Definition

Transitional Justice (TJ)  is often referred to in a legal scope as the “legal responses that deal with the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes”, with  five pillars associated with it : truth, justice, reparations, memorialisation and guarantees of non-recurrence.

Personally, I interpret TJ as all the processes, initiatives, projects, and movements that have and will lead to creating a Syria where everyone is free and feels free no matter their background and without this freedom being co-opted by external parties.  This is what many Syrian civil society actors have been working towards for 14 years or more.

So, how prepared are we?

Mapping the Syrian CSOs’ initiatives in Transitional Justice

TJ initiatives have been in progress for many years in the Syrian civic space,particularly in Northern Syria, but full-scale freedom could not be achieved with the presence of the repressive Assad regime. Now, it is time to put in practice the theories and projects developed by Syrian CSOs that fall under four categories: documentation of the revolution and human rights violations, criminal trials, truth-seeking initiatives, and preparatory plans for a post-Assad Syria.

  • Documenting the Syrian Revolution –

With 14 years of rampant impunity for horrific war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Syrian people have been left on their own to document, archive and show the world what Assad did to the country. Still, this documentation had little effect on destroying the monster of disinformation created by the Assad regime and its allies within the international community.

However, what these efforts created is an impressive archive of verified information, reports, and databases that can be used as evidence to fight impunity in post-Assad Syria.

Some very significant initiatives in the documentation domain include organisations fact-checking videos, pictures and documents exposing human rights violations and attacks on infrastructure by the regime and various armed groups in the country. Namely, the Syrian Revolution Archive, the Syrian Archive (as part of Mnemonic), the Syrian Network of Human Rights (SNHR), and the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), amongst others, have been working on this[1].

[1] I am currently working on a comprehensive yet non-exhaustive list of Syrian CSOs doing archival work.

The Syrian Archives’ Methodology of Research. Available at: https://syrianarchive.org/

The Syrian Archives’ Methodology of Research. Available at: https://syrianarchive.org/

An event organised by the Syrian Design Archive with the Syrian Oxford Society. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/C3A0OnDMPbm/?hl=en&img_index=1

An event organised by the Syrian Design Archive with the Syrian Oxford Society. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/p/C3A0OnDMPbm/?hl=en&img_index=1

There have also been huge amounts of documentation about the events of the revolution through artistic means. Projects working on this include the Creative Memory Archive and the Syrian Design Archive. In addition, countless documentary movies have been made exposing the crimes committed by the Assad regime.

These initiatives have created a strong base of evidence of the war crimes and crimes against humanity that can be used in processes of accountability of members of the Assad regime, as they include the names of the perpetrators, the locations and dates of the violations and the sequences of events as well as direct testimonies by the victims/survivors.

To strengthen the impact of these archival efforts, unifying organisations like Madaniya (see below) can bolster work on providing an easily-accessible and comprehensive database of this work to be used in accountability trials.

  • Criminal Trials of Regime Members –

Following up on the important archival work done by the Syrian people, Syrian legal groups have worked hard on holding accountable the perpetrators of torture and murder under the Syrian regime by using the concept of universal and transnational jurisdiction. This was significantly seen in the 2020 case of Anwar Raslan in Germany, where a Syrian regime colonel was convicted of torture of detainees of conscience. Many such cases followed suit.

Whereas these cases were previously small-scale, they have given the Syrian civil society working on criminal trials the experience to tackle the mountain of trials that need to take place with the change of powers. Many crimes are being uncovered with Assad’s fall and evidence must be handled with care so as not to jeopardise accountability trials.

Organisations like the Syrian Legal Development Programme, already having taken part in trials in Europe, have activated an accessible awareness campaign to advise those on the ground on how to handle evidence, including how to refer the evidence to UN human rights mechanisms. This is the type of knowledge Syrian CSOs gained throughout the revolution, waiting for the day of wide-spread accountability.

A demonstration outside the courthouse where former Syrian intelligence officer Anwar Raslan stands on trial in Koblenz, western Germany, on January 13, 2022. (Photo by Bernd Lauter / AFP) (Photo by BERND LAUTER/AFP via Getty Images)

A demonstration outside the courthouse where former Syrian intelligence officer Anwar Raslan stands on trial in Koblenz, western Germany, on January 13, 2022. (Photo by Bernd Lauter / AFP) (Photo by BERND LAUTER/AFP via Getty Images)

In moving forward with criminal trials, we  also have to ask ourselves where such trials will take place. Facilitating the access to justice of the Syrian people could be a crucial role for any new government that wishes to rebuild societal trust. This means, at the very least, to provide ample space (literally and metaphorically) to the Syrian civil society to participate and/or lead criminal trials and to aid the Syrian people in reclaiming their stolen rights, such as property rights. An organisation to consult with much experience in House, Land and Property rights is The Day After.

  •  Truth-Seeking in the Decay of Assad’s Disinformation Campaigns –

 The Assads, having left behind them 54 years of disinformation, are the reason for countless accusations and denialist rhetoric rejecting even the most obvious of violations that occurred in Syria. To name a few, the Assad regime has forcibly disappeared approximately 100’000 people since March 2011, and attacked civilians 217 times with chemical weapons.

An Infographic by Don’t Suffocate the Truth: Map of the Chemical Attacks in Syria. Available at:

https://donotsuffocatetruth.com/en/infographics/17#infographic

From the denial of these horrific events, arose organisations specifically dedicated to establishing the truth. For instance, the Don’t Suffocate the Truth Campaign has promoted the truth about the use of chemical weapons in Syria to counteract an intense disinformation campaign by Russia and the Assad regime on this topic. In this regard, Don’t Suffocate the Truth can support by providing evidence, the work of groups like The Syria Campaign and the White Helmets that have called for the formation of an Exceptional Chemical Weapons Tribunal (ECWT) to investigate and prosecute the users of chemical weapons in Syria.

As for enforced disappearances, countless on-going campaigns have formed by victims/survivors of the crime to establish the whereabouts of their loved ones. For instance, a coalition of associations raising awareness of enforced disappearances of detainees of conscience launched the Truth and Justice Charter in February 2021,  which eventually led to the creation of the new UN Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria in June 2023, a mechanism for the search and identification of ‘missing people’ in Syria.

In uncovering Assad’s crimes after his fall, mass graves have been discovered across the country, one of which an estimated 100 ‘000 unidentified bodies are buried. In this context, it is crucial to protect the evidence at all costs to identify and bring back the bodies to their families for proper burial.  Coming back to the SNHR, it has published crucial Guidelines on the Treatment of Mass Graves in Post-Armed Conflict Syria. These are more ways the Syrian civil society has prepared itself for the large-scale process of transition to justice, accountability, reparations and stable freedom.

DARAA, SYRIA - DECEMBER 16: Teams work on the uncovered 12 mass graves, believed to contain the remains of civilians killed by the ousted Assad regime, in Daraa, Syria on December 16, 2024. (Photo by Bekir Kasim/Anadolu via Getty Images)

DARAA, SYRIA – DECEMBER 16: Teams work on the uncovered 12 mass graves, believed to contain the remains of civilians killed by the ousted Assad regime, in Daraa, Syria on December 16, 2024. (Photo by Bekir Kasim/Anadolu via Getty Images)

To bring all of these crimes together, and to elucidate comprehensive truth, many groups, including the SNHR and the SCM, have advocated for the creation of a Truth Commission, to fully investigate the crimes committed in Syria by the Assad regime and its allies and to create the basis for widespread criminal prosecutions. This Truth Commission needs to be urgently supported by the international community and any new Syrian government.

  • Preparing for the Fall of Assad –

As anticipatory plans for the fall of the brutal regime, the Syrian civil society has created critical legal, political, and economic documents to help guide the process of democratisation and achieve full freedom in the country. Here are three examples to illustrate my point:

First, the SCM developed in 2022 a 60 page handbook on applying practical solutions to the TJ process in Syria, drawing on experiences of TJ in other countries and adapting entrenched concepts of TJ specifically to the Syrian context. In a similar vein, The Day After wrote a detailed plan on gender-sensitive TJ in Syria. Such documents should be indispensable to human rights activists in the Syrian context.

Second, the Center for Legal Studies and Research coordinated an important project in which Syrians of all backgrounds were consulted and given 10 workshops on constitutional culture, the result of which was the drafting of a constitution “with the aim of laying the foundations and mechanisms to protect [Syria’s] future from repeating past mistakes”. This is a full constitution with 282 articles addressing freedom and equality. Again, workers in TJ could use this constitution as a very helpful starting point.

Third, the Madaniya initiative was created in the context of the revolution  to reclaim political agency for civic actors in and outside of Syria. With the fall of the regime, they went from a diaspora initiative, to a group established in the Syrian capital. Uniting over 200 Syrian CSOs, this group has prepared a bloc of Syrian civil society groups that can serve as a powerful united entity pushing for lasting freedom in the country.

Madaniya Press Conference in Damascus. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/madaniyanetwork/p/DD4xp_7sedK/?img_index=1

Madaniya Press Conference in Damascus. Available at: https://www.instagram.com/madaniyanetwork/p/DD4xp_7sedK/?img_index=1

What now?

Now is the time to push the mechanisms and archives developed by Syrian civil society even further, to achieve deep and relentless accountability for the perpetrators of human rights violations in the country in the past 14 years. Everyone has a role to play.

To all those wondering what they can do for their country, I have provided examples of organisations whose initiatives you can contact and help strengthen. As for the organisations with active initiatives, let in newcomers with an open heart to the work you have been doing, as generations of young activists will be knocking on your door. Syria needs all its people of conscience, now is the time for collaboration and building trust, more than ever before.

This article was submitted by Lily RADWAN. Lily is a Syrian of the second generation diaspora in Europe. Since the Syrian revolution started in 2011, she has dedicated her time to researching, learning, organising and supporting the revolution and its goals towards freedom. This led her to her current Masters studies in Transitional Justice to answer the question: what can be done now that the Syrian regime has fallen. 

We Will Need Time: a podcast with The Final Straw Radio, Ashville, NC (USA)

This podcast was made by THE FINAL STRAW RADIO, Asheville, NC, USA :

https://thefinalstrawradio.libsyn.com/we-will-need-time-two-libertarian-communist-perspectives-on-events-and-possibility-in-syria 

In this episode, you’ll hear Cedric and Khuzama, two libertarian communists with connections to Syria and editor contributors to the blog interstices-fajawat.org , speaking about their observations of what’s been going on leading up to and through the ouster of Bashar Al-Assad, as well as complications among various factions on the ground and the view from the Syrian diaspora. The situation on the ground is changing fast, so check the show notes for this episode on our website for links to news sources that can be helpful in keeping up.

And if you care to hear a perspective from an anarchist combatant affiliated with Tekosina Anarsist, which works with the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria affiliated with the SDF and Rojava Revolution, you can find our episode from December 22nd and the transcribed zine.

We Will Need Time: two libertarian communist perspectives on events and possibility in Syria

by The Final Straw Radio

Call to all Syrian progressive forces !

Apart from the accomplices of the Assad regime and the civilian populations still being targeted in the North and East of Syria, all Syrians are happy with the liberation of Syria thanks to the offensive of the Syrian rebels and the support of many Syrian communities who were only waiting for a signal to participate in the liberation.

After 58 years of one of the most ferocious dictatorships, and not 13 or 24 years as suggested by the Western media, Syrians needed at least 48 hours to breathe and share their infinite happiness, their cries, their joy, but also their tears of relief and sorrow too long contained.

Many abroad have not respected this need, continuing to infantilize Syrians and scorn their democratic and secular aspirations, constantly brandishing the Islamist threat in front of our faces since the start of the rebel offensive (which we refuse to reduce to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, because hundreds of other factions have joined the operation).

We didn’t need to be told. We were among the first to suffer this threat, which has been with us for years, but we also know that jihadist criminal groups didn’t just spring up. They were born out of the chaos produced by decades of colonization, armed invasion and indiscriminate bombing.

Having celebrated, Syria’s progressive forces must now act fast and not relax too early. The threats of a reactionary and fundamentalist backlash are real.

That’s why we want to share a few essential demands with you, to be widely disseminated within ALL Syrian communities and passed on to those who will ensure the political transition in Syria.

We must:

END THE VIOLENCE

  • Put an immediate end to all military intervention in the areas of Idleb, Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Ez-Zor and Hasakeh and implement ceasefire agreements between rebel forces and YPG/SDF armed forces;
  • Condemn and put a definitive end to foreign bombing raids on Syrian soil;
  • Demand the liberation of Syrian territories and civilian communities held hostage by neighboring states and armed groups serving their interests, in particular Israel and Turkey in the Golan, Quneitra, West Damascus, Idleb, Aleppo, Raqqa and Hasakeh regions;
  • Disarm non-Syrian armed fighters and ask them to leave the country, return home or apply for asylum in Syria, to be considered in the light of serious investigations into the crimes committed by the armed groups to which they belonged;
  • Guarantee access to Syrian territory for humanitarian NGOs and journalists;

IMPLEMENT A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROCESS:

  • Protect and analyze the archives of the Assad regime’s security services, then make them available for consultation by those concerned, to enable grieving and reparation for the crimes, as well as prosecution of the perpetrators;
  • Protect and allow full access to the lists of detainees and victims of the Assad regime for the families of victims searching for missing persons;
  • List those complicit in slanderous denunciations and protect their identity to prevent personal vengeance and ensure fair judicial procedures, which may involve transformative and restorative, rather than punitive, modes of justice;
  • Arrest and detain in humanitarian conditions all army, security service or armed militia personnel suspected of direct involvement in the commission of crimes against civilians and war crimes;
  • Prevent any public humiliation or execution, and initiate justice processes that respect international conventions against the death penalty;
  • Enable the establishment of alternative systems of conflict resolution and justice, allowing defendants to choose under which justice system they wish to be tried, while prohibiting the use of penalties involving corporal punishment or the death penalty;

GUARANTEE POLITICAL TRANSITION:

  • Prevent the establishment of a political regime based on religious or ethnic affiliations, to prevent a sectarian division of Syria;
  • Prevent the use of symbols of armed groups, as well as flags associated with Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, and other Islamist groups, in the public institutions of the new political regime;
  • Organize a political transition to a confederal regime allowing egalitarian and non-segregative representation of the different ethno-religious communities of Syrian society that represent at least 1% of Syrian society: Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Christian Arabs, Druze, Alawites, Kurds and Assyrians. Ethnic communities representing less than 1% of the Syrian population must be given proportional representation in order to ensure respect for their specific identities and related rights: Turkmen, Circassians, Bedouins, Armenians, Mizrahim Jews, Yezids, Palestinians, Romanis, Aramaic/Syriacs;
  • Freeze all cooperation with a neighboring state that does not guarantee full freedom for populations belonging to at least one of the above-mentioned Syrian communities;
  • Restore full and unrestricted political and religious freedoms, as well as freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of the press;
  • Guarantee the freedom and protection of the rights of women and sexual minorities;

Without the implementation of all these demands, the self-determination of Syrians is not guaranteed, and the resurgence of authoritarian powers is to be feared. We must mobilize en masse to prevent history repeating itself and autocratic or reactionary ambitions compromising the democratic and secular Syrian revolution.

We must therefore loudly proclaim our solidarity with the Palestinian, Lebanese and Kurdish peoples in the face of oppression and unjustified violence. It’s not a question of supporting armed groups who carry their voice, but of sending a clear message to our brother peoples and to civilians who don’t deserve to suffer the repercussions of colonial wars.

We only want peace and democracy in Syria and the surrounding region.

Interstices-Fajawat Initiative

The situation in Syria was never black or white: How the foreign interests converge

If you think Syrian rebels are only a tool of Israel and the USA,

If you think that Russia and Israel are enemies,

If you-think that Assad and Iran were the brave “Axis of Resistance to Israel” and that you cannot support Palestinian people AND Syrian people,

If you think that it’s a matter of Black or White and Block against Block,

If you think that the Syrians weren’t uniting all together to throw down one of the most horrendous and genocidal regimes in the world,

READ OUR FOLLOWING ANALYSIS:

 

1.     TURKEY

Erdogan wanted -to occupy and expel the Kurds from-all Syrian territory above the M4 road, and continue to supply Israel with 30% of its oil via the BTC pipeline.

We believe that Turkey needed an armed force, the Syrian National Army (SNA) made up of docile Islamist and foreign mercenaries to carry-out its colonial and ethnic cleansing plans north of the M4 road, while another armed force made up of Syrian rebels motivated by the liberation of their country, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) provided a diversion to the south.

We also ‘believe that Turkey was not particularly interested in-what the Syrian rebels would do south of Aleppo, and was potentially surprised by the weakness and rout of the Syrian army, the speed with which the rebels reconquered western and southern Syria, but also the massive support for the offensive from the rebels in Suwayda and Deraa.

After the third day of offensive, Erdogan called Assad and the rebels to find a settlement.

2.     ISRAEL

Netanyahu needed Turkey-to continue providing 30% of its oil to continue-the genocide of Palestinians.

Israel wanted also to drive Hezbollah and pro-lranian militias out of all Syria and protect its northern borders, i.e., the stolen Syrian Golan lands, by establishing a buffer zone on Syrian soil.

We think Israel has no interest in waging a war into Syria and won’t get any support for this. Furthermore, Israel is facing a huge economic, social and political crisis that would not be helped by opening a new front of war.

Israel’s targeting of all Syrian military zones and arms depots immediately after the fall of Assad demonstrates that Israel did not feel threatened by the Assad regime: Israel-had never bombed the Syrian army before, but only Hezbollah officials in Syria.

Israeli intelligence officers declared the past week that they need Assad to maintain the status quo guaranteeing the security of Israel.

3.     RUSSIA

Putin and Assad had made agreements with Israel in 2016 to guarantee the security of Israel’s. northern border and keep Hezbollah away from it. By 2018, the Russians had established control over the Deraa region by integrating former rebels into its 5th ‘Army Corps (8th Awda Battalion).

Russia and the USA had made agreements back in 2015 as part of the “deconfliction line” allowing them both to use Syrian skies to carry out their attacks against ISIS without their aircraft colliding.

Russia has been considerably weakened by the war in Ukraine since 2022 and had substantially reduced its presence in Syria. The relentless bombardment of the rebel zone of Idleb and the energies deployed to keep the feckless Assad regime in place since 2015 were no longer worth the effort.

Russia actively engaged with Turkey and the UN in the Astana agreements to get out of Syria without being humiliated.

4.     THE USA

After the 2011 revolution and the-takeover of ISIS in 2013, USA wanted to-gain and retain control of the areas east of the Euphrates (Deir ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh) where 75% of Syria’s oil reserves are -located*, without engaging American troops on the Syrian soil and without supporting Kurdish socialist YPG/PYD affiliated to the PKK.

Thus, the US backed and trained the Syrian Democratic Forces (FDS) to repel ISIS and keep. the East of Syria out of Assad-or Iranian control.

The US also kept a military base on Syrian soil (al-Tanf) that was never threatened by Assad, and never a threat for Assad. The Americans NEVER attacked the Syrian army.

Russia and the USA had made agreements back in 2015 as part-of the “deconfliction line” allowing them both to use Syrian skies to carry out their attacks against the Islamic State without their aircraft colliding. The US Command Center is located at Al-Ubaid in Qatar.

Also, after the USA gave carte blanche to Turkey to bomb the Kurds in 2019, SDF began to look towards Russia…

5.     IRAN

Iran has been Syria’s ally since the Lebanon war (1982) and needed Syrian territory as a lifeline to supply its Hezbollah militia with arms and money. Iran controlled the entire road network linking Iraq to Lebanon, and in particular the Bukamal and Al-Qusair crossing points, as well as the key area of Palmyra and the right bank of the Euphrates.

In return for the support of Iran and its Lebanese, Iraqi, Pakistani and Afghan militias, Assad allowed Iran to build commercial links-inside Syria, transforming it into a giant captagon factory and the Syrian regime into a narco-state, headed by his brother Maher.

After Israel had destroyed Hezbollah’s infrastructure and worn down its forces in Syria, Iran no longer had any interest in supporting the Assad regime and risking the destruction of its Iraqi militias in a confrontation with the Syrian rebels. It therefore preferred to fall back-on controlling Iraq. In addition, Iran was also involved in the Astana process with Turkey and Russia.

6.     THE SYRIAN NON-STATE OPPOSITION ARMED GROUPS

HTS have clearly entered negotiations with the YPG/SDF on the outskirts of Aleppo from the first days of the offensive, and the Sheikh Maqsood and Ashrafiye neighborhoods are still under YPG/SDF control. Moreover, their desire to protect religious minorities is not just a statement: there are no reports of HTS persecuting civilians since November 27th, and Syrian communities are welcoming the offensive, even if many people also worry about the coming weeks. HTS immediately opened the prisons and restored the water and electricity services that had been cut off and rationed for years by the regime, allowing foreign journalists into the country for the first time in decades. Moreover, HTS’s leader Al Joulani, who has severed his ties with al-Qaeda and has been in conflict with the SNA for several years, declared before the end of the offensive that he plans to dissolve the HTS and to leave the governance of Syria to a transition authority made from a coalition of groups representing the diversity of Syrian society.

Meanwhile, the turkey-backed SNA are indeed organizing the ethnic cleansing of northern Syria, with the aim of carrying out Erdogan’s plans. This aim is obviously not the liberation of the Syrians, and the conquest of the Tall Rif’at and Manbij districts, as well as the ongoing aggression in the Ayn al-Arab/Kobane district with the help of the Turkish air force, is associated with number of abuses and crimes against Kurdish civilian populations. Moreover, the most radical elements of the jihadist groups are affiliated to SNA, making it a major threat to the future stability of the whole of Syria.

Regarding the SDF, we think their compromises with the US on one hand and with the Assad regime and Russia on the other hand, but also their disrespect for Arab communities’ customs and demands in many regards (in Manbij, in Deir ez-Zor and other parts of Jazira/Rojava region) made them too unpopular to gain sympathy from other Syrians. Even so, it’s not fair to consider them allies of the Assad regime, their main concerns since 2015 having been to protect themselves from the serious risks of genocide represented by ISIS and to defend their autonomy, itself seen as a means of separating and protecting themselves from Assad’s dictatorial central power. Thus, SDF and Kurdish communities should enter into negotiations with the Syrian transitional authority to retain their autonomy, while proposing to be integrated into a new federal-type system enabling them to benefit from the same rights and guarantees as other Syrians.

There are many other rebel groups who took part in the HTS offensive but are not affiliated to HTS. This is notably the case of the Druze of Rijal al-Karami from the Suwayda district, who have resisted the central power since 2011 and massively obstructed the recruitment of 50,000 young Druze by the regime’s army, refusing to go and kill other Syrians. Over the past few years, Rijal al-Karami has been engaged in an uphill battle against criminal gangs affiliated to Maher al-Assad’s 4th Armored Division and Hezbollah, who have developed a number of trafficking operations in the Suwayda region that enable the regime to replenish its coffers, in particular that of captagon.

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If, after reading this analysis, you still think that the Syrians were incapable of liberating themselves on their own and without foreign intervention, and that you support Assad and Hezbollah because you think they are in solidarity with the Palestinians, read our article addressed to the Western campist left following this link: https://interstices-fajawat.org/western-leftist-comrades-you-failed-your-arab-fellows/