This work to of re-establishing the facts hour by hour since the beginning of the aggression against the communities of Suwayda was carried out on the basis of our own experience on the spot, the testimonies of our relatives and members of Suwayda’s civil society (which we refuse to qualify as “Druze” insofar as the community includes Christians, Bedouins and some Muslim families native to the region and non-Bedouins), as well as the rereading of all the Facebook posts of several local media objectively reporting the facts over the period from July 12 to 26, 2025:

• Al-Raased: ~220 publications
• Aram News: ~230 publications
• Suwayda24: ~170 publications
• Suwayda Media: ~100 publications

To these can be added the publications of the main players in the conflict:

• Gathering of the Southern Tribes (Tajmua Asha’er al-Janub): 332 publications
• Legion of the Mountain of Dignity (Liwa Jabal al-Karama – leader: Shakeeb Azzam): 49 publications
• Movement of the Men of Dignity (Harakat Rijal al-Karama – leader: Yahia al-Hajjar): 30 publications
• Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari: 15 publications
• Army of Unitarians (Jaysh al-Muwahidun – leader: Osama al-Safadi): 9 publications
• Forces of the Sheikh of Dignity (Quwat Sheikh al-Karama – leader: Raafat Baali): 9 publications
• Suwayda Military Council (Majliss al-Askari fi as-Suwayda – leader: Tareq al-Shufi): 6 publications
• Madhafe of Dignity (Madhafet al-Karama – leader: Layth al-Balous): 5 publications
• Gathering of Free Men of the Arab Mountain (Tajmua al-Ahrar Jabal al-Arab – leader: Suleiman Abd al-Baqi): 1 publication

It is important to remember that it all began on the evening of July 11, 2025, with the kidnapping, theft (vehicle, 5 tons of fruit and vegetables, 7 million Syrian pounds, a phone) and the torture of Fadlallah Naeem Dwara, a merchant from al-Kharsa (Suwayda), near the Braq/al-Masmiyeh checkpoint.

It should be noted that this checkpoint controls the junction of the roads between Damascus, Suwayda, and Deraa and has been held since May by members of the Al-Naim tribe of Mteleh who do not officially answer to the orders of the Al-Sharaa regime. Several fighters controlling this checkpoint wore balaclavas and Islamist insignia (shahada and Islamic State flag).

Fadlallah Naeem Dwara was then thrown, shackled, onto the side of a road, from where he was able to reach Route 110 and be picked up by motorists, who took him to the hospital.

It should also be noted that the region between Braq and Mteleh is home to criminal groups that have been committing abuses and crimes against users of Route 110 between Suwayda and Damascus for many years, often in collaboration with the Bashar al-Assad regime. All indications are that these groups, as well as the unidentified armed men controlling the Braq/al-Masmiyeh checkpoint, are involved in the kidnapping of Fadlallah Naeem Dwara.

Saturday 12 July

(13 press publications)

15h to 22h

Fadlallah Naeem Dwara’s relatives responded to the attack by kidnapping two, then eight Bedouins from Suwayda tribal community and from Al-Hasakeh tribes with the help of a faction from Ariqa (bordering Al-Kharsa), demanding the return of Fadlallah Naeem Dwara’s truck in exchange.

The Suwayda electricity company announced the cutting of the high-voltage line supplying the governorate at Al-Kaswa and Sheikh Meskin.

Tensions and exchanges of fire took place in Shahba, in the Bedouin neighborhoods of Shaqrawiya and Mansoura, followed by attempts for mediation by the sheikhs of the different communities involved. A first casualty, Rami Faysal Naeem, was admitted to the Suwayda hospital after being shot in the head. The Southern Tribes Assembly announced a return to calm late in the evening.

Sunday 13 July 

(75 press publications)

10 a.m. to 11 a.m.

Members of the Shanabla tribe of Al-Maqwas (associated with Syrian-Jordanian sheikh and businessman Rakan Al-Khudeir, leader of the Southern Tribes Gathering and notorious drug trafficker) kidnap five residents of Suwayda on the Suwayda-Damascus road.

11 a.m. to 12 p.m.

The intervention of sheikhs from the community (notably Youssef Jarbou’a) and mediation efforts to end the escalation remain unsuccessful, and armed clashes have begun in the district of Al-Maqwas, a predominantly Bedouin neighborhood on the outskirts of the city of Suwayda.

12 p.m.

Internal Security cuts the road between Suwayda and Damascus.

3 p.m. to 5 p.m.

Seven wounded people are treated at the Suwayda hospital after being brought in from Al-Maqwas, while the neighborhood is the scene of heavy weapons clashes (mortars and RPGs) between armed Bedouin groups and Druze factions. Clashes also take place in Al-Kharej.

Statement: Sheikh Hammoud al-Hennawi issues an initial statement calling for reasonable behavior and an end to tensions that are detrimental to social peace.

5 p.m. to 6 p.m.

The Ariqa faction announces its decision to release the Bedouins taken hostage following mediation by the sheikhs.

Six deaths are recorded at this stage by the hospital, while the residents of Al-Maqwas are trapped between the two sides of the conflict: children Yaman Muqlad and Zyad Mazen Dal.

6 p.m.

A seventh death is reported at Suwayda hospital, along with 32 wounded.

Sniper fire is reported in Atil.

The governor of Suwayda, Mustafa Bakur, calls for calm in a statement, along with the residents of Al-Maqwas.

8 p.m.

Tribal groups from outside Suwayda launch an attack from the Suwayda-Izraa road on the villages of At-Tira, Harran, Labin, and Jreen located on the western border of the governorate, while the villages of Mazraa and Sami’ are subjected to mortar fire.

An attack is also reported at the Internal Security checkpoint in El-Al-Araq, Al-Sawara al-Kbira, and Hazm. Clashes continue in the Bedouin neighborhoods of Al-Mashourb, Al-Harubi, and Mansoura.

Three residents of the villages of Um Rwaq and Maf’aleh are killed: Aamer Nassar Nassar, Imran Al-Aqbani, and Basel Najm Ghanem.

9 p.m. to 11 p.m.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari issues a statement denouncing attempts to incite sedition.

A mortar shell hits the home of faction leader Suleiman Abd al-Baqi in Suwayda, injuring four of his men.

Three other people die at the Suwayda hospital: Hamoud Naseeb al-Arbid, 65, Jalal Ghassan Abu Ghazi, 21, and Walid Fouad Al-Ish’oush. Two residents of Al-Majdal are also killed in At-Tireh: Ehsan Ahmed al-Shater and Khaldoun Salman al-Shater.

Monday 14 July 

(75 press publications)

1 a.m. to 2 a.m.

At this point, the governorate is completely under siege, while the Rijal Al-Karami movement liberates the village of At-Tireh. The group issues a statement denouncing the violation of the agreements signed with the government in May, which included a promise to restore security on this same road. It emphasizes the need for the community to ensure its own self-defense.

2 a.m. to 3 a.m.

Press release: Sheikh Youssef Jarbou’a’s mediation results in the release of the Suwayda hostages held by Bedouin tribes in exchange for the payment of a ransom.

The first images showing the abuses in At-Tireh are broadcast.

6 a.m. to 9 a.m.

Tribal groups from Dera’a relaunch their offensive at dawn against the villages of Taara, Al-Dour, Sami’ and Al-Dwira with heavy mortar fire and drones. They also approach the village of Kanaker.

11 a.m. to 4 p.m.

The Israeli air force intervenes in the skies over Suwayda, while the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior announce the deployment of troops and heavy weapons to the borders of the governorate, claiming to be intervening to “end the clashes and restore security.” However, the army is doing nothing to prevent the tribal groups from advancing, taking advantage of their support to move forward along the Bosra al-Harrir–Taara and Oum Walad–Kanaker axes.

Violent clashes are taking place in Al-Mazraa, Al-Thaala, and Kanaker.

Hundreds of displaced persons are fleeing the combat zones, and reception centers have been opened in Salkhad and Shahba.

Videos are beginning to emerge on social media, posted by tribal groups. These videos reveal the involvement of Sheikh **** and foreign fighters.

Statement: Emir Hassan al-Atrash issues a statement declaring that he is in talks with the government and Druze spiritual leaders to find solutions to the conflict.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari also issues a statement rejecting any presence of the government army in the region and calling for international protection.

Tribal groups fired numerous mortar rounds at nine villages and the city of Suwayda, while 200 wounded were reported at the Suwayda hospital. Druze factions announce the death of 22 of their fighters near Al-Thaala and Kanaker, bringing the total number of deaths to 64. Among the fighters is a comrade-in-arms of local revolutionary hero Khaldun Zein ed-Din, Baha Abdullah.

The Druze leadership, along with the Suwayda Medical Corps, call for an end to all violence.

4 p.m. to 7 p.m.

Tribal groups and the government’s army seize Labin, Harran, Al-Dour, Al-Mazraa, and Al-Mjemer. The occupied villages are subjected to systematic destruction and looting of homes.

At this stage, the Suwayda National Hospital has recorded 53 deaths, including women and children, and more than 200 wounded. Al-Hakma Hospital reports that it has received a total of 40 wounded, one of whom has died from his injuries: Asim al-Qontar.

The Israeli air force carried out a strike on the outskirts of Al-Mazraa.

7 p.m. to 8 p.m.

Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari met with several sheikhs from Mayamas at his home in Qanawat. A drone carried out a strike on the city, causing minor material damage.

Statement: The Druze leadership calls for a ceasefire and the expulsion of the Islamist groups responsible for the attack.

11 p.m.

Four missiles strike the city of Suwayda.

Tuesday 15 July

(84 press publications)

5 a.m.

Attacks resume in the village of Kanaker.

8 a.m. to 10 a.m.

Statement: The Druze leadership declares its acceptance of the governement’s army entering the area and requests that it secure the governorate’s internal military and defense institutions, inviting the government to engage in dialogue and calling on Druze self-defense factions to cease resistance, cooperate with the army, and surrender their weapons.

Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari joins this statement, despite his opposition to the Al-Sharaa government.

In the wake of this, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior announce their deployment in central Suwayda, as well as the imposition of a curfew until further notice. They call on residents not to allow fighters to use their homes to target government forces.

Photographs are published showing the deliberate burning of the Christian church in Al-Sawara Al-Kabira by Islamist groups and the government army, which stormed the village two days earlier.

10:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari issues a new statement, retracting his previous statement, which he says he signed due to international pressure.

The director of Salkhad Hospital, Loui Al-Shufi, announces that the hospital has reached capacity after receiving more than 40 wounded.

11 a.m. to 12 p.m.

The government’s armed forces enter the city of Suwayda accompanied by hundreds of Islamist fighters, who undertake the systematic destruction and looting of the city’s shops and monuments. Under the pretext of disarming the factions, these groups enter residential buildings and begin the systematic massacre of civilians they encounter. Snipers take up positions in empty buildings and shoot at civilians trying to move around the streets, while the city is heavily bombed. Mortars are fired at the town of Atil, north of Suwayda.

12:00 p.m. to 1:00 p.m.

The Ministry of Defense declares its intention to transfer control of Suwayda to the forces of the Ministry of Interior and announces a ceasefire, promising to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes and offenses. Images are broadcast showing a military convoy including heavy weapons heading towards the exit of Suwayda, while a Military Police convoy is deployed in Suwayda.

1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.

The commander of the internal security forces for Suwayda, Colonel Ahmed Dalati, and the commander of the internal security forces for Deraa, Colonel Shahir Imran, meet with community leaders in Suwayda to discuss the deployment of internal security forces.

Tribal groups nevertheless continue their war crimes and acts of genocide. Chaos reigns in the city and among the forces present, with social media spreading contradictory messages. Civilians are subjected to humiliation, abuse, and summary executions, while the shabiha of the new regime, Jamil Al-Hassan and Qutayba Yassin, posing as journalists, spread false information mixed with calls for sectarian hatred.

The first images of summary executions of civilians are broadcast, including those of the 13 members of the Al-Radwan family, shot at point-blank range in the living room (madhafeh) of their home, where they believed themselves to be safe: Wessam Fahad Radwan, Ashraf Fahad Radwan, Nasreen Radwan, Omar Muafagh Radwan, Imran Muafagh Radwan, Samer Moazi Radwan, Satea Reza Radwan, Rabee Radwan, Khaldoon Radwan, Khalid Radwan, Essam Radwan, Mamun Sabir Radwan, Majdi Mamun Radwan.

Crowds of civilians are trying to flee Suwayda towards the south.

4:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

An Israeli strike targets a light vehicle belonging to the government’s army near the criminal police building, while Islamists have taken over the governorate headquarters and are advancing on the northeast axis toward the Khaldun Zein ed-Din roundabout and the Qanawat road. At the same time, they are advancing on the south-eastern axis towards the national hospital, where dozens of wounded people have gathered, while the response from Druze self-defense factions is strengthening on the north-western axis towards Walgha and the south-western axis towards Kanaker. Outside the city, violent clashes continue around ‘Ira and Al-Mjemer.

Medical sources in Suwayda report that Dr. Faten Hilal was shot dead by a sniper as she was on her way to the National Hospital to help the overworked staff, along with six members of the Qordab family at the Sultan Basha roundabout: Hisham Qordab, Fajr Qordab, Leith Qordab, Imran Qordab, Zaid Qordab, and Rebal Qordab.

5 p.m.

Regime forces and Islamist groups launch a raid on the national hospital compound.

7 p.m. to 8 p.m.

The director of medical teams at the national hospital, Dr. Omar Obaid, calls on the parties to the conflict to respect the hospital’s neutrality and allow it to operate normally.

Sources report the abduction of civilians by Islamist groups and government forces, while medical sources count more than 20 summary executions. The disappearance of a couple and their son is reported: Eman Naseeb, Nasir al-Hadwe, and Adam.

The government’s official armed forces are gradually withdrawing from the city of Suwayda.

10 p.m. to midnight

Images of the destruction of the Christian Church of As-Sawara Al-Kabira are broadcast as the village is occupied by the government’s armed forces.

Several villages in the region, as well as the city of Suwayda, are subjected to intense bombardment and their streets are the scene of intense clashes. The Salkhad hospital in the south of the governorate declares that it is reaching capacity due to the arrival of numerous injured people.

The Rijal al-Karami community self-defense movement has issued a statement holding the regime’s army responsible for the deaths of a large number of its fighters and accusing it of violating the ceasefire agreement signed prior to its entry into the city of Suwayda. It condemns the numerous abuses committed by the army and the Islamist groups accompanying it and reaffirms the right of the Suwayda community to self-defense.

Wednesday 16 July

(57 press publications)

1:30 p.m.

The media announces the death of Sheikh Marhaj Shaheen (80), originally from Al-Thaala, following the release of a video by tribal groups showing him being humiliated and his moustache shaved off.

Videos filmed by Islamists show trucks leaving Suwayda for Deraa loaded with furniture looted from homes in Al-Thaala.

9 a.m. to 12 p.m.

The city of Suwayda, as well as the villages of Rsas and Sahwet Blata, located 10 kilometers south of it, are subjected to intense mortar bombardment from dawn. Other villages are targeted by Grad rocket fire, while tribal groups invade houses near the junction between the Rsas and Kanaker roads (south of Suwayda). Three residents are kidnapped and then executed: Muhammad al-Barbour, Ra’ed al-Barbour, and Amjad al-Barbour.

Entire families are killed in Sami’, Al-Mazraa, and several other villages after their homes are raided by tribal groups claiming to be members of the General Security.

The area surrounding Suwayda Hospital is the scene of clashes and the target of mortar and RPG fire, while a tank advances toward the building and blocks access to ambulances. Snipers from the government’s armed forces take up positions in the hospital bunker and fire on civilians attempting to receive medical care there. At the end of the clashes, hospital staff declare that the hospital is out of service and blocked by heavy weapons, requesting that patients be transferred to other medical facilities in the province.

The execution by a sniper of Dr. Talaat Fawzi Amer, famous for his participation in the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad, is announced. Medical staff confirmed that all the injuries treated at the hospital were the result of gunshots to the head, including women and children. Reports of crimes and summary executions are multiplying, with the city of Suwayda being invaded by tribal groups who are randomly killing residents in front of their homes, breaking into houses, looting them, and setting them on fire.

12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Statement: The Rijal al-Karama movement issues a statement paying tribute to its martyred fighters and condemning the aggression by government forces, recalling that the Druze factions have not stopped calling for a ceasefire.

The hospital is heavily bombed, while its staff is trapped inside. Armed men move through the Qalaa and Nahdha neighborhoods, shooting at homes and attacking residents in their homes.

Citizen Abdullah Al-Baeini is executed in front of his family during a raid on his home.

A demonstration in support of Suwayda is organized in Aleppo.

2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

The media announces the death of the girl Tala Hussam Al-Shufi, killed by a sniper shot to the head. Her father, Hussam al-Shufi, is also known for his support of the Syrian revolution against Bashar al-Assad.

The Israeli air force is concentrating its strikes on the area around the village of Kanaker, located 8 kilometers southwest of Suwayda, against locations firing mortars at the city.

Numerous accounts are piling up, testifying to large numbers of residents trapped in their homes, hiding in basements, or summarily executed in several neighborhoods of the city of Suwayda by tribal groups as well as by fighters wearing the uniform of the government’s army. Members of the government’s army broke into the hospital and executed two civilian volunteers and several wounded patients. Summary executions of civilians are also reported in the town of Shahba, located 17 kilometers north of Suwayda, along the road to Damascus. Four people are executed in the village of As-Sawara as-Sughra: Mazen Obaid, Zia’ Obaid, Aseel Kamel Obaid, and Abdullah al-Khatib.

The regime’s armed forces and accompanying tribal groups are moving up the road from Suwayda towards Qanawat, the home of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari, and violent clashes are taking place at the National Museum.

A truck loaded with looted furniture is hit by Israeli air strikes as it prepares to leave Suwayda for Deraa.

The governorate remains under siege, with no way out, no electricity, no ADSL, and no telephone lines, while the mobile network is extremely unstable.

Many civilians are heading toward the Jordanian border to escape the fighting and abuses.

4 p.m. to 6 p.m.

Israeli strikes hit the presidential palace and the Ministry of Defense in Damascus. This unnecessary show of force only serves to turn the entire Syrian population against the Suwayda community.

The death toll stands at more than 300 civilians and combatants.

Mass mobilization of Druze combatants to liberate the city of Suwayda from tribal groups.

A group of protesters gathers in front of the Parliament building in Damascus to protest against the military operation in Suwayda.

6 p.m.

The town of Al-Kafr, located 11 kilometers southeast of Suwayda, is targeted by bombing.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari declares that no agreement has been reached with the government, demands the unconditional withdrawal of all armed forces that have invaded the region, and calls for the continued armed defense of the community.

The villages west of Suwayda continue to be systematically looted and their property transferred by tribal groups to Deraa.

Thousands of displaced persons are heading south, while all roads leading out of the Suwayda governorate remain blocked. The national hospital is virtually out of service and corpses are piling up in the streets, while large areas are without electricity and suffering from water shortages. Communication networks are virtually non-existent.

9 p.m.

The US Secretary of State calls on the Syrian government to withdraw its armed forces from Suwayda. Once again, this does not apply to tribal groups that support the government’s army.

Statement: The Rijal al-Karami movement issues a statement declaring that it will not accept any agreement that does not include the total withdrawal of all armed forces committing war crimes in the governorate, and that it will fight to the last combatant until the invaders withdraw from the towns and villages they have occupied.

11 p.m. to midnight

The Ministry of Defense announces the start of the withdrawal of its armed forces. This decision still does not apply to tribal groups that remain in many neighborhoods, particularly in Al-Khudher, Nazla al-Auj, near the Cultural Center, near the al-Omran and al-Zinabqa roundabouts, etc. The national hospital also remains under siege.

Thrusday 17 July

(53 press publications)

Midnight to 1 a.m.

A video confirms the summary execution of a group of civilians near Teshrin Square (recently renamed “Martyr Khaldoun Zein Eddin Square” in honor of a Druze defector from the army who formed a Free Syrian Army battalion against Bashar al-Assad in 2012).

A group of Islamist fighters is captured in Suwayda, including two foreign fighters.

Numerous eyewitness accounts confirm the presence of many bodies in the streets of Suwayda.

The regime’s armed forces begin to withdraw, while tribal groups remain in the city of Suwayda.

6 a.m. to 11 a.m.

After the regime’s armed forces withdrew, Druze factions gradually regained control of the city and discovered the extent of the destruction and crimes committed. Numerous bodies littered the streets of the city and filled the rooms and corridors of the hospital. A large number of businesses were looted, destroyed, and burned.

It takes four hours to collect the bodies from the streets.

11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari issues a new statement calling for support for the families of victims and medical teams, and for the crimes to be documented. He also calls for the opening of a crossing point with Jordan.

Images of the massacres begin to be broadcast.

1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

The national hospital reports receiving 226 bodies, some of which are awaiting identification, and estimates that the total number of victims is likely to exceed 500, most of whom are civilians.

The bodies of 12 members of the same family, the Al-Muz’har family, are found in their apartment in the al-Koum neighborhood, including eight women and girls and an elderly disabled man.

Several bodies belonging to members of the Saraya family are discovered in Teshrin Square.

In several locations throughout the city, bodies of civilians are found in their vehicles riddled with bullets.

Statement: Sheikh Youssef Jarbou’a issued a statement denouncing a massacre organized under the guise of a “simple security operation,” contrary to the precepts of Islam, for which the Syrian state and the countries that support it bear full responsibility. He called on humanitarian organizations and international institutions to investigate and document the crimes.

False information and threats are being spread from phones stolen from the victims, and an intense disinformation campaign is being launched on social media and by mainstream media outlets, including Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabi, Al-Akhbariya, and SyriaTV. The Druze are accused of massacring hundreds of Bedouins, presenting the Druze victims as Bedouins and stirring up a wave of resentment and sectarian hatred on social media and across the country.

Most fake news stories are refuted by the website Verify.sy.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari issues a statement rejecting all violence and calling for the Bedouin population not to be persecuted.

An armed group attacks the village of Walgha.

5 p.m. to 8 p.m.

Videos are circulating showing that Bedouin populations are being welcomed and sheltered in several public buildings in the region, notably in Shahba, Reemt al-Lohof, and Al-Kafr. Rumors are beginning to circulate on social media that these populations are being held hostage.

Friday 18 July

(51 press publications)

1 a.m. to 6 a.m.

Videos show houses on fire in Al-Mazraa.

A wave of fake news reports announced the invasion of Suwayda by Bedouin tribes, but the entry of armed groups has only been confirmed in Thakir and Walgha. False videos alleging crimes committed by Druze factions are circulating on the internet, some of which originate from massacres committed by Israel in Gaza.

Despite the rumors, Druze factions remain in control of most of the province, with the exception of some 20 towns and villages in the west and north.

8 a.m.

At this stage, thousands of Islamist militants across the country are declaring their intention to wage jihad against the Druze, while a number of villages in the west of the governorate remain occupied by the groups responsible for the crimes committed over the past four days.

The regime refuses to send its army back to Suwayda, while Turkey and Saudi Arabia declare their support for it.

12 p.m. to 2 p.m.

Statement: Father Tony Petros, representative of the Roman Catholic Church in Suwayda, calls for reason and peaceful coexistence.

The Druze factions announce the liberation of Suwayda, then Walgha, and the escape of the Islamists to Al-Mazraa.

3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Press release: The Archdiocese of the Roman Orthodox Church of Bosra Hauran and Jabal Arab, represented by Archpriest Antonius Saad, calls for the reopening of roads and an end to the siege that is depriving 300,000 households of water, electricity, medicine, and food.

A new video shows the humiliation of a Red Crescent employee by a member of the tribal groups, who shaves his moustache in front of the camera, as well as the summary execution of medical staff at the national hospital.

5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.

Nearly 80,000 families have been displaced from Suwayda by the violence towards the south of the province and the Jordanian border, while a thousand Bedouin families have been displaced to Deraa.

The hospitals in Suwayda are out of service.

An armed convoy of tribal groups is positioned near Barek coming from the desert, while hundreds of displaced people have taken refuge there in recent hours. They are unable to advance and are content to film the burning of houses left empty by their owners.

The military commander of Rijal al-Karama, Sheikh Abu Dyab, has released a video showing his men liberating Walgha.

6 p.m. to 8 p.m.

The village of Sahwet Blata announces the death of 19 of its residents, killed in a massacre committed while the armed forces of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior were occupying the town. Most of the victims belong to the Al-Bani and Salah families.

The media outlet Al-Raased disputes the Civil Defense’s statement claiming that their employee, who had been missing since Wednesday, July 16, at 6 p.m. at the Al-Omran roundabout, had been kidnapped by Druze factions. It points out that the area was under the control of the government’s armed forces at the time and until late into the night.

10 p.m. to 11 p.m.

Druze factions announce the liberation of the village of ‘Ira, Al-Thaala, and Kafr al-Lohof, where many houses have been looted and burned.

Israel carries out airstrikes on armed groups remaining in the west of the province.

A video is released showing the execution by defenestration of three young men in Suwayda, forced to jump from a balcony by Islamists.

Saturday 19 July

(60 press publications)

1 a.m. to 6 a.m.

The Ministry of the Interior announces a ban on all vehicles and weapons entering Suwayda until further notice and calls on the Bedouin tribal command to withdraw their fighters from Suwayda and surrender their heavy weapons.

The White House envoy announces a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Syria, also signed by Turkey, Jordan, and their neighbors. The Jordanian army deploys on the Syrian border.

Factions continue to respond to attacks by tribal groups in the province.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari confirms the deployment of government internal security forces around the province to prevent the entry of armed groups, prohibits anyone from entering border villages for 48 hours to avoid any initiative that could jeopardize the ceasefire, guarantees protection for Bedouin populations wishing to leave the province, declares the opening of a humanitarian passage to Bosra al-Harir (Deraa) and calls on civil society and armed factions to show responsibility and coordination.

11 a.m. to 2 p.m.

Statement: The Rijal al-Karama movement declares that “government-backed terrorists” continue to attack the province despite the ceasefire, continuing their criminal actions against the civilian population.

2:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Tribal groups continue to carry out attacks on several roads leading to Suwayda, in violation of the ceasefire agreements. A video is circulating showing these groups rejecting the ceasefire agreement.

The bodies of tribal fighters found in the streets are carrying military ID cards proving their affiliation with the Ministry of Defense.

The bodies of around 20 members of Mazhar family, including women and children, are discovered in their home in Suwayda.

Statement: The Archbishop of the Roman Orthodox Church of Bosra Hauran sends a message to the international community calling for immediate intervention to put an end to the barbaric massacres targeting young people and the elderly alike.

5 p.m. to 7 p.m.

The medical staff at Suwayda National Hospital declare that the healthcare system has collapsed and that it is impossible to remove the bodies stored within the hospital grounds, as well as reporting the deaths of patients due to the inability to provide them with adequate treatment.

Druze factions liberate the village of Al-Majdal.

7 p.m. to 9 p.m.

Factions continue to clash with disparate armed groups in certain neighborhoods of Suwayda.

Armed groups attack the towns of Ariqa from Dama, Kafr al-Lohof and Um Zeitun using mortars, heavy weapons and drones, while many residents are still there. The town of Shahba is also under attack.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari confirms that the armed action of the Druze factions has been in response to the imperative of self-defense from the outset and that it is the adversary who is not respecting the ceasefire agreement, with armed gangs continuing to commit crimes against humanity. He calls on the countries that signed the ceasefire to take responsibility and protect the Druze community.

9 p.m. to 11 p.m.

Press release: The Southern Clans Assembly (Bedouins), led by Sheikh Nawaf al-Bashir, declares that reports of the beheading of Bedouin children are false, calls for the total and immediate withdrawal of all Bedouin fighters, reaffirms peaceful coexistence with the Druze, and calls for reason and dialogue.

Statement: The Patriarch of the Roman Orthodox Church of Antioch and the Levant calls for an end to the massacres that are jeopardizing coexistence between communities.

A video is circulating showing “journalists” participating in the destruction of Druze religious symbols inside private homes.

Sky News reports testify to the systematic looting of homes by Islamist groups and the massive transfer of stolen goods to the province of Deraa.

Tribal groups attack Shahba after entering Um Zeitun.

Dimanche 20 Juillet

(52 publications de presse)

10h à 11h

Les factions druzes continuent de résister aux attaques des groupes tribaux au Nord de Shahba et Ariqa, tandis que le pillage et l’incendie des maisons se poursuit dans les villages occupés par les forces armées du régime.

Une vidéo atteste de la mise à l’abris des familles bédouines au centre d’accueil temporaire de Shahba.

12h à 14h

Des vidéos montrant les familles bédouines accueillies et prises en charge dans des centres d’accueil sont diffusées par la communauté druze pour démentir les rumeurs selon lesquelles ces familles seraient prises en otages et maltraitées.

Un premier convoi humanitaire du Croissant Rouge entre à Suwayda.

Communiqué : le sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari exige la fin des actions armées et le retrait de toute les forces armées affiliées au régime, accueille l’entrée de l’aide humanitaire dans la province et appelle à la fin immédiate des attaques haineuses contre la communauté, ainsi que les campagnes médiatiques mensongères visant à attiser la haine. Il demande aussi le rétablissement des lignes électriques et des communications et la libération des prisonniers et otage, qui doivent être livrés à 18h sur la place du village de Um Zeitun.

14h à 17h

Des images témoignent de la destruction totale des hangars de stockage du Croissant Rouge à Suwayda.

Communiqué : L’ONU établit une liste des besoins urgents pour Suwayda, à savoir l’ouverture d’un passage sécurisé pour les civils, l’entrée d’aide médicale, d’eau et de nourriture ainsi que l’accès sécurisé et la protection des travailleurs humanitaires.

Publication d’une liste de 25 résidents de Suwayda pris en charge à l’hôpital de Deraa.

17h à 22h

Les factions annoncent la libération complète de Um Zeitun, tandis que Ariqa continue de résister aux attaques des groupes tribaux. Des échanges de tirs ont lieu à Reemat Hazm.

17 femmes de Suwayda sont rappatriées saines et sauves vers Jaramana depuis Deraa.

Des images témoignent des nombreuses violations, destructions et pillages d’habitations commis par les groupes tribaux et les forces gouvernementales dans les villages de Kanaker et Mazraa.

22h à minuit

Les sources médicales annoncent que plus de 600 corps ont été amenés à l’hôpital national depuis le début des massacres, indiquant que cela ne prend pas en compte les corps emmenés aux hôpitaux de Salkhad, Shahba et Sali, ainsi que les corps enterrés sans avoir été emmenés à l’hôpital et les nombreux corps toujours parsemés dans les rues.

Monday 21 July

(33 press publications)

11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

Druze factions continue to resist attacks by tribal groups in Shahba and Um Zeitun, which are making extensive use of drones. This is the thirteenth time that tribal groups have violated the ceasefire agreement.

Druze factions manage to stop attacks on the village of Ariqa from the three axes of Dama, Najran, and Harran.

The US special envoy declares that the Syrian regime must be held accountable.

1:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.

The transfer of bodies from the Suwayda National Hospital for burial has begun with the help of the Red Crescent. All bodies have been photographed in advance in accordance with legal procedures.

A list of 25 patients from Suwayda being treated at Al-Razi Hospital in Damascus is made public to reassure their relatives.

3 p.m. to 7 p.m.

New mortar fire hits the town of Ariqa.

Christian churches in the region open their doors to serve as emergency medical centers and provide vehicles to serve as ambulances.

Many volunteers participate in cleaning up the Suwayda National Hospital.

The Al-Mazraa hospital announces that it is once again operational.

The Suwayda Bar Association announces its collective resignation in protest against the denial of terrorist crimes and massacres committed in the province.

Students from Suwayda residing in other governorates are being threatened on social media by Islamists, who are publishing their photographs and addresses.

Armed men attack the village of Hayat.

7 p.m. to 8 p.m.

Press release: The Rijal al-Karama movement disputes the false information spread by media outlets complicit in the massacres, claiming that Laith al-Balous is their leader, pointing out that he has been leading his own movement since 2016. It points out that in the face of the aggression against the community, all components of the mountain form a united bloc.

Evidence of a new massacre of civilians by the forces of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of the Interior is emerging: engineer Samir Hussein Hamidan was found murdered in his home in his wheelchair, along with two members of his family.

A group of lawyers is preparing a legal case establishing the responsibility of the Director of Security for Suwayda, Colonel Ahmed Haytham Dalati, and the Director of Security for Deraa, Colonel Shahir Jabbar Imran, in the commission of war crimes.

8 p.m. to 9 p.m.

Tribal groups continue their attacks on the village of Um Zeitun and the town of Shahba, targeting wheat and flour reserves in a clear attempt to facilitate the siege imposed by the regime. The youth of Majadil put up fierce resistance to the tribal groups and call for reinforcements.

A video taken from CCTV footage in a shop in Suwayda confirms that members of the government armed forces played an active role in the massacres of civilians on July 15 and 16: a sheikh is shot dead at point-blank range in the street by men wearing General Security uniforms while walking unarmed in the street. Other videos show raids on private homes and violent attacks on residents.

There are also increasing reports of summary executions, implicating both tribal groups and government forces.

10 p.m. to midnight

As calm seems to be returning, more than twenty villages have been completely destroyed and burned down.

The Rijal al-Karama movement has announced the death of 46 of its fighters since the attacks began.

A first convoy of tanker trucks carrying fuel and gasoline entered Suwayda from Bosra al-Sham toward the town of Al-Qurayya.

Tuesday 22 July

(41 press publications)

9 a.m. to 12 p.m.

The population of more than 30 villages in Suwayda has been evacuated and displaced due to attacks by government forces and their tribal auxiliaries.

Employees of the Suwayda electricity company attempting to restore power to lines near Kanakr warn of the presence of snipers. The company reports that it has lost numerous vehicles and seven of its best employees in the massacres.

Filmed testimonies from victims of the attacks are multiplying, while a new surveillance video shows members of government forces engaging in the destruction and looting of businesses during their temporary occupation of Suwayda on July 15 and 16.

12:00 p.m. to 3:00 p.m.

Statement: Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari calls for restrictions on the sharing of sectarian and provocative publications and speeches, while reminding people that the Bedouins are part of the community, should not be persecuted, and must be protected.

Videos and photographs show the destruction of property and homes in the village of Najran.

5 p.m. to 6 p.m.

The effects of the 10-day siege of the province by government forces are beginning to seriously impact the population, which is lacking water due to a total power outage preventing pumps from operating to retrieve water from wells. At the same time, numerous fires are mobilizing tanker trucks to enable firefighters to extinguish the blazes.

9 p.m. to 11 p.m.

Press release: The archbishop of the Roman Orthodox Church of Bosra Hauran and the Arab Mountain denounces false reports claiming that Christians are being expelled from the province and reiterates that Christians are defending their land and heritage while providing protection and spiritual and community support to the population.

A new video has been released showing the summary execution of Al-Thaala resident Mounir Al-Rajma by members of the government forces when he declared himself to be Syrian after they asked him if he was Druze.

LEGENDE:

• Green – Area under regime’s control before 22 of July.
• Brown – Mountain “Jabal al-Arab”
• Red dots – Towns under control of the regime (30 of them entirely destroyed)
• Pink dots – Towns attacked but not occupied.
• Green dots – Main cities in Deraa from which the tribes departed.

The fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024 was an undeniable liberation for millions of Syrians, who suddenly and unexpectedly emerged from fifty years of totalitarian barbarism that had transformed Syria into a field of ruins doubling as a concentration camp archipelago, since which several hundred thousand civilians have disappeared or been forced into exile.

Liberation, not revolution

As early as December 9, Ahmed al-Sharaa proclaimed himself leader of the new Syria, categorically rejecting all forms of power-sharing, decentralization and federalism, while taking care never to use the term democracy, before declaring in an interview with Syria TV on December 15 – just one week after the fall of Assad – that it was now “crucial to abandon the revolutionary mentality”. It is legitimate to ask: When was Al-Sharaa ever revolutionary?

On December 29, Al-Sharaa asserted that no elections could be held for another four years, which is understandable given the deplorable situation of Syrian civil society, but not at all reassuring coming from a person who rejects the very concept of democracy, whatever its form. At the same time, he announced the forthcoming adoption of a new constitution at a hypothetical National Dialogue Conference, which would bring the transition period to a close. At this stage, the most optimistic were still waiting to “see what happens”.

On January 29, Al-Sharaa was appointed President of the Syrian Arab Republic by the Syrian General Command (embodied by himself) at a “Victory Conference”. The Syrian constitution and all the institutions inherited from the Baath Party and the Assad dictatorship were subsequently abolished. No one will regret them.

On February 12, Al-Sharaa set up a 7-member preparatory committee[1] to organize the National Dialogue Conference, which took 10 days to prepare and opened on February 24. It brought together 600 people – many of whom had been invited less than two days earlier by SMS – and excluded any representation from the Syrian Northeast Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces. The discussions lasted just one day, and objectively achieved nothing, apart from a superficial reaffirmation of the needs already formulated by everyone: transitional justice, respect for public and political freedoms, the role of civil society organizations in rebuilding the country, constitutional and institutional reform, respect for national sovereignty and the State monopoly on arms. To this was added a symbolic declaration condemning the Israeli incursion.

On March 2, Al-Sharaa set up a 5-member committee[2] to draft a proposed constitution, which was drawn up in 10 days and adopted on March 13 for a 5-year transitional period. The new constitution stipulates that the president must be of Muslim faith and makes Islamic jurisprudence a pillar of constitutional law, while pledging to “protect minorities”, as Bashar al-Assad had also pledged. Four days later, several hundred Alawite civilians were massacred on the coast.

On March 29, Al-Sharaa dissolved the provisional government led by Prime Minister Mohammed al-Bashir, replacing it with a Transitional Government and appointing 23 ministers[3], nine of them from HTS. With civil society insisting on respect for diversity and women’s rights, Al-Sharaa appointed the only woman in the government, also a Christian, to the post of Minister of Social Affairs. If he’d wanted to be cynical, he couldn’t have done a better job. In addition, all ministers are now appointed directly by the President, while the position of Prime Minister has been abolished. It should be pointed out that a presidential regime without a prime minister is not very different from a monarchy.

In less than three months, Ahmed al-Sharaa has subtly and without opposition established himself as head of state, implementing a presidential regime that can best be described as autocratic.

Political transition in the shadow of the Astana agreements

Since 1970, Syria has followed in the footsteps of its Russian sponsor. If we are familiar with the Russian system of power and analyze the Syrian system under Assad, we discover the same modes of predation, plunder and clan-based corruption, the same cynical contempt of the loyalist elites for the majority of the people, the same policy of abandonment and voluntary impoverishment of the country, but also and finally the same collective cult of the leader, Even if he clearly lacks charisma. Ironically, Assad came to power at the same time as Putin, becoming both his copy and his disciple. Since the start of the popular revolution in 2011, Assad has acted exactly as Putin does or would do in his own country in the event of an insurrection, by denying the very existence of the revolt and causing half the country’s population to die, disappear or flee, rather than engaging in any semblance of reform that might win back a modicum of popular support. Obstinacy and criminal denial are what Assad and Putin have most in common. The only real difference between them is that Putin has not yet experienced a full-scale popular uprising, and has therefore not had the opportunity to deploy his totalitarian know-how to the full.

In reality, nothing could be worse than the Assad regime, and the only valid comparison would be with the Stalinist dictatorship. The model remains Russian, always. Consequently, the shadow of Russia will not cease to hang over the lives of Syrians overnight. What’s more, it’s legitimate to think that Assad’s downfall could only have been achieved with Putin’s cooperation or consent. Before crying conspiracy, let’s recall a few facts we all know.

Russia has no friends, only clients, vassals and debtors. Syria has lived on Russia’s and then Iran’s credit for several decades, and their interventionism in the Syrian civil war was motivated by the need to repay the debts contracted by the Assad clan. Like the United States, Turkey and the Gulf petro-monarchies, each has placed its pawns on the Syrian chessboard, modifying alliances and geostrategic priorities according to circumstances and their fluctuating interests. Against their will, or even without their knowledge, Syrian communities and factions have become the proxies of a game that has quickly overtaken them. And any attempt to detect a logic based on polarized alliances, axes or camps with clear demarcations is bound to be misguided or mistaken. There are no friendships or solidarities between states, only opportunities and maneuvers.

From the outset of the popular uprising in 2011, Iran and Hezbollah were the first to intervene to protect the Syrian regime and keep control of the routes between Iraq and Lebanon, while developing their military-commercial hold in Syria. The USA, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, with logistical support from Jordan, Great Britain and Israel, intervened in parallel, supplying arms to nearly fifty groups linked to the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian opposition embodied by the Syrian Interim Government in exile (in Turkey), including Islamist groups linked to the al-Nosra Front and united from 2015 under the umbrella of the Army of Conquest. Qatar and Turkey are thus among the main creditors of the al-Nosra Front (2012-2017), then Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (2016-2017) and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (2017-2025).

With the Russian intervention, the capture of Kobane and the Paris attacks by the Islamic State in 2015, the strategies of both sides have evolved. The Paris attacks, following on from Assad’s release of Islamist prisoners in 2011, largely contributed to the international community turning its gaze away from the regime’s barbarity to focus on the jihadist scarecrow. Each has thus justified its intervention in Syria by the fight against the Islamic State: the United States gradually withdrew its support for Salafist groups to redirect it in favor of the Kurdish YPG/YPJ, then the FDS, with a focus on the fight against the Islamic State, while Russia sent its Wagner mercenaries to recruit Syrians into the “ISIS hunters” battalion before sending them to secure the regime’s oil farms or serve as cannon fodder in Libya (which Turkey also did). But in reality, the Islamic State was struck with one hand and fed with the other by Turkey, Russia and the Assad regime alike, which never ceased to dispose of jihadist cells as it suited them, moving them from right to left to commit atrocities to divert attention from their own crimes and intrigues, destabilizing certain areas or populations that bothered them, or to legitimize the use of force where they lacked sufficiently valid reasons. The jihadist is a practical tool.

And contrary to popular belief, Russia, the United States and its allies (Jordan, Israel and Turkey) have not clashed militarily on Syrian soil[4]. On the contrary, in 2016 and 2017, the US, Russia and Turkey reached an agreement to set up joint air operations aimed at striking Islamic State and al-Nosra Front[5] [6]positions. Following on from this, Russia signed agreements with the USA, Israel and Jordan in 2017[7] [8] to keep the Islamists (Hezbollah and Islamic State) out of the Golan Heights and the Jordanian border, which led to the recapture of Deraa by the Syrian regime and Russia in 2018, culminating in the elimination of the Islamic State pocket in the Yarmouk basin and the surrender of the Deraa rebels as well as their integration into the normalization processes with Assad. It should be noted that all the agreements signed by Russia were signed with the consent of Bashar al-Assad[9]. Without going into further detail, it is quite clear that in the Syrian context there has never been any real duality between the “axis of evil” and the “axis of resistance”.

As early as 2015, two influential figures close to the Syrian and Russian regimes, Randa Kassis and Fabien Baussart, had begun suggesting the implementation of a peace process for Syria at a conference in Astana, Kazakhstan. After two years of fruitless talks in Geneva under the aegis of the UN, Astana finally established itself in 2017 as a negotiating space between Russia, Turkey, Iran, the Assad regime and a dozen Syrian rebel factions, led by Jaysh al-Islam, with the UN relegated to observer status. Russia and Turkey clearly showed their leadership in the discussions, with Russia even proposing a draft constitution for the future “Republic of Syria”, introducing a decentralized, federalist and secular system that would abolish Islamic jurisprudence as the source of law.  Turkey, the Arab League, the pro-Turkish opposition and Al-Assad were categorically opposed to any form of federalism. To better understand the content and outcome of these talks in the light of recent events, it may be useful to recall that Russia had proposed Assad’s resignation back in 2012, but that this proposal had been refused by the USA, Great Britain and France on the pretext that Assad was “about to be overthrown” (sic). It seems that Turkey has taken the lead over Russia in these negotiations between 2019 and 2023, before designing in its corner the modalities of the political transition in Syria. Russia has been stymied by Bashar Al-Assad’s obstinacy in believing himself invincible and obstructing any proposals for constitutional reform, particularly since his return to the international stage at the Arab League summit in Jeddah in June 2023.

On the eve of the regime’s fall, Russia, Turkey and Iran met in Doha in the presence of 5 members of the Arab League (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan and Qatar) to declare the end of hostilities. In the wake of this, the Russian air force suddenly halted its strikes after nine years of incessant bombing, and Russian troops peacefully withdrew to their bases in Hmeimim and Tartus, where they remain to this day in application of the Doha agreements. Under these agreements, Russia gave Assad, his clan and his allies guarantees of security and amnesty in exchange for the general withdrawal of his army, while Iran negotiated the protection of Shi’ite holy sites. On the evening of December 7-8, Assad’s inner circle packed their bags, before being efficiently evacuated by plane from Syria to Russia and the Gulf States, including Bashar Jaafari, the main negotiator of the Astana agreements and Syria’s ambassador to Russia[10]. All without Israel shooting down their aircraft in flight, obviously.

As early as December 29, 2024, Al-Sharaa declared that Syria shared deep strategic interests with Russia, evacuating out of hand its manifest complicity with the Assad regime and the latter’s responsibility for the massacre of thousands of civilians since 2015[11].

At the end of January 2025, a Russian delegation led by Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and Russian Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentyev came to Damascus to set the framework and criteria for further bilateral relations. Al-Sharaa then laid down its conditions, demanding financial compensation for the crimes committed and the extradition of Assad to Syria, knowing full well that Russia would never agree.

At the beginning of March, just as the massacres on the coast had driven hundreds of Alawite civilians to take refuge on the Hmeimim base, Russia hypocritically offered its help to stabilize the situation in Syria. The following month saw the beginnings of a new military cooperation with Turkey and Russia, with Al-Sharaa admitting that the bulk of Syria’s military equipment was supplied by Russia, that Syria remained dependent on numerous contracts with Russia in the food and energy sectors, and that its veto power at the United Nations posed a serious threat to the prospect of lifting the sanctions that were heavily affecting the country.

What we can conclude from all this data is that the destiny of the Syrians will remain intimately linked to the desiderata of Erdogan and Putin. We could call this constraint the “Curse of Astana”.

What about foreign jihadists?

First, a few biographical and contextual facts.

Ahmed al-Sharaa was born in 1982 in the same place as Osama bin Laden – Riyadh, Saudi Arabia – and lived in Syria between 1989 and 2003. Before the start of the American invasion of Iraq, he went to Baghdad, where he joined the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda, which its leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had just founded after pledging allegiance to Bin Laden. Arrested in 2006, he then spent five years in American prisons. Released after bin Laden’s elimination on May 2, 2011, his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri sent al-Sharaa to Syria in August to establish the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, in collaboration with the Islamic State in Iraq then led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. As fate would have it, at exactly the same time, Bashar al-Assad amnestied and released hundreds of Islamists from Sednaya prison, including a number of notorious militants[12] who simultaneously set up, within a quarter of their release, the main Salafist groups responsible for the fragmentation and subsequent Islamization of the Free Syrian Army (FSA): Liwa al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham.

In the world of Islamist armed groups, armed confrontations, wars of power, alliances of circumstance and recompositions have followed one another unceasingly, culminating in large-scale mergers in 2017 within the Syrian National Army (Jaysh al-Watani as-Suri) and the Levant Liberation Organization (Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS), under the aegis of Turkey. These recompositions coincide with international negotiations within the framework of the Astana process mentioned above. This was the moment when a number of Islamist factions, faced with a stalemate in their trench warfare with the Assad regime, were prompted to change their strategy and adopt a nationalist and revolutionary rhetoric, while cleaning up on their most radical wings. Al-Sharaa’s associate and accomplice since 2011, Anas Hassan Khattab, held the position of HTS intelligence officer[13], a position he retains in the Syrian government. In this position he was responsible for eliminating HTS rivals in the Idleb pocket, notably Hurras al-Din and DAESH cells, an operation he carried out in collaboration with Turkish and US intelligence services.

Their jihadist approach was then gradually abandoned in favor of a political and technocratic management of the areas under their control, embodied in particular by the new Syrian Salvation Government. Clearly, Turkey and Russia exerted a major influence on the evolution of the Syrian rebellion at this time, even though the two main factions forming HTS did not participate in the Astana negotiations[14]. Nevertheless, no one is deceived by the role played by the two imperialists in this cynical game of chess.

At that time, Ahmed al-Sharaa was still Abu Mohammad al-Joulani, and whatever his populist strategy of “Syrianization” to become a credible interlocutor on the international stage, everyone knows very well that he could never have kept control of the situation without keeping at his side the jihadist dogs of war that have always formed the core of his troops. And among them, the hundreds of international jihadi hitmen whom he would need to thank should he win the final battle to topple Al-Assad.

This is precisely what happened after the fall of the regime. In late December 2024, Al-Sharaa appointed several Syrian and foreign jihadists[15] and war criminals from its inner circle to positions of authority in the new army, referring to the forthcoming dissolution of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group as a precondition for lifting sanctions against the HTS leadership and Syria. A month later, 18 armed factions declared that they were disbanding to join the new national army, although no official list of the factions concerned was made public.

In concrete terms, hundreds of criminals benefited from a general amnesty and the normalization of jihad. A month later, the transitional government announced that it was considering granting citizenship to foreign anti-Assad fighters who had lived in Syria for several years, a decision that would not prevent the lifting of sanctions against Syria, even though this appeared to be a central demand on the part of the United States.

Rewarding its mercenaries seems more important than finally alleviating the suffering of Syrians: normalizing international jihad or Syrian revolution, Al-Sharaa seems to have chosen. We can also read in the background that the new strongman of Damascus may not have a complete choice, and that after years of trying to purify his ranks of the most extremists following the wise advice of his Turkish godfather, nobody knows better than he does that the only way to continue reigning supreme over a furious horde is to keep it close to you and share pieces of the feast with it. Nor is he unaware that many jihadists want him dead, especially now that he’s shaking hands with all their sworn enemies.

To illustrate this nepotism, the provisional government announced a few days earlier that it had begun the process of revoking the citizenship of almost 740,000 foreign pro-Assad fighters, including Iranians, Iraqis, Afghans, Pakistanis and Lebanese. Where there’s a will, there’s a way. Rather than guaranteeing justice for all crimes committed against Syrians, Al-Sharaa’s decision confirms that all foreign mercenaries are not treated equally. Hence, his own can continue to persecute infidels and heretics in peace.

Sectarianism and tribalism: the twin scourges of Syria

When Turkey whispered in Al-Sharaa’s ear that federalist demands must not be given free rein, it was a clear message not only to the armed Kurdish factions, but also to all other armed and political forces drawn from minorities. Everyone immediately thought of the Alawites and the Druze. The former have no armed factions attached to communal demands, apart from the remnants of the regime who are still hiding here and there, but who neither represent nor protect their community. The latter, on the contrary, benefit from powerful community self-defense structures embodied by more than twenty factions committed to protecting the integrity, interests and cultural identity of their community, while enjoying solid solidarity networks among Druze communities abroad, particularly in occupied Palestine, Lebanon and among the diaspora in the rest of the world.

For the new authority in Damascus, the three communities represent a considerable balance of power and diplomatic stakes, and even a threat to the hegemonic, centralized and mono-confessional state project defended by Al-Sharaa and its main international sponsors: Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, Russia, the United States and Israel are on the lookout to exploit the three communities’ demands for autonomy or decentralization, while Europe and the UN are eternally applying the same paternalistic schemes that would have us believe that minorities need protectors – and therefore a protectorate – even though a majority of the populations we’re talking about don’t wish to be chaperoned or protected by foreign powers. But whatever the true opinion of the various populations, the sectarianism that the Assad regime has promoted for several decades continues to prevail over any egalitarian or democratic consideration. Conspiracy theories, binary analyses and even analyses clearly based on sectarian or xenophobic biases combine with the aggressive propaganda of the various imperialisms to produce a constant media noise in which it is impossible to see clearly and keep a cool head. In contrast to 2011, when instant communication was still relatively undeveloped, social networks are now joining the traditional media in conveying and giving resonance to the most implausible rumors, which are nonetheless credible enough to incite anyone to violence and denial of the crimes committed. This is how, when the regime fell, the paranoid fantasies of the West about the massacre of minorities came true in part, like self-fulfilling prophecies, but less suddenly than predicted.

Before continuing, it is absolutely essential to distinguish between the scenario of the Syrian Coast massacres in early March and the violent confrontations targeting the Druze community in early May. In the former case, it was the remnants of the deposed regime, united in groups called the “Coastal Shield Brigade”, the “Military Council for the Liberation of Syria” and the “Syrian Popular Resistance”[16], who initiated the confrontation with the central authority in Damascus. Several sources suggest that these groups, made up of war criminals and torturers who remained loyal to Assad, were supported by Russia and/or Iran in an attempt to foment a takeover of power on the coast, or even beyond. In any case, these few hundred remnants launched a coordinated offensive against checkpoints, government buildings and hospitals, seizing entire districts in the towns of Jableh, Baniyas and Qardaha and indiscriminately attacking civilians and the Security forces who had arrived to put an end to the insurgency. In the bosom of General Security and in response to its call for volunteers on Telegram[17], thousands of radical fighters more or less affiliated to Salafist groups, themselves more or less affiliated to the Syrian National Army and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, rushed to the coast with the intention of punishing loyalists as well as the entire Alawite civilian community from which they hail. Among these, there are still groups that have not disbanded, and are even hostile to Al-Sharaa, but regard General Security as one of the armed wings of the Sunni community seeking revenge. The loyalist insurrection and the ensuing ethno-confessional cleansing resulted in the massacre of between 823 and 1659 civilians and the death of around 260 fighters on each side[18], with both sides participating in the massacre of civilians.

In the second case, it all started with the broadcasting of a false recording insulting the Prophet Mohammed and attributed to a Druze clerick, Marwan Kiwan. From a polemic on social networks, the situation quickly evolved into a sectarian and xenophobic riot at Homs University, initiated by petro-engineering student Abbas Al-Khaswani, who had taken part in the bloody offensive against the Alawite community the previous month. This student was filmed delivering a hate speech against the Druze, Alawites and Kurds, followed by a mob of students circulating around the university grounds, randomly attacking seemingly non-Muslim students. The transitional government initially thanked the rioters for their religious zeal in defense of the Prophet, before timidly denying the authenticity of the audio recording. In the 48 hours that followed, armed groups stormed the predominantly Druze (and Christian) towns of Jaramana, Sahnaya and Ashrafiyet-Sahnaya, although it is not clear who these groups were composed of. However, a number of corroborating sources point the finger at networks of Bedouins and Islamist fighters from Deir Ez-Zor, Dera’a and Ghouta. In response, Druze factions in Suwayda mobilized and a convoy set off on the road to Damascus to support local factions in Sahnaya. The convoy was then ambushed, resulting in the death of more than forty Druze fighters, before a further ten villages in the Suwayda region were attacked for three days by groups from Dera’a and the region’s Bedouin tribes. General Security finally deployed its forces all around the governorate to prevent further groups from entering from Dera’a, but this stranglehold on the region was accompanied by pressure on Druze leaders to agree to the disarmament of factions and the entry of General Security forces into Suwayda, which was refused. In exchange, an agreement was reached on the activation of the police and General Security in the governorate, on the sole condition that all its members be from the region. When General Security withdrew from the only village it had occupied, residents found their homes and holy places burnt and looted. Two days after the end of hostilities, dozens of Suwayda students left their universities in Damascus and Homs, while the road to Damascus remains threatened by armed groups who have fired on vehicles and placed a checkpoint under their control, while General Security seemed powerless or complicit. At the same time, the transitional government has surprisingly appointed three Bedouin tribal leaders from Deir Ez-Zor to head the intelligence, anti-corruption and supreme council of Syrian tribes and clans[19]. It’s legitimate to wonder whether this is voluntary gratification or the result of blackmail and pressure tactics exerted by the powerful Bedouin tribes of the Al-Uqaydat confederation to reclaim a slice of the cake.

What these events say about Syria today is that you can’t remain President of Syria without, on the one hand, exacerbating intra-community prejudices and tensions in order to retain control over the regions, and, on the other, being endorsed by the country’s most reactionary forces and their allies abroad. It also demonstrates that Syrian society has not yet healed, nor is it likely to do so in the near future, from the diseases of sectarianism and the clanism that goes with it. After decades of intellectual regression and depoliticization accomplished with the whip of the Ba’ath’s national socialism, Syria has gradually returned to its pre-existing tribal and feudal reflexes. In this fertile breeding ground, the Islamic model – which rejects secularism, democracy and popular representation – once again gives free reign to the heads of large families (sheikhs), warlords and other Emirs, whose ability to impose a balance of power will determine their proximity to this power and their legitimacy in sharing its usufruct. Al-Sharaa’s own seizure of power demonstrated that all it takes to be legitimate is to be the strongest. And whoever can demonstrate military strength as well as loyalty will be duly thanked. This is what the leaders of the armed groups who fought for the fall of the regime have obtained, and who have agreed to dissolve their groups within the national army. It’s also what the Al-Uqaydat confederation may have just obtained, after responding to the call to teach the “heretics” of Suwayda a lesson, while agreeing to withdraw once the government had obtained an initial compromise from the Druze leaders.

The virile, archaic adventure of crossing the desert to subjugate unsubmissive neighbors in order to demonstrate allegiance to the sultan and his pashas reflects a return to the feudal model that preceded the French colonial mandate. What distinguishes it, and gives the current situation an all the more terrifying dimension, is the persistence of the racist and genocidal dehumanization practices introduced by the Western colonialists, adapted to the local context by the jihadists[20] since the 1980s and brought to a climax by the Assad dictatorship. Perhaps the most notable expression of these new modes of virilist terror is the filming of Alawite men barking while Druze men have their moustaches shaved, before taking them away in shackles to an unknown destination. In truth, there is nothing to distinguish this racist practice from that of Israeli soldiers against Palestinian Arabs, which reinforces the idea that it is indeed an import from the West. Thus, a significant part of the younger generation of Sunni Muslims who did not participate in the 2011 revolution but grew up during the civil war seem to be following a similar path of fascization to that of Bashar’s shabiha[21], notably by flooding news feeds and social networks with sectarian publications and comments advocating revenge and murder in the name of defending their allegedly threatened ethno-confessional identity. The paranoid logic of believing that everyone around you wants to destroy you naturally induces a reflex of withdrawal into oneself and around the charismatic leader who is supposed to guarantee your protection. So it’s not surprising to see Al-Sharaa presented by Sunni Muslims – especially the younger ones – as the providential hero of a revolution carried out exclusively by and for their community, while other communities are denied their participation in the revolution against Assad. The Revolution of all Syrians appears to have been hijacked by apologetic and mystical discourses presenting HTS’s seizure of power as a divine achievement, likened to the return of the Umayyads for some, or the Ottomans for others.  It’s the Ummah rewarded. We shouldn’t be surprised, therefore, that Al-Sharaa celebrated its victory at the Umayyad Mosque, and that old takfirist Imams such as Sheikh Adnan al-Arur – who is known for systematically peppering his sermons with interfaith hatred – are invited back to Syria after years of exile and welcomed there as masterminds of a Sunni revolution that would have prevailed over “45 years of minority rule[22]”. Meanwhile, in the shadows, a majority of moderate, progressive and pacifist Sunni Muslim Syrians – including the federalist Kurds – are once again essentialized by the extremism of a minority that agitates in the spotlight, and holds power by force of arms.

The ultra-confessional interpretation of social and political relations by fundamentalist clerics, to which members of the government and their supporters continue to belong, leads to dangerous simplifications that result in the Assad family being absolved of responsibility for its dictatorship by an entire community, the Alawites, or even all the minorities associated with them: Shi’ites, Druze, Ismailis or even the Murshidis[23], of whom hardly anyone ever hears, but of whom a dozen members have been executed since December by “unidentified individuals” in Latakia, Hama and Homs.  Similarly, several hundred civilians, including children and women, have been murdered since the fall of the regime, particularly in the Homs countryside where some villages have seen several of their residents executed on the same day by armed groups intervening as part of or alongside the “security operations” carried out by General Security[24]. So it’s not a revolution that has been taking place in Syria since December 2024, but the revenge of 50 – 60% of Syrians against everyone else. As a result, we can better understand the new authority’s reluctance to implement the transitional justice mechanisms needed to complete the revolution: not only is this not a priority, since it would highlight the persecution of all communities without exception, but also because it would lead to many of the new authority’s representatives themselves being incriminated and prosecuted for their crimes [25].

No transitional justice, no peace

The demand for justice was pounded out by the collectives of families of the disappeared from the very first hours after the fall of the regime, when the world was pretending to discover for the first time the extent of the horror it had represented. Syrian society, which has suffered violence without being in a position to inflict it, is unanimous: no social peace or regime that respects Syrians can exist without transitional justice. If Syrian communities are to heal from half a century of dictatorship and live together once again, the representatives of the new government have no choice but to arrest as quickly as possible all the dignitaries of the regime and all those who actively participated in the disappearance, torture and murder of tens of thousands of Syrians. Obviously, when we refer to justice, we’re not speaking of summary executions, show trials, closed-door hearings and public killings that reproduce the traumas generated by Takfirist barbarism, but of transparent justice that respects the fundamental principles of the right to defense and the dignity of the accused. Avenging blood and humiliation with blood and humiliation is not what Syrian society needs. On the contrary, in order to regenerate itself and emerge from the cycle of violence, it needs to demonstrate fairness and integrity, but also severity, towards those who have shown nothing but sadism and cruelty towards it. The objective must remain resilience, not the mere primary satisfaction of revenge instincts.

It is also clear that the systematic prosecution of all members of the deposed regime’s army and militias is not possible and would be an extremely dangerous undertaking, leading to large-scale purges and endless settling of scores. A very instructive interview with the Director of the Syrian National Network for Human Rights, Fadel Abdul Ghani, published by the Syrian media Enab Baladi[26], describes the transitional justice process that could potentially be implemented in Syria. In it, Abdul Ghani distinguishes between a judicial component and a civil component, the latter taking the form of “Truth and Reconciliation” commissions. He estimates the number of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity linked to the former regime at 16,200, 90% of whom would be military personnel, and considers that only first- and second-rank army officers could be concerned by criminal proceedings, while third- to sixth-rank officers would be included in the program of reconciliation commissions. Non-military officials, including businessmen, would not be exempt from prosecution.

It is currently impossible to know whether this coherent framework has been accepted and implemented by the new authorities. Beyond the brief communication from the Ministry of the Interior on its Telegram feed at the time of their arrest, there is no transparent mechanism for determining the fate of those under investigation. No special court has been mentioned, nor any judicial deadline. For the past four months, the self-proclaimed government has shown a deplorable lack of commitment to this issue, and the impunity enjoyed by some of the former regime’s high-ranking criminals is helping to erode Syrians’ confidence. The diplomatic evacuation of the Assad clan to Russia and the United Arab Emirates was already a first betrayal of the Syrians and the Revolution. The appointment of a whole series of takfirists and war criminals to positions of responsibility, while promising foreign takfirists access to citizenship, was a second.

Beyond these highly flawed decisions taken in the name of short-term stability, the new authority has also arrested a number of notorious criminals from the former regime, only to release them due to “lack of evidence”, “ regularizing” their situation or even granting them outright amnesty. The best example is undoubtedly that of the Commander-in-Chief of the National Defense Forces (Quwat ad-Difa’a al-Watani), Fadi Ahmad aka “Fadi Saqr”, who is directly responsible for numerous massacres, the best known of which is that of Tadamon in April 2013, or that of Talal Shafik Makhlouf, Commander-in-Chief of the Republican Guard and Director of the Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Armed Forces, responsible for the murders of numerous demonstrators during the peaceful protests in Douma, Harasta, Nawa and Dera’a in 2011. To these can be added the cases of Mohammad Ghazi al-Jalali, former Minister of Communications and then Prime Minister, and Mohammad al-Shaar, former Minister of Interior[27], as well as a number of other high-ranking figures in the repressive apparatus of the Assad regime, who have since benefited from so-called “regularization” measures in exchange for their collaboration. Thus, on February 7, 2025, the residents of Tadamon reacted angrily to Fadi Saqr’s visit to the scene of his own crimes in the company of General Security officials, with the stated aim of “coming clean” by denouncing his former accomplices[28].  Two months later, the authorities were conspicuous by their absence from the commemoration of the April 16 massacre, while no security perimeter or forensic investigation of any significance has been set up on the block of buildings that served for several years as the National Defense’s “execution zone”, and where mass graves still undoubtedly exist. On the contrary, Fadi Saqr was appointed to head a reconciliation commission sent to the Syrian coast following the massacres of early March, a position from which he negotiated the release of former Assad regime officers arrested on that occasion. To say the least, empathy and consideration for the trauma of victims and survivors are not hallmarks of the new authorities. More recently, other notorious servants of the ousted regime have continued to make public appearances and use their privileged social position, even ostentatiously appearing alongside representatives of the new authorities[29].

Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the new authorities ostensibly disregarded the file on prisoners and the disappeared[30], leaving families without support or answers[31], while neglecting for many weeks to protect the archives of over 800 security services and places of detention, before finally deciding to partially restrict public access[32]. The al-Marjeh square in Damascus, where relatives of the disappeared used to meet in the weeks following the fall of the regime to support each other and gather information, was suddenly cleared of hundreds of photos of the disappeared in January as part of a vast clean-up campaign initiated by the Civil Defense and entitled “Damascus, we’re back”, while a collective called ‘The Hands of Mercy’ caused a scandal by covering the inscriptions left by inmates on the walls of a prison with paintings in praise of the revolution, with the prior approval of the authorities. The indifference and negligence of the latter, or even their eagerness to wipe the slate clean, is not reassuring, even if the most optimistic find good reason to persuade themselves that it’s normal and natural for things to take time, that the authorities are doing their best or that the processes underway offer encouraging signs. With five months to go since the fall of the regime, this persistence in relativism and lack of critical judgment regarding the carelessness, but also the nature and liabilities of most of the representatives of the new state apparatus, has become almost naïve and reckless. As for the relatives of victims and missing persons, they continue to be animated by the same hope that has enabled them to survive all these years. Nothing is really being done, in action or in words, to enable them to find peace.

Syria, a deprived society in the grip of Islamist neo-conservatism

The disastrous state in which Assad has left the country testifies not only to the incredible resistance and resilience of the Syrian people, but also to the inestimable capacity of human beings to survive in the most abominable circumstances. When we look at the Syrian economy, we realize just how devastated the country is and how much its infrastructure has been destroyed. And when we say destroyed, the word is inadequate: Syria is a hollowed-out, rusting wreck whose skeleton was already beginning to be eaten away before the fall of the regime. The regime’s soldiers were selling furniture and looted goods to feed themselves, and when the end came, they didn’t even wait for the enemy to approach before abandoning their weapons and uniforms, while the population was already rushing into all public buildings to loot absolutely everything they could. What’s most astonishing about the Syria afterwards is the absolutist nature of the looting: it’s not just the furniture that’s been taken away, but also the cables, pipes, doors, windows, tiles and bricks that have been ripped out, and now also the metal beams, bricks and breeze-blocks that make up the very structure of the buildings. Let’s not even mention vehicles (including tanks) and trees, which have been methodically removed or chopped up, transforming the entire public domain into a wild wasteland. And if you look closely at the cities and districts razed to the ground by the bombs, you’ll see that every single building in ruins has been absolutely stripped of every single small object, as if every single one of the thousands of apartments demolished in this way had been conscientiously purged of everything it contained. This was carried out by the regime’s own agents and soldiers, as certain districts were off-limits until the fall of Assad. Between Damascus and the governorate of Suwayda, the looters went so far as to knock down high-voltage pylons, cutting them up and severing the power cables that supply thousands of homes with electricity. Everywhere, it’s hallali[33] and the smallest piece of the beast has a value.

Looting is one of the main afflictions plaguing the new Syria. The phenomenon existed before the fall of the regime and cannot be blamed on the new authorities, although it has only increased and absolutely nothing seems to have been done to put a stop to it or to protect the infrastructure. The only progress that could put an end to this self-sabotage by the Syrian population itself is the restoration of a stable economy, or at least a perceptible improvement in it. Yet it seems that the Syrian Central Bank has decided to apply a risky method, restricting liquidity[34] while refusing to intervene on the exchange rate[35] and curb illegal speculation on the Syrian pound, resulting in intense exchange rate volatility and considerable money losses for Syrians, in a country where 90% of the inhabitants continue to live below the poverty line.  The main beneficiaries are speculators, while neither local investment and production nor exports have increased. The government does not print new currency, nor does it intervene to limit currency exchange to official exchange offices, with hundreds of small traders resorting to this activity to make a profit. Meanwhile, markets have begun to be flooded with low-priced products from Turkey and elsewhere, threatening the already fragile local production[36], while Syrians’ incomes have not seen any significant rise and the unemployment rate exceeds 25%. The new government seems to be relying exclusively on foreign investment. The current situation therefore foreshadows the capitalist predation to come, and with it another form of widespread looting, which will benefit speculators rather than the mass of Syrians. The pattern is well known: just look at the situation in Lebanon and Greece.

From this opportunistic perspective, international diplomacy did not wait two weeks to resume its normal course, as capitalist predators from the Arabian Peninsula and Europe were the first to flock to the presidential palace in Damascus with a view to restoring economic relations with Syria as quickly as possible and making the greatest possible profit from the new regional situation. On December 23, 2024, Qatar was the first foreign state after Turqui[37] to send a delegation to Syria to meet the new Syrian authorities, while Al-Sharaa made his first foreign visit on February 2, 2025, with a much-publicized trip to Saudi Arabia, during which he visited Mecca and introduced his partner Latifa al-Droubi to the world, before flying directly to Turkey[38].  Beyond the show, these visits testify to the desire to place Saudi Arabia and Qatar at the forefront of Syrian foreign policy. The two states plan to take back control of the energy sector by reviving electricity production fuelled almost exclusively by fossil fuels from the Gulf. That’s going to burn lots of gas[39]. Both began by delivering tons of humanitarian aid to Syria the day after their first official meetings, and also pledged to pay Syria’s $15 million debt to the World Bank, which foreshadows major investments: nothing is free. Germany and France were then the first European states to show up at the ex-jihadist’s door on January 3, 2025[40], followed by Italy on the following January 10, the three countries having been the main beneficiaries of Syrian oil exports[41] on the eve of the 2011 revolution.  They were also the first to implement the suspension of asylum procedures for Syrians the day after the fall of the regime, and to advocate the lifting of sanctions against Syria, while France was the first European country to welcome Al-Sharaa on May 7, 2025, despite his continued blacklisting as a terrorist suspect. For Macron, the state of exception is a mode of government, and signing juicy contracts is worth turning a blind eye to the suffering of the Syrian people. All that al-Sharaa has been asked to do is to make a few symbolic statements in favor of the protection of human rights and justice. But like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a declaration is not binding and remains a mere promise whose primary aim is to buy social peace, and to deceive the most credulous liberals. Syria’s economic partners will never bother to make the restoration of trade relations conditional on the strict implementation, under international supervision, of a democratic system representative of Syria’s diversity, and of transitional justice excluding the death penalty and inhuman and degrading treatment. Instead, as mentioned earlier, we’ll just demand an oral commitment from Al-Sharaa to “protect minorities” and “neutralize the Islamic State”, as has already been the case for a decade with Bashar al-Assad. No big deal.

In the capitalist system, it’s all about deals and compromises. The conclusions of the commission of inquiry into the massacres on the Syrian coast can wait a few more months, until the sanctions against Syria are lifted and al-Sharaa can quietly retract its promises once international trade is restored. We are currently witnessing a historic transition towards a fusion of economic liberalism and societal conservatism, such as occurred in the United States under George Bush and his son George W. Bush, but in its Islamic version already in power in Saudi Arabia. So we shouldn’t be surprised if Syria’s fate depends on the relationship between Ahmed al-Sharaa, Donald Trump and Mohammed Ben Salman. Our article is timely, as all three are scheduled to meet in Saudi Arabia in a few days’ time…

Sharia is capitalism-compatible, and so is Ahmed al-Sharaa.

NOTES:

[1]  Maher Alloush (1976, Homs), writer and researcher specializing in political, social and economic issues, as well as Transitional Justice, Hassan al-Daghim (1976, Idleb), graduate in Islamic studies and comparative jurisprudence, Mohammed Mustat (1985, Aleppo), graduate in electronic engineering, political science and Islamic studies, Youssef al-Hijar, Mustafa al-Moussa, pharmacist and member of HTS, Hind Kabawat (1974, India), Master’s degree in Law and International Relations and Houda Atassi, civil engineer with degrees in Architecture and Information Technology.

[2] Abdul Hamid al-Awak, PhD in Constitutional Law; Yasser al-Huwaish, recently appointed Dean of the Faculty of Law at Damascus University; Ismail al-Khalfan, PhD in International Law; Mohammad Reda Jalkhi, PhD in International Law; Bahia Mardini, the only female journalist with a PhD in Law.

[3] Anas Khattab (1987, Rif Dimashq), Minister of Interior; Murhaf Abu Qasra (1984, Hama), Minister of Defense; Asaad al-Shaibani (1987, Al-Hasakeh), Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates; Mazhar al-Wais (1980, Deir Ez-Zor), Minister of Justice; Mohammed Abu al-Khair Shukri (1961, Damascus), Minister of Awqaf; Marwan al-Halabi (1964, Quneitra), Minister of Higher Education; Hind Kabawat (1974, India), the only woman, Minister of Social Affairs and Labor; Mohammed al-Bashir (1984, Idleb), Minister of Energy; Mohammed Yisr Barnieh, Minister of Finance; Mohammad Nidal al-Shaar (1956, Aleppo), Minister of Economy and Industry; Musaab Nazzal al-Ali (1985, Deir Ez-Zor), Minister of Health; Mohammed Anjrani (1992, Aleppo), Minister of Local Administration and Environment; Raed al-Saleh (1983, Idleb), Minister of Emergency and Disaster Management; Abdul Salam Haykal (1978, Damascus), Minister of Communications and Information Technology; Amjad Badr (1969, As-Suwayda), Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform; Mohammed Abdul Rahman Turko (1979, Afrin), Minister of Education; Mustafa Abdul Razzaq (1989), Minister of Public Works and Housing; Mohammed Yassin Saleh (1985), Minister of Culture; Mohammed Sameh Hamedh (1976, Idleb), Minister of Youth and Sports; Mazen al-Salhani (1979, Damascus), Minister of Tourism; Mohammad Skaf (1990), Minister of Administrative Development; Yaarub Bader (1959, Latakia), Minister of Transport; Hamza al-Mustafa, Minister of Information.

[4] Except by proxies.

[5] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/deal-for-joint-military-action-with-us-in-syria-could-elevate-russia-as-well-as-defeat-isis-a7237256.html

[6] https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/news/russia-and-turkey-agree-deal-coordinate-strikes-syria-1427197601

[7] https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/jordan-and-the-us-russia-deal-in-southern-syria/

[8] https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/Pages/Israel-Reacts-to-US-Russian-De-Escalation-Agreement-in-Syria.aspx

[9] See the history of Ahmad Al-Awda’s 8th Brigade – https://middleeastdirections.eu/new-publication-med-the-eighth-brigade-striving-for-supremacy-in-southern-syria-al-jabassini/

[10] He is currently still in charge.

[11] Between 4356 and 6456 civilians killed according to airwars.org; 8763 civilians killed according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

[12] Zahran Alloush (founder of Liwa al-Islam in September 2011, which became Jaysh al-Islam in 2013); Ahmad Issa al-Sheikh (founder of Suqour al-Sham in September 2011); Abu Khalid al-Suri and Hassan Aboud (founders of Ahrar al-Sham December in 2011).

[13] Anas Hassan Khattab is also said to be a liaison officer for the Turkish intelligence service (MIT). He is believed to be operating under the control of MIT officer Kemal Eskintan, known to jihadists under the pseudonym Abu Furqan, himself under the orders of Hakan Fidan, then Ibrahim Kalin, heads of Turkish intelligence from 2010 to 2023 and since 2023. After 15 years of close collaboration, Ibrahim Kalin and Hakan Fidan were the first foreign officials to visit Damascus after the fall of the Assad regime. The former was seen praying with Al-Sharaa at the Umayyad Mosque on December 12, 2024, while the latter celebrated Turkey’s victory with Al-Sharaa on the heights of Qassiun on December 22, 2024.

[14] Opposition leaders present in Astana include Mohammed Alloush (Jaysh al-Islam – Army of Islam), Fares Al-Bayoush (Jaysh Idleb al-Harr – Free Army of Idleb), Nasser al-Hariri (Syrian National Coalition of Opposition Forces and the Syrian Revolution), Abu Osama Joulani (Southern Front, made up of 58 rebel factions). Eleven other groups are taking part in the negotiations.

[15] Abdul Rahman Hussein al-Khatib a.k.a. ” Abu Hussein al-Urduni ” (Jordanian, General de brigade) ; Omar Mohammed Jaftashi a.k.a. ” Mukhtar al-Turki ” (Turc, General de brigade) ; Abd al-Aziz Daud Khudaberdi a.k.a. ” Abu Mohammed al-Turkistani ” ou ” Zahid ” (Chinese ouïghur, General de brigade) ; Abdel Samriz Jashari  a.k.a. ” Abu Qatada al-Albani ” (Albanais, colonel) ; Alaa Muhammad Abdul Baqi (Egyptian, colonel) ; Moulan Tarson Abdul Samad (Tadjik, colonel) ; Ibn Ahmad al-Hariri (Jordanian, colonel) ; Abdulsalam Yasin Ahmad (Chinois Ouïghur, colonel) …

[16] The leaders of these groups are, respectively, former Assad Republican Guard commander Moqdad Fteha, former head of the Syrian Arab Army’s 4th Armored Division Ghiath Dalla and Mundir W.

[17] Realizing the scale of voluntary participation in the offensive – and no doubt the genocidal chaos that ensued from the very first hours of clashes – the Authorities subsequently announced that this support was no longer necessary.

[18] Figures vary according to the two main sources: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR).

[19] Hussein al-Salama as head of intelligence, replacing Anas Khattab, Amer Names al-‘Ali as chairman of the Central Control and Inspection Authority (anti-corruption) and Sheikh Rami Shahir al-Saleh al-Dosh as head of the Supreme Council of Tribes and Clans. All three hail from the town of Al-Shuhayl in the governorate of Deir Ez Zor, which has a population of less than 15,000.

[20] Which are nothing other than an Arab-Muslim version of European fascism.

[21] The chabiha are the regime’s supporters, henchmen and mercenaries, most of whom have been integrated into the National Defense Forces and other paramilitary groups.

[22] In the words of Syria’s new Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani during his speech at the 9th Donors for Syria Conference in Brussels on March 17, 2025.

[23] The Murshidis are a recent religion founded in 1923 in the Latakia region by Salman al-Murshid. This religion derives from Alawism, and its members exist only in Syria, where they are estimated to number between 300,000 and 500,000.

[24] See our mapping of incidents listed by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights on the home page of our website: https://interstices-fajawat.org/fr/accueil/

[25] As is already the case for the Jaysh al-Islam faction, whose members Majdi Nema aka Islam Alloush and Essam Al-Buwaydani aka Abu Hammam were arrested and prosecuted in international legal proceedings before being granted diplomatic immunity.

[26] https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/02/transitional-justice-in-syria-steps-to-diffuse-tension/

[27]  https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/02/former-syrian-interior-minister-mohammad-al-shaar-surrenders-to-authorities/

[28] In the wake of this controversial visit, General Security quietly arrested the commander of the local branch of the National Defense Forces, Ghadeer Salem, then – with more media noise – three of his subordinates, Mundhir Al-Jaza’iri, Somar Mohammed Al-Mahmoud and Imad Mohammed Al-Mahmoud.

[29] These include : Farhan al-Marsumi, chief of a Bedouin tribe in Deir Ez Zor, actively involved in drug trafficking to Iraq in collaboration with Maher al-Assad’s 4th Division and Iranian militias; Agnès Mariam de la Croix, Mother Superior of the Carmelite monastery of “Saint-Jacques le Mutilé” in Homs, an accomplice and active propagandist for the Assad regime; Dr. Tammam Al Yousef, cardiac surgeon and brother of Brigadier General Ali Mu’iz al-Din Youssef al-Khatib, head of the Idleb air force intelligence service, suspected of corruption and embezzlement in cooperation with the Assad regime; Safwan Khair Beyk aka “Safwan Shafiq Jaafar”, mafia boss from Jableh and leader of the National Defense Forces, linked to the Assad family through Bashar al-Assad’s cousins, Mundhir al-Assad and Ayman Jaber – Source: Zaman al-Wasl – https://www.zamanalwsl.net/

[30] The number of missing is estimated between 96,000 and 158,000, including enforced disappearances attributed to the Assad regime, the Islamic State, the Syrian Democratic Forces, armed opposition factions, the Syrian National Army and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

[31] It was only through public appearances and rallies in the three months following the fall of the regime that the families of the disappeared represented by The Syria Campaign obtained an appointment with Al-Sharaa in February 2025 – https://diary.thesyriacampaign.org/my-father-is-still-missing-join-wafas-struggle-to-uncover-the-truth-about-syrias-disappeared/

[32] As early as December 20, 2024, the Association of Detainees and Missing Persons in Sednaya Prison (ADMSP), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Independent International Commission of Inquiry set up by the UN Human Rights Council urged the transitional government to take steps to protect the archives and evidence of mass atrocities – https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-preserve-evidence-mass-atrocities-enar

[33] The hallali is the decisive moment in hunting when the impatient or excited herd of hounds rushes to the exhausted prey to put an end to the hunt.

[34] Withdrawals from ATMs have been frozen, while a large number of civil servants are no longer receiving their salaries.

[35] The exchange rate fluctuated between 10,000 and 12,000 pounds per dollar during the first four months of 2025, compared to a rate of 14,750 pounds before the fall of the regime, 15,000 the day after and an exceptional drop to 8,000 at the beginning of February – ttps://www.sp-today.com/en/currency/us_dollar/city/damascus

[36] https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2025/02/turkish-goods-undermine-local-products-in-syria

[37] The Turkish embassy in Damascus reopened on December 14 after a 12-year interruption in diplomatic relations, and its foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, officially visited Al-Sharaa on December 22, on the eve of Qatar’s visit.

[38] Syria’s relationship with Turkey must be distinguished from its relationship with Qatar and Saudi Arabia. While the former is characterized more by a form of military and strategic dependence, implying a form of colonial extension and Turkish security hold over Syria, the latter is primarily economic.

[39] The Deir Ali power plant is expected to generate 400 megawatts daily by burning natural gas supplied by Qatar via Jordan.

[40] Ahmad al-Sharaa remains on the international terrorism list with his war name of “Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani”, but the promise of a $10 million reward for his capture has been revoked by the USA.

[41] The main importers of Syrian crude oil in 2010 were Germany (32%), Italy (31%), France (11%), the Netherlands (9%), Austria (7%), Spain (5%) and Turkey (5%).

Over the past week, Syria’s Druze community has suffered an unprecedented attack by sectarian and Islamist armed groups, with the passive support of the new government in Damascus.

We are currently in Syria, close to the events. Here is our description and analysis.

APRIL 27

A fake record circulated on social media, in which a non-identified voice is heard insulting the prophet Muhammad, provoking sectarian riots by Islamists in the University of Homs, led by the petrol-engeneering student Abbas Al-Khaswani.

This Islamist agitator was giving a hateful speech targeting several religious communities including the Druze, the Alawi and the Kurds. Following this speech, tens of people chanting sectarian and hateful slogans were demonstrating in the University compound and assaulting non-muslim students.

The old Druze sheikh Marwan Kiwan accused of being the author of the record soon denied this accusation. It is reminded that Muhammad is not only a prophet for sunni muslims, but also for the Druze.

The non-elected authority in Damascus published a weak press release in which it thanked the rioters for their efforts to defend their prophet, instead of holding them accountable for the dangerous unrest they provoked.

Abbas Al-Khaswani is not a student in Islamic studies and was identified as one of the armed perpetrators in the attacks on the Syrian coast two months earlier. He was not arrested and went back the next days to the university where he and his colleagues threatened the lives of other students.

APRIL 29

The authenticity of the record that sparked racist and sectarian riots two days earlier was denied by the Syrian Minister of Interior, but the General Security did not do anything to prevent the unfolding events.

Thus, armed groups of unknown origin attacked the town of Jaramana, targeting its residents and druze local self-defense factions.

The General Security intervened and were allegedly targeted by the local factions, while the difference between the early attackers and the newcoming members of the General Security remains unclear. Locals identified the unknown attackers as tribal factions from the Al-Uqaydat tribe of Deir Ez-Zor.

17 SYRIANS WERE KILLED, most of them from the attackers. All of them are then presented as members of the General Security while the local factions were presented as responsible for the clashes.

It is vital to remember that Jaramana IS NOT a Druze Only neighborhood, but rather, it represents the diversity of the Syrian social fabric, including refugees from Palestine and Iraq.

APRIL 30

Following a similar scenario as in Jaramana, armed islamist groups from Dera’a, Deir Ez Zor and Ghouta attacked the towns of Sahnaya and Ashrafiyeh-Sehnaya, targeting its residents and the Druze local self-defense factions.

45 SYRIANS WERE KILLED, most of them from the Druze community, including 10 field executions of civilians. Among them was the mayor of the city Hussam Warwar with his son Haider. He was seen welcoming the General Security forces hours before his assassination.

It is vital to remember that Sahnaya and Ashrafiyeh-Sehnaya ARE NOT a Druze only neighborhoods.

On the other hand, Druze factions from Suwayda left the governorate to rescue their community under attack in Sahnaya and Ashrafiyeh, but they were ambushed next to Braq on the Damascus road by mixed groups of local tribes, Islamists from Dera’a and Deir Ez Zor, but also elements of the General Security. There is a video showing them clearly opening fire while standing side by side.

42 SYRIANS WERE KILLED, most of them from the Druze factions, the community of Salkhad being particularly impacted, with 11 martyrs from the Quwaat Al-Alya’ and Quwaat Sheikh al-Karami self-defense factions, including their leader Amjad Baali.

MAY 1st

During the night, armed groups of unknown origin attacked the towns of As-Sawara al-Kabira, Al-Thala, Ad-Dour, ‘Ira, Kanaker and Rsas, leading to heavy clashes with local self-defense factions and shelling of civilian houses.

All the Suwayda factions composed of more than 80 000 fighters were put on high alert and spreaded to all the strategic points of the governorate.

In the evening, the General Security surrounded the governorate, allegedly to prevent any further attacks from Dera’a. However, several armed groups attacked the towns of Lebbin, Harran, Ad-Dour and Jreen, where they were met with strong resistance that left most of the attackers dead. The number of casualties is unknown, but the attackers were identified as belonging to the local tribes.

All the Druze community leaders were put under pressure by the central authority in Damascus to agree on the disarmament of the local factions, unfairly accused of being responsible for the unrest. In the night, the Druze leadership issued a statement to inform about the agreement that was met, but it stayed unclear until the next day, with contradictory and fake information being spread.

Israel used the situation to threaten Syria and bombed the presidential palace in Damascus, allegedly to “warn” Syrian authority over the threats to the Druze.

MAY 2 to 4

On May 2nd, an Israeli drone was flying above Suwayda and targeted a farm in Kanaker, killing 4 of its Druze residents. One of them, Issam Azam, who was known to be an active supporter of the protests in Karami square against the Assad regime. In the following night, Israeli planes launched series of strikes on military sites in Dera’a, Damascus and Hama.

On May 3rd, Khaldun Sayah Al-Mhithawi, a Druze lawyer involved in negotiating the release of another lawyer who was kidnapped north of Suwayda, was assassinated in Aqraba, located next to Jaramana. The same day, the 11 martyrs from Salkhad were buried following a ceremony gathering thousands of mourners in their hometown, with the presence of the prince Hassan al-Atrash and Aqel Sheikh Hammoud al-Hennawi.

On May 4th, the Druze leadership issued a five-point statement providing for the activation of the police and general security in Suwayda governorate, on a condition that its members are all from the region, as well as securing the road to Damascus plus a ceasefire in all areas affected by the clashes of recent days.

Laith Al-Balous, the leader of the “Madhafet al-Karami” faction, who was actively involved in negotiating the entrance of the General Security into Suwayda governorate, was pushed out of his town of Mazra’a by its residents after he provided access to several General Security vehicles.

MAY 5th

At day, clashes between local tribes and Druze factions were still ongoing in the vicinity of al-Thala and Harran in Suwayda.

After the withdrawal of the General Security from the town of As-Sawara al-Kabiri, the police of Suwayda entered the town with the governor Mustafa Bakkur and found several houses burnt and looted, as well as the Druze shrine of the village.

It is notable that the only town where homes were looted and vandalized in Suwayda is also the only one where General Security forces were deployed.

At the same time, rumors circulated that Druze factions were threatening mosques, when in fact they had been deployed to protect Muslim religious sites. Several imams from the region and representatives of local Bedouin tribes denied these rumors of sectarian threats by the Druze towards Muslims, reaffirming peaceful coexistence within the governorate and the need to tackle “fake news” and sectarian incitement on social media.

BULLET POINTS

– The recording that sparked the sectarian outrage was fake, and the person responsible for the racist riots at the University of Homs has not been arrested;

– The only offenders are armed groups with Salafist affiliations, but not at any moment they were named by the authorities, while their members who were killed in the clashes were not officially identified as the main offenders;

– The situation was either provoked or exploited by the central authority in Damascus to put pressure on the Druze community’s self-defense factions and justify their disarmament;

– Community leaders with authority over the tribes suspected of being behind the armed attacks have been rewarded with the highest positions of power in the new state apparatus;

– The authorities and the media have fostered or allowed a wave of sectarian hatred on social media, falsely accusing the victims of being responsible for the clashes plus of attacking General Security forces;

– The authorities have surrounded the Suwayda region, generating fear among its residents, while being unable to guarantee and restore the safety of users on the 110 road to Damascus;

– The majority of the population as well as the main factions in the Suwayda region – those that existed before the fall of the Assad regime and were legitimate among the revolutionary movement – reject Israel’s intervention and insist on unity with all other Syrians;

OUTCOMES

After a week of violence, the Damascus government continues to deny the existence and the identity of the armed groups responsible for the attacks on more than 10 Syrian towns and their inhabitants. All this, despite numerous sources indicating the involvement of some Bedouin tribes, as well as a group called “Burkan al-Furat” which is even bragging about the assault on its Telegram group.

One of the worrying outcomes of these three days is the appointment by Al-Sharaa of three members of the very influent Al-Uqaydat confederation of Bedouin tribes from Al-Shuhayl (Deir Ez-Zor), to positions of responsibility: Hussein al-Salama as head of intelligence, replacing Anas Khattab, Amer Names al-‘Ali as Chairman of the Central Monitoring and Inspection Authority (fight against corruption) and sheikh Rami Shahir al-Saleh al-Dosh as head of the Supreme Council of Tribes and Clans.

We can legitimately wonder whether the authority in Damascus has a free hand, or whether it is under pressure from the traditional power structures that have been destroying the lives of Syrians for half a century or more. The key question is: who benefits from the disarmament of the Druze community’s self-defense factions?

In Jaramana, the agreements included the progressive disarmament of the local factions, who have begun to hand over their heavy weapons. On the other hand, the armed groups that attacked them are not required to surrender their weapons…