Exploration trip in war-torn Ukraine

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Український переклад незабаром…

One of the members of our initiative visited Ukraine in April 2024. The objective of this first stay was to meet local actors from the communities concerned in order to better understand the general context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as the state of mind of the local population, but also to see what is being done in terms of popular solidarity initiatives and identify their needs.

I have already been to Ukraine, but a long time ago, on my way to Russia where I visited almost every year for twelve years. It was before Maidan and before the war. I speak Russian and I had links for several years with libertarian political activists from Belarus and Russia, who are fighting against the totalitarianism of the Russian state and its imperialism on its external borders. Since the outbreak of the 2022 offensive, I have been obtaining snippets of critical information from my contacts in the region, but to be sincere, the understanding of the issues eluded and still largely eludes European societies, including political activists. Although I am very familiar with the social reality and the geopolitics of the region, having also worked for years with the Chechen refugee community, what this war entails nevertheless remained a mystery. To understand is to get there.

April 2022, I take the bus to Warsaw, then the train to Kyiv. Two contacts on site had written to me that I was welcome.

Kyiv, project « BeSt »

First, I meet Petro*, Slava*, Kira* and Matviy* (* aliases) in a workshop located behind a rundown building in the Shevchenko district of Kyiv. Many other faces will pass in the small place during my short stay, but my exchanges will mainly be with those four.

They are not activists. For them, political organization seems to be a game of sectarian representations and a waste of energy, which they simply leave to others. At the beginning of the Russian invasion, Petro was carpenter and video-artist, Kira had opened a beauty salon, Slava was a hairdresser and musician, Matviy was a graphic designer. Russian imperialism abruptly interrupted their projects and they found themselves in Kyiv because of the necessity and providential meeting, and because their desire to resist Russian colonialism and to be in solidarity with their friends who had gone to fight led them to join a common project. Petro is working on the development of electronic devices and systems that will help the fighters to resist and survive on the front. Matviy lends a hand on the manual work necessary for the operation of the project, while Slava contributes to the computer engineering work. Other people lend their help on small tasks or logistical support.

Only Matviy lived through the Maïdan experience (popular uprising of 2014), and for him the story begins at that point. For the others, it doesn’t play a crucial role in what’s happening today. The “Russian problem” is much older, and has always somehow existed. Slava seems the most attached to his Ukrainian identity, which he strictly separates from the Russian one: for him, these are two worlds that have little in common. He legitimizes Ukrainian nationalism, which he contrasts with European forms of nationalism, which he describes as fascist. For him, Ukrainian nationalism has no intention or purpose of oppressing racial and gender minorities, while Nazism is a European evil that cannot be transposed to Ukraine. Like the rest of the group, he has migrant and queer friends, attends the alternative music scene and feels no contempt for anti-fascist activists, whom he repeatedly refers to as just another legitimate component of society. When you listen to him, his nationalism seems compatible with democracy, as well as openness to the world and to Europe. Ukrainian identity is defined simply by an attachment to the culture of the Ukrainian people and their strong desire for self-determination. Slava explains that this specificity is summed up by the Ukrainian word “VOLYA”, which is a blend of the notions of freedom, will and desire.

For the group as a whole, resistance goes without saying, and those who shrink from it jeopardize the freedom of all. While not being on the front fighting, they organize themselves to provide logistical support to the fighters and humanitarian aid to those left behind in the regions directly affected by the Russian bombardments. This is their contribution until they are called to the front. When the time comes, they say they’ll go without a second thought, despite the fear they feel. Matviy is the most hesitant, less zealous, and doesn’t believe that his individual involvement as a soldier would change the course of war, which depends more on technology and the power of non-human means employed, and therefore on political decisions beyond our control. He thinks he’d be more useful without a weapon, in logistical or infrastructure-building tasks. Slava encourages him to learn how to fly drones, to stay away from direct combat and because their use has become commonplace in this war. Since Ukraine’s allies are failing to deliver the weapons needed for a decisive response, killer drones are replacing rockets and missiles. From the front come images set to music of these small remote-controlled devices dropping shells and grenades directly on the heads of enemy soldiers. This is the new paradigm of modern warfare: hundreds of drones are manufactured daily by civilians and sent to soldiers on the front line. And as the latter are still insufficiently trained in their use, the contribution of experienced pilots is much appreciated.

However, since volunteers are required to join the regular Ukrainian army, their specialization is not taken into account when they arrive at the front, and my contacts criticize this amateurism on the part of a backward military staff. They explain that it’s different with the Azov battalion, which offers more room for maneuver. Nevertheless, Slava deplores a lack of commitment from Ukrainian youth, who have already got used to this war of position far to the east of the country and continue to live a normal life. He is not very optimistic and says there is no choice but to liberate the whole of Ukraine and bring the war to Moscow, otherwise Russia will never stop crushing its neighbors. Russian colonialism is a constant that must be put to an end once and for all: for Slava and the Ukrainians, it’s freedom or death. And in Slava’s words, one senses resentment towards Russian society, which he accuses of not giving itself the means necessary to put an end to Putin’s dictatorship and the war. If they were truly horrified by this fratricidal war, they would rise up and take up arms against the government. He doesn’t want to know what’s going on in the minds of the Russians, whom he sees as an alienated mass that accepts its fate and sends thousands of its men to be slaughtered without doing anything to stop it. The Ukrainian government claims that around 180,000 Russian soldiers have been killed since February 24, 2022, while the number of Ukrainian soldiers killed is estimated at 31,000.

Where Matviy and Slava, each in their own way, express a moral aspiration and a kind of inner wound of legitimate anger or disillusionment, Petro seems more pragmatic, committed to doing what has to be done, without necessarily letting himself be too affected. At least, that’s what his composure suggests. Perhaps the fact that he grew up in a military family contributes to this rationality. During the few days I’m in their workshop, he’s always active, operating 3D printers, soldering and fastening together oddly shaped parts. When I begin my interview with him, he struggles to describe his activity and prefers to launch the discussion on the absence of foreign military support: “Where are the F16s?”. He goes on to describe the feeling of abandonment and collective powerlessness of an entire people, who are watching the missiles fall helplessly, since there are no weapons to prevent the bombs from landing on Ukrainian cities. This observation is echoed by many Ukrainians who describe themselves as “zhduny”, in reference to the famous sculpture created for the hospital in Leiden (Netherlands) by the artist Margriet van Breevoort, i.e. as “ordinary patients calmly awaiting diagnosis in their doctor’s waiting room, hoping for the best”. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian army is losing ground.

A few steps away, Kira has set up her artistic and humanitarian project: she creates all kinds of pieces of art from objects found in the ruins or picked up here and there, and which help to finance the efforts of the collective as well as actions to help the populations located just behind the front line. She also travels to Europe for exhibitions and informative events, in connection with a collective of independent directors, « Free Filmers », and a support fund for Ukraine, « Medychka Fundraiser ». I also briefly meet Sashko, director of the Free Filmers collective from Mariupol. He gives me an interview during which he describes their various actions: distributing their films and raising awareness in the West, supporting displaced Roma communities in Zaporizhia, rehabilitating houses behind the front line and sending medical supplies to combatants. He gives me a pragmatic and effective list of humanitarian needs, explaining in passing that international NGOs are often out of touch with the reality of these needs. The interview is brief, with Sashko evading my questions about his personal analysis, which he considers too abstract. I understand: in this context, you don’t necessarily want to get lost in theoretical convolutions. Unfortunately, we won’t have time to discuss her vision with Kira either, but it’s thanks to her that I make contact with the people of Kherson. Slava convinces me to go there to “really understand”, but also because he thinks I need to experience this fear to know how I stand in the context of war. He says it’s like a “sobering pill”.

KYIV, « SOLIDARITY COLLECTIVES »

Before leaving Kyiv, I also meet members of another network active in resistance to Russian imperialism, “Solidarity Collectives”. Housed in the premises of a foundation in the Solomyansk district, the collective’s political identity is clearly on the radical left, i.e. anarchist, libertarian communist and anti-fascist. They supply equipment, vehicles and medical supplies to libertarian fighters on the frontline, as well as attack drones ordered in parts and assembled on site. Well-connected with networks of European and international left-wing political supporters, their logistical organization was set up at the start of the Russian invasion, before changing its name in July 2022. They have links with a number of libertarian fighters in various frontline battalions, but also organize humanitarian missions in various localities in the unoccupied zones.

On April 19, I meet up with around thirty activists on Shekavitsya hill to plant oak trees in memory of three internationalist fighters killed on April 19, 2023 during the Battle of Bakhmut, Dmitry Petrov, Finbar Cafferkey and Cooper Andrew. Among those present are other libertarian fighters temporarily back from the front. Dmitry’s father shares his feelings and gratitude by phone, the moment is humble and convivial.

Finbar Cafferkey
Dmitry Petrov
Cooper Andrew

Serguey, one of the active members of “Solidarity Collectives”, talks to me a few hours before my train to Kherson. He describes the enormous amount of solidarity work that has been set up over the past two years, as well as his analysis of the current situation. Before the war, he ran an anti-fascist political media and knows that the lives and freedom of activists like him, but also of a significant proportion of the Ukrainian population, would be seriously threatened if the Russian army occupied Ukraine. He believes he has little chance of surviving a Russian military occupation. Internationalist, egalitarian and pacifist, Serguey has not renounced his principles, but readily admits to having changed his order of priorities: yesterday’s social struggles and political divisions have been partially put on hold because of Russian aggression. He and his entourage had no choice but to reconcile their values with the reality of war, by taking part in armed resistance on the one hand, and supporting the regular army on the other, even if it meant resigning themselves to the militarization of minds that this implied.

However, his decision to support libertarian comrades as a priority reflects his determination not to give in to nationalist logics, and to participate in the “war effort” without renouncing his anti-fascism. He acknowledges the predominance of reactionary thinking in Ukrainian society, but believes that a capitulation by Ukraine, which Putin would present as a victory, would lead to even greater right-wingization, as well as a complete collapse of the social fabric and a threat to progressive circles. At this stage, war-weariness has already taken hold of Ukrainian society, and if Serguey remains optimistic, it’s because he doesn’t rule out a turnaround in the situation, which unfortunately depends solely on political decisions beyond his control, and in particular on the delivery of armaments capable of rolling back the Russian aggressor.

As I walk up Kyiv’s grand avenues to the train station, I continue to stare in bewilderment at the posters advertising regiments and military equipment all along the sidewalks: “Glory to the Armed Forces of Ukraine (ЗСУ)”, “The death of the enemy begins with us: be part of the great story”, “Security Service (СБУ): Together for Victory! “, ‘Protect your own, join the armed forces of Ukraine’, ‘An unshakeable Kyiv for an unconquerable people’. Dying for the country where you were born has never made sense to me. Dying for one’s ideas, perhaps, but the nation is not an idea. Freedom and social justice are far more important. But deep down I believe that if you can and must be a pacifist to prevent war from starting, it’s foolish (and too late) to maintain that position once war has arrived on your doorstep. The pacifists and campists who, from their armchairs in Europe, pass judgment on the libertarians resisting the Russian invasion, seem to have forgotten that self-defense is at the very foundation of the principles of political autonomy. And even if the Western powers support the Ukrainian government, this in no way means that popular self-defence becomes an accomplice of their imperialisms: the fighters on the Ukrainian side are not participating in a war of conquest in the name of the Ukrainian state, but in a war of liberation in the name of the people. The struggle against imperialism begins by preventing colonization wherever it is carried out by force of arms. Then, once the military threat has been removed, there’s plenty of time to focus on the fight against capitalism, corruption and state authoritarianism. And there too, alas, it’s not certain that we can succeed without arms…

KHERSON, CITY BEHIND THE FRONT

On the train to Kherson, all these thoughts are running through my head: nationalism, militarization, drones… I’ve come because I need to hear from the people concerned what they think, to better understand what’s at stake, and to clarify my position. During the night journey (9 hours), I shared my cabin with an old lady and a special forces officer. He gives me his number and tells me to contact him if I have a problem in Kherson. I accept out of politeness, with no intention of following up his offer of help, especially as he spontaneously and without asking me scanned my number into an application to check whether I had been flagged by the authorities. After a four-hour stopover in Mykolaiv, I got back on the train for another hour and a half. In Kherson, I got off the train between two thick walls of sand and under the gaze of several heavily armed soldiers. Immediately, the air raid siren went on and two loud explosions sounded. In the station square, and then all the way to the hotel where I meet up with my contact, the buildings are mutilated, gutted, their windows shattered or covered with wooden planks, and the streets are strewn with shell holes filled with sand and rubble. Every so often, a detonation shakes the city, with no way of telling how far away the missile fell. I immediately feel this terrible sensation in my spine, as if a persistent threat were hanging just behind me and urging me to leave the public space as quickly as possible.

I’m staying in what appears to be the last hotel in town. It did take a drone and a rocket, but it’s still standing near the central market. Here I meet up with another Serguey, who runs the hotel housing mainly internally displaced people (IDPs) and provides humanitarian aid here and there where it’s needed. After asking me what I was actually doing here, he pulls me along in his van on his drinking water supply missions. He fetches water in the north of the city, from a huge church invested by the American Christian NGO “The Samaritan Purse” in the Tavrichesk district, then takes it to the east of the city, in the Sklotarne district, where a building houses food distributions under the aegis of the “World Food Program” (WFP). On the way, he describes the various missiles and rockets that fall on the city: 500 kg “KAB” guided bombs, 500 kg “FAB” dropped bombs, 122 mm “GRAD” ground-to-ground rockets. Every day, the Russian army also sends kamikaze drones, the Shahed-136 patented in Iran and then produced in Russia under the name Gueran-2, to crash into civilians or moving vehicles. Serguey shows me a crater left by a rocket in the asphalt: “See this, it fell three days ago. If we’d passed by then, we’d be two dead bodies”.

During my short stay here, I live with constant anxiety, and above all I understand that the buildings don’t protect me. Nothing and nobody is protected here, and the Russian army is shelling without specifically targeting military infrastructures. Around twenty villages on the right bank are targeted daily by Russian missiles, as well as the outskirts and center of Kherson. Every day, homes are destroyed and civilians wounded or killed. On April 26, two schools were pulverized. I follow local news on several Telegram channels: @suspilnekherson, @kherson_monitoring, @kherson_non_fake and @hueviyherson. Every siren and bombardment is reported on these news feeds, and images from both sides of the river are regularly broadcasted. On the other side, soldiers from both sides are engaged in trench warfare that has left nothing of the villages that once stood there. During my stay, the Ukrainian army recaptured Krinky, but the images from there show only a tongue of scorched earth dotted with shell holes and ruins.

I don’t get within 350 meters of the Dnieper, which is already too close. The Russian troops are across the river, 5 kilometers away, in the village of Olechky. The closer you get to the river, the more the streets take on the air of a ghost town: I feel like I’m in the post-apocalyptic video game Fallout, or Chernobyl. It’s terrifyingly quiet, and the streets are deserted. Nevertheless, in this no-man’s-land, old people regularly walks down to the river with a shopping bag, or weeds the lawns and sidewalks of the dead city. When the detonations of fighting and bombing are not heard, birds and dogs seem to agree to fill the silence. Especially at night, when the bombardments intensify, it’s as if hundreds of dogs are barking between two detonations. But the humans are silent. Kherson had a population of 360,000 before the war. Today, more than two-thirds have left.

Through Serguey I meet Igor, who has set up a local NGO called “Strong because free”. Their premises occupy the first floor of two buildings in the Korabelnyi district. Igor worked in construction in Poland before the war. In July 2023, he set up his association, which today does a considerable amount of work: evacuation of bombed-out areas, assistance to families whose homes have been damaged by explosions, assistance to the elderly and disabled, assistance to animals victimized by war, assistance to families whose homes have been flooded following the explosion of the Kakhovka hydroelectric power station, distribution of daily lunches and bread, distribution of medicines, clothing, hygiene products, activities and classes for children… In collaboration with the “San Martin Christian Center” and “Save Ukraine”, they are provided with a minibus and a 4×4 with armored windows, with which they regularly drive into areas directly affected by the bombardments to evacuate inhabitants, particularly the elderly, who have been trapped under enemy fire. The 4×4 has already suffered several impacts, including the perforation of the driver’s side window.

Despite his hectic schedule and constant phone calls, Igor takes the time to show me around their premises. I get a glimpse of the scale of the work accomplished in a year and the dynamism of their team, who are sorting dozens of bags of clothes as I arrive. He then takes me to a small café that his wife has just opened on the avenue next to the association’s premises. Despite the context, despite the pressure, I’m warmly welcomed. But Igor confides in me that he’s exhausted, and that they’d need a lot more volunteers to do everything they’d like. He also explains that he had to live in hiding under the Russian occupation, and that the prospect of their return is a source of anguish for everyone.

I’m taken back to the hotel in the 4×4 with bulletproof windows. After another night of explosions, Serguey takes me back to the bus station. Before I leave, police and military officers check my identity and the contents of my phone. One of the officers explains at length that it would be more appropriate for me to report myself to the local authorities and offer my help as a humanitarian volunteer through them. Two days earlier, however, the same authorities had told me that they preferred not to use foreign volunteers, for reasons of security and liability in the event of an incident.

After a stopover in Odessa, where the sirens also sound on my arrival, I set off again for Bucharest during the night. End of the expedition. Now I’ll have to go back and process all this information, and think about what to do next.

A few historical notes on two often-mentionned Ukrainian national figures.

The Ukrainian national pantheon is made up of two contradictory figures: Stepan Bandera (1909-1959) and Nestor Makhno (1888-1934).

Putin’s propaganda rhetoric uses Ukraine’s complex history to essentialize Ukrainians, accusing them of being Nazi sympathizers overall. Beyond the fact that this shortcut is utterly defamatory and grotesque, it relies on the fact that nationalists clearly gained the upper hand over progressives and libertarians in the aftermath of the violent repression of the 2014 democratic revolt. This was particularly true of the “Svoboda” and “Right Sector” movements, whose involvement in the Maidan uprising was generally welcomed by anti-government forces. Both ultra-nationalist parties proudly claim Stepan Bandera’s legacy. For many Ukrainian patriots, if Bandera was led to collaborate with the Nazis between 1934 and 1943, this can only be understood in the context of the emancipation struggle against Russian (Soviet) imperialism, responsible for the deaths of millions of Ukrainians between 1929 and 1933 (dekulakization and holodomor). This analysis, while explaining the anti-Soviet motivations of Bandera’s Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), nevertheless denies the involvement of its fighters in the massacre of thousands of Polish and Jewish civilians in Lviv in 1941 (around 8,000 dead). Versions of the OUN’s involvement in the pogroms differ, as Bandera was arrested by the Germans on the eve of the massacres and placed under house arrest in Berlin, before being sent to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp in January 1942 (Nota bene : It has been established that Bandera’s conditions in detention were not those of most of the deportees, and that he benefited from privileged conditions at Sachsenhausen). Two of his brothers were killed in Auschwitz in September of the same year, as Ukrainian nationalists opened a new front against the German occupiers, in addition to that against the Soviet occupiers. Despite the denial of the Ukrainian nationalists, a number of documents attest to Bandera’s responsibility in planning and approving the anti-Jewish and anti-Polish massacres. There is therefore no question of rehabilitating Bandera on the pretext of opposing Russian propaganda. Whatever, the influence of ultra-nationalists on the current Ukrainian political landscape needs to be clarified: beyond the often-mentionned ultra-nationalist factions “Svoboda” and “Right Sector”(they claim around 25,000 members and won around 6% of the votes in 2014 and 2019 elections), nationalism, conservatism, traditionalism, religious fundamentalism and anti-communism remain strong within most of the other political parties aswell as in the Ukrainian society. This does not mean, however, that Ukraine is any more nationalistic or conservative than Poland, Hungary, Italy or Russia…

If we had to choose a folk hero, it would certainly be more interresting to delve into Nestor Makhno’s legacy. Between 1917 and 1921, Nestor Makhno, but also Maria Nikiforova (who is less well known, no doubt because she was a woman) led thousands of Ukrainian peasants in their armed insurrection against Russian imperialism (monarchist, then Bolshevik). In the areas liberated by the Ukrainian revolutionary, libertarian and anarchist insurrectionary army, almost 7 million Ukrainians temporarily experienced a stateless communalist political system. The “green” and “black” armies gathered up to 100,000 fighters in a relentless struggle against the requisitioning and plundering of Ukrainian agrarian resources by the German, the “White” and the Russian occupying armies, and later against the Bolshevik dictatorship. Wrongly accused of anti-Semitism, a charge denied by a number of historians and not attested to by any historical documents, the Makhnovist movement was finally crushed in blood by the Bolsheviks, who then applied relentless repression against the entire Ukrainian population and peasantry. Today, the town that was the nerve center of the Makhnovchina, Houliaïpole, lies behind the front line after being occupied by the Russian army for less than a week in March 2022, and has been under constant bombardment ever since.

In southern Syria, the uprising of Dignity has begun

More than ten years after the uprising of 2011, the revolt has resumed in southern Syria. As in 2011, the mainstream media are not reporting much on it, as if popular uprisings in this region were only of interest if they coincided with the interests of the states that have been working to carve up the Middle East since the Sykes-Picot agreements in 1916.

This time, the revolt started in Suwayda, the Druze governorate, in the middle of August and spread modestly to other towns, notably in the neighboring governorate of Dera’a.

This text offers a contextualization on Syria in general and on Suwayda in particular. It has been written by people from the region who are concerned about the situation there, and who hope that a solution will finally be found for the people, which does not simply consist of choosing their oppressors. No foreign power can propose a viable and satisfactory solution for the Syrians, their land having served as a bloody playground for all the powers that have interfered in their affairs.

THE DRUZE EXCEPTION

 

The Druze are a religious community attached to a heterodox belief in Ismaili Shi’ite Islam, which originated in Egypt under the impetus of Imam Hamza ibn Ali ibn Ahmad and Vizir Nashtakin ad-Darazi in the early 11th century. The druze religion, like Sufism, takes a philosophical and syncretic approach to faith, recognizing neither the rigorist precepts nor the prophets of Islam. Note that the Druzes prefer to call themselves Al-Muwahhidun (Unitarians) or Bani Maaruf (People of Goodness). Despite the spread of this belief to Cairo during the Fatimid caliphate of Al-Hakim, who was venerated by the Druzes, they were swiftly subjected to persecution by the rest of the Muslim community following his demise in 1021. As a result, they were exiled to Bilad el-Cham (present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine), specifically to Mount Lebanon and Hawran. However, it was around the beginning of the 19th century that the Druze community of Hawran gained strength after a large part of the community had been expelled from Mount Lebanon by the Ottoman authorities. The Hawran then took the name of Jabel al-Druze.

Today, Suwayda governorate is home to the majority of the world’s Druze community, some 700,000 people. The Lebanese Druze are the second-largest community, numbering 250,000. In Syria, several Druze settlements also exist in Jebel al-Summaq (Idlib, 25,000 people), Jebel al-Sheikh (Quneitra, 30,000 people), and Jaramana (Damascus suburbs, 50,000 people). Finally, outside Syria and Lebanon, the largest Druze communities are to be found in occupied Palestine (al-Juwlan, Galilee and Mount Karmel, 130,000), Venezuela (100,000), Jordan (20,000), North America (30,000), Colombia (3,000) and Australia (3,000).

Following numerous revolts against the Ottoman Empire until 1918, then against the French colonizers between 1925 and 19451The withdrawal of the French in 1945 was largely due to the fight for independence waged since the 1920s by Sultan Pacha al-Atrach, representing a family of Druze notables, whose feats of arms and resistance to the occupiers are still celebrated by many Syrians., the Druze have a reputation for insubordination that describes them to this day and which has enabled them to maintain a permanent balance of power with the Assad regime, based on compromises negotiated between Druze leaders and the regime’s local representatives2The regime has no checkpoints inside Suwayda governorate, and the community refuses to send its young people to the army outside the region. Nevertheless, the governorate administration and security services remain present and informed of what is happening in the region.. After 2011, despite a few sheikhs expressing their support for the regime3Among these sheikhs, the notorious ones are the sheikh Jerbo and Nayef al-Aqil from the Dir’ al-Watan faction., many Druzes took part in the demonstrations against Bashar al-Assad, mostly supporting the position of the “Men for Dignity”4https://yalibnan.com/2012/03/25/anti-regime-druze-spiritual-leader-killed-in-syria/, who refused to take part in the war and called on the community to arm itself for the sole purpose of self-defense. The sheikhs took the lead and the initiative by refusing to join the regime’s army with the aim of protecting the region and its youth, but also to prevent the community from being compromised in Assad’s war by taking part in the repression of other communities elsewhere. This defiance of the regime was embodied, among others, by the druze sheikhs Ahmed Salman al-Hajari and Abu Fahd Wahid al-Bal’ous, who both were killed, the first in a car “accident” in March 20125https://www.meforum.org/5554/the-assassination-of-sheikh-abu-fahad-al-balous and the second in a bombing that killed 23 other people in September 2015.

Other prominent druze figures got involved in the opposition : Khaldoun Zeineddine, his brother Fadlallah Zeineddine and Hafez Jad Al-Kareem Faraj, all three officers in the Syrian army, from which they defected to join the rebels. Khaldoun Zeineddine formed the Sultan Pasha al-Atrash Battalion within the Free Syrian Army (FSA)6https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/22/druze-syria-assad-israel-netanyahu/ ; https://syrianobserver.com/news/34453/sedition_between_druze_and_sunni_fighters.html. Joined by a number of Druzes, the battalion, however, remained weak and isolated and faced several attacks and kidnappings by Al-Nusra rebels in Dera’a7https://www.meforum.org/3463/syrian-druze-neutrality before being finally wiped out and its commander killed in 20138https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/45392. Its remaining members fled to Jordan, from where they announced the cessation of their activities in January 2014, denouncing a lack of support for the revolution from the Suwayda Military Council and from the Druze community, as well as the hostility toward the Druze on the part of the rebel groups of Dera’a, called “Islamists” and accused of being accomplices of the Assad regime9 https://www.zamanalwsl.net/news/article/45392 (AR).

Generally speaking, the Druze have a very secularist vision of society, and their religious representatives refuse to take charge of the community’s political and administrative affairs. In the conflicts that have shaken Druze and Syrian society, the sheikhs have repeatedly expressed their support and encouragement for the community’s choices10https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8HeEzKTmbc (EN). While the Druze community has refused to take sides in the civil war, it has nevertheless always expressed its rejection of the regime, not hesitating to confront the security forces present in the governorate to enforce their demands or free prisoners from the hands of the army11https://suwayda24.com/?p=20610 (AR).

BASHAR AND HIS ISLAMIST PUPPETS

 

Right from the start of the insurrection and repeatedly since, the regime has played the divide-and-rule card, urging the Shi’a and Ismaili religious minorities (to which the Druzes belong) to oppose the FSA because of the “Islamist threat” their Sunni majority component is supposed to represent. In the propagandist rhetoric of the regime and its allies, the FSA rebels are constantly equated with the Al-Nusra Front and branded as Salafists or takfiri, while the useful idiots of the Islamic State are used in a thousand ways to hinder the revolution and to go hand in hand with the regime’s forces for the indiscriminate slaughtering of the Syrian population. In fact, the most radical religious component of the Syrian opposition has been deliberately favored by the regime: between June and October 2011, three months after the first anti-regime demonstrations, Bashar al-Assad released nearly 1,500 Islamist militants from prison, most of whom went on to join jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and ISIS. Thus, the main leaders of the Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and Jaish al-Islam groups, as well as the ISIS section responsible for most of the beheading of foreigners, had previously been released from the notorious Saydnaya prison12https://s.telegraph.co.uk/graphics/projects/isis-jihad-syria-assad-islamic/ (EN).

Bashar al-Assad’s strategy has paid off, as the outpouring of violence from ISIS jihadists has succeeded in permanently distracting the rest of the world’s gaze from the atrocities committed by the Syrian army, the Shabihas13https://npasyria.com/en/53834/ (EN) ; https://cija-syria-paramilitaries.org/#investigating-assads-ghosts (EN) and Iran-backed militias14https://syriafreedomforever.wordpress.com/2017/02/26/the-rawr-report-interview-with-joseph-daher-on-hezbollah-and-the-syrian-revolution-02162017/ (EN), and then from the massive bombing of civilians in the north and east of the country by the Russian air force from September 2015 onwards15https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/9/30/russia-carries-out-first-air-strikes-in-syria, with this military intervention itself motivated by the “fight against Islamists”. Moreover, it has enabled the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) to distance themselves from the Syrian revolution and focus their forces on the fight against the Islamists, mainly with American help. Finally, because of the terror instigated by the jihadists and out of disinterest in the fate of the Syrian people and their revolution, the “international community” (EU, USA and UN) did not bring substantial support to the FSA, leaving Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey to provide logistical and military support to the FSA components most compatible with their political agenda and confessional interests, so to speak “the Islamists”16The main are Ahrar al-Sham (Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia), Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (Qatar, Turkey), Liwa al-Tawhid (Qatar, Turkey), Jaych al-Islam (Saudi Arabia, Qatar).. The democratic, secular and socialist components of the FSA, abandoned on most sides and threatened from within by the Islamists, then had no choice but to join the sectarian groups in order to survive and continue the fight against the main executioner of the Syrian people: the regime of Bashar al-Assad17https://thisishell.com/interviews/894-leila-al-shami-robin-yassin-kassab (EN).

In May 2018, Bashar al-Assad’s regime made an agreement with ISIS for their surrender in the Damascus area18https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/1275206/isis-militants-evacuated-southern-damascus-desert (EN). Following this agreement, 800 of its fighters and their families (1,800 people) had been evacuated from the districts of Yarmouk and Tadamon (Damascus suburbs) to the desert near Palmyra and to abandoned villages northeast of Suwayda19Hamlets called Ashraffieh, al-Saqiya and al-Awara, less than 20 kilometers from the Khalkhalah military base and less than 10 kilometers from the first Druze settlements at the gateway to the desert, al-Qasr and Barek – https://suwayda24.com/?p=2423 (AR), with 40 trucks and cars under heavy guard by the Syrian army. Three months later, on July 25, 2018, ISIS predictably attempted to invade the Suwayda governorate from the east, guided by Bedouins who had a long-standing discord with the Druzes. At dawn, ISIS fighters thus began slaughtering the population of several druze villages on the edge of the desert20Villages of Tema, Douma, Al-Kseib, Tarba, Ghaydah Hamayel, Rami, al-Shabki, al-Sharahi, al-Matouna and al-Suwaymra – https://suwayda24.com/?p=4431 before taking 42 members of the community as hostages (including 16 children and 14 women21On July 31, 2018, the regime negotiated the release of women held hostage by the jihadists, in exchange for an agreement to evacuate more than 200 of their fighters from western Deraa (Yarmouk Basin) to the Badiya region. Refusing the deal, the Islamic State demanded a ransom, before publishing the video of the execution of one of the hostages, Muhannad Touqan Abu Ammar, a 19-year-old Druze resident of al-Shbeki, on August 2, 2018 – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_OhL8bJD2M (AR). Eventually, the remaining hostages were released following agreements reached with the regime in october and november 2018, while 700 to 1,000 jihadists were evacuated to Badiya under a new agreement reached with the regime on November 17 – https://suwayda24.com/?p=19606 (AR) ; https://stj-sy.org/en/946/ (EN)) and carrying out four suicide attacks in the heart of the main city of Suwayda22https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/25/syria-isis-holding-children-hostage (EN). Hundreds of Druzes from Jabal al-Druze (the region of Suwayda), joined by Druzes from Jabal al-Sheikh (located on the border with Lebanon), spontaneously took up arms and threw ISIS back into the desert, putting a stop to its campaign towards the south of the country23The ISIS offensive affected 10 villages, 263 people were killed (30 by the suicide bombers in Suwayda) and 300 injured. In retaliation for the massacre, on August 7, 2018 local members of the pro-regime Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) hanged an elderly man they presented as a jihadist at the so-called “Arch of the Hanged” (al-Mashnaqah) in the town of Suwayda – https://suwayda24.com/?p=4711 (AR) ; https://syria.news/179bd6d3-07081812.html (AR) ; https://orient-news.net/ar/news_show/152458 (AR) but also definitively confirming the anger and distrust of the Suwayda Druzes towards the Syrian regime, accused of using ISIS to weaken them24The regime’s army intervened only belatedly (after the attack on the Khalkhalah military base located to the north of Suwayda governorate) to track down ISIS into the desert next to the volcanic field of as-Safa, as they were already pushed back by the Druzes’ counter-attack..

REGIME AND GANGS HAND IN HAND

 

Although the region has escaped bombardment and military operations since 2011, the people of Suwayda, like all Syrians, have endured the consequences of the war and the regime’s murderous policies: sporadic armed confrontations with gangs and militias affiliated to the regime, assassinations, kidnappings, drug trafficking25Watch “Captagon: Inside Syria’s drug trafficking empire” by BBC World Service Documentaries – https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N4DaOxf13O0 (EN)

In the spring of 2022, the gang of Raji Falhout, a notorious trafficker, claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of some twenty residents of Suwayda and Dera’a26https://www.facebook.com/Suwayda24/photos/pb.100064794576009.-2207520000/2097785973734342/?type=3 before his men stormed the swimming pool in Suwayda’s al-Maqous district to kidnap its users, provoking an armed confrontation with the residents27https://suwayda24.com/?p=19288 (AR).

Falhout gang with the citizens they kidnapped, 2022.
Raji Falhout posing with his gang.
Raji Falhout’s card as a member of the Intelligence Service Division n°2017.

Following this incident, an uprising broke out on July 26 in the town of Shahba following the kidnapping of a resident, Jad al-Taweel, by Falhout’s gang28https://suwayda24.com/?p=19589 (AR) ; https://suwayda24.com/?p=19611 (AR). Residents led by the “Men for Dignity” Movement blocked the roads and arrested military intelligence agents affiliated with the local organized crime29https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-Do5hgZ5JS8hTfGJbyQvr6J/ (EN) before taking up arms against the Falhout gang, leaving 24 people dead on the residents’ side and 12 on the gang’s side. The gang’s headquarters in the towns of Salim and Atil were then stormed by residents of numerous villages in the region, leading to the capture of the premises, the release of hostages, and the discovery of Captagon production equipments30https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=2161930727319866&set=pb.100064794576009.-2207520000, revealing the Assad clan’s complicity with organized crime, using the 4th Military Intelligence Division and Hezbollah as middlemen31https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-66002450 (EN). Over the past decade, these regime-affiliated gangs have been responsible for numerous kidnappings and assassinations, causing insecurity and violence to destabilize the region.

People from Suwayda gathering to raid the Falhout gang
Captagon production

After the eradication of the Falhout gang and its affiliated gangs, kidnapping and car theft operations in the Suwayda region significantly decreased32https://suwayda24.com/?p=19955 (AR), and this victory over organized crime has proven the capacity of the Druze community to ensure its own security.

ENDEMIC CRISIS AND SEEDS OF REVOLT

 

Over and above the direct consequences of the civil war, and then of the imperialist wars waged in Syria by the major powers (Iran, Russia, Turkey, Israel, the United States, Qatar, Saudi Arabia…)33Since 2011, over 600,000 people have been killed in the conflict, more than half of them civilians. Five million Syrians have left the country, while almost 8 million have been internally displaced. While Russia and Turkey intervene militarily on Syrian territory, most other powers intervene through militias or by providing financial and material aid to the various armed groups active in the conflict. Iran openly supports the Syrian regime, notably by guaranteeing the support of its militias, the main one being Hezbollah., Syria has been in an unprecedented economic slump for ten years. The population was initially subjected to rationing of basic resources and foodstuffs, such as water, gas, petrol, fuel oil, bread, sugar, oil, rice, tea and onions, obtained with the help of a ration card (the smart card), before abolishing this support for essential goods, leaving the population obliged to buy these commodities at market prices. The value of a Syrian pound has risen from $1 = 47 SYR in 2011 to 500 SYR in 2017, and climbed from 2,500 to 14,000 SYR by the summer of 2023, with an above average salary of 200,000 SYR ($14). In summer 2023, the food prices reached unprecented level : 1L oil = 30000 SYR, 1L milk = 6000 SYP, 1kg flour = 4500 SYR, 1kg tomato = 4000 SYR, 1kg potatoe = 6500 SYR, 1kg onions = 3500 SYR, 1kg cucumber = 4000 SYR, one egg = 2000 SYP. This means that the majority of Syrians have spent their entire salary in less than a week. As for electricity, two years ago it was delivered to the Suwayda region as part of a daily rationing program (three hours on, three hours off), before this short window was reduced to an hour and a half on, versus six or seven hours off, not to mention the numerous power cuts occurring during this time, causing the rapid degradation of electronic devices whose purchase or fixing prices are unaffordable.

In recent years, Russian military police have regularly attempted to act as peacekeepers to ease tensions generated by the economical crisis. Its presence was confirmed in 2021 in Suwayda governorate, when a delegation of Russian officers presented themselves to the population with the intention of recruiting deputies from the population of both governorates34https://npasyria.com/en/65789/ (EN). The Russian contingent based in Bosra, located between Suwayda and Dera’a, made several attempts to distribute food aid in 2021 to Shahba and in 2022 to Dhibin, but residents firmly rejected their humanitarian intervention35https://syrianobserver.com/news/75404/widely-condemned-russian-delegation-enters-town-in-suweida-under-pretext-of-aid.html (EN).

Between 2020 and 2023, spontaneous and short-lived demonstrations regularly took place in Suwayda, but were either not renewed or were repressed. In February and April 2022, protesters blocked the roads, stormed the governorate building, and set fire to a military vehicle before security forces opened fire on demonstrators, killing one and injuring 1836https://suwayda24.com/?p=20325 (AR). Nevertheless, in December 2022, protesters managed to storm the governorate building for the second time, while their slogans and protest signs were mainly demanding a “decent life”, after the allocations of gas and electricity had been reduced. Throughout the winter and spring of 2023, rallies continued under pressure from Baath Party members actions, who attempted to organize pro-regime demonstrations in order to intimidate the protesters.

Meanwhile, the Assad regime returned to the fold of the Arab League following diplomatic meetings in Cairo on May 7, 2023, and the Arab League Summit in Riyadh on May 1937https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/7/arab-league-agrees-to-bring-syria-back-into-its-fold (EN), as well as a Chinese-brokered deal to reestablish ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia in order to defuse the proxy war these two countries are waging in Syria and Yemen38https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/what-you-need-know-about-chinas-saudi-iran-deal (EN). In exchange for this return of favor, Bashar al-Assad committed himself to tackling drug trafficking on his borders with Jordan and Iraq39https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/1/syria-agrees-to-curb-drug-trade-in-arab-ministers-meeting (EN). The day after the Cairo agreement, Jordan sent a clear message to the Syrian authorities by carrying out an air strike on the personal home of drug trafficker Marai al-Ramthan in Al-Shaab, south of the Suwayda governorate, killing him, his wife and six children, as well as an Iran-linked (handled by Hezbollah) drug facility in Kharab al-Shahem in the nearby Dera’a governorate40https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/8/sohr-attack-that-killed-drug-trafficker-in-syria-was-by-jordan (EN).

AND THE FUSE CAUGHT FIRE…

 

On August 5, 2023, a collective emerged in the coastal governorates of Latakia and Tartus, issuing an ultimatum to the regime by August 1041https://www.newarab.com/news/who-are-syrias-new-opposition-group-10-august-movement (EN), demanding reforms and making public a list of demands in application of UN Security Council Resolution 2254 which was adopted in Geneva in 2015. A particular feature of the movement is that it has developed in regions with a strong Alawite community, to which Bashar al-Assad belongs, notably in the towns of Tartus, Latakia, Banias and Jableh, where thousands of leaflets have been distributed42https://en.majalla.com/node/297431/politics/alawite-protest-movement-emerging-syrias-coastal-areas (EN). In response, Bashar al-Assad raised civil employees’ salaries by 100% but simultaneously announced the abolition of petrol subsidies and an increase in fuel prices, with the price of a liter of petrol rising sharply from 3,000 to 8,000 Syrian pounds, an increase of 167%, and the price of fuel from 700 to 2,000 Syrian pounds, an increase of 186%. Syrians’ exorbitant transport budgets are making daily life impossible and forcing thousands of Syrians to stop going to work. Faced with the rise in resignations in the public sector, the regime has responded by tightening the conditions of resignation. Meanwhile, the regime has announced its intention to abolish subsidies on all consumer goods by 202443https://alsifr.org/syria-protests (AR).

In the wake of these announcements, a call for a general strike was issued in southern Syria44https://suwayda24.com/?p=21730 (AR) ; https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/21/strike-protests-in-syrias-sweida-enter-second-day (EN). Since August 16, more than 52 communes in southern Syria have witnessed demonstrations using various types of action: strikes, vigils, blocking roads, closing government institutions, etc.

Demonstrations of support took place in the governorates of Idlib, Dera’a and Aleppo, as well as in Jaramana, the predominantly Druze district of Rural Damascus, reviving the slogans of 2011 for the fall of Assad : “Syria is ours, not Assad’s”, “one, one, one, the Syrian people are one” and “the people want the fall of the regime”. The demonstrators also expressed their wish to see an end to the Iranian presence in Syria.

On August 25, demonstrations spreaded to Idleb, Aleppo, Azaz, Afrin and Al-Bab. In several places, demonstrators waved the Druze, Kurdish and Syrian Revolution flags together. While the regime’s forces did not overreact in Suwayda governorate, they did open fire in Aleppo and Dera’a, killing at least two people. The Syrian Human Rights Network also reports the arrest of 57 people in connection with the protests, mainly in the governorate of Lattakia et Tartus45https://leilashami.wordpress.com/2023/08/26/revolution-reborn/ (EN).

Protesters show Druze, Syriaque and Kurdish flag replacing the three stars of the Syrian Revolution flag in the city of Idleb
Protesters show Syrian Revolution, Kurdish, Shia, Druze, Sunni, Christian and Syrian national flags in the city of Suwayda.

Since then demonstrations in Suwayda’s central square, long since renamed “Dignity Square” (al-Karami) by the population, have been weekly, if not daily, and have grown from one Friday to the next, reaching several thousand people a month after the start of the revolt, on September 22. Baath Party offices and a number of government offices were closed by the demonstrators during the protests, while banners and portraits of Bashar al-Assad were destroyed and burned.

Protesters burn a military vehicle in front of the governorate building.
The governorate building with Hafez al-Assad’s picture set in flames.

Meanwhile, on September 14, Bashar al-Assad’s cousin, Firas al-Assad46Firas’ father, Rifaat, commanded the armed forces responsible for the Hama massacre in 1982, before attempting a coup against his brother, Bashar al-Assad’s father, in 1984. Exiled to France, he finally returned to Syria in 2021 after being granted an amnesty by his nefew and found guilty by French courts of embezzling and laundering money for the Syrian regime. All his assets were seized, worth an estimated 90 million euros, including two Parisian townhouses, a stud farm, 40 apartments, 7300 square metres of office space in Lyon and a chateau., published a video in which he condemned the regime and expressed his support for the demonstrators47https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GmCRl-Hkn94 (AR). This video follows that of Majd Jadaan, Maher al-Assad’s sister-in-law48Maher is Bashar’s brother and General commander of the Republican Guard and the regime’s Military Intelligence. He is the regime’s second strongman, directly responsible for the Shabihas militia and the captagon traffic organized by the military intelligence services, in particular the Fourth Armored Division., fiercely denouncing the crimes of the Assad clan from Jordan and hailing the revolt of the people of Suwayda against the regime49https://youtu.be/IobX1vxHkDY (AR). Interviews of actors of the revolt were also made public, such as that of the leader of the “Men of Dignity Movement” in Suwayda, Sheikh Abu Hassan Yahya Al-Hajjar50https://suwayda24.com/?p=20610 (AR), or the activist and lawyer Adel al-Hadi51https://hawarnews.com/en/haber/developments-in-as-suwayda-to-where-h37625.html (EN).

IN THE CHAOS OF THE PROXY WAR

 

Despite twelve years of revolt and civil war, the Syrian regime is still in power. If it has withstood the storms, it is undoubtedly thanks to the interventions of Iran, ISIS and Russia, each of which, in their own ways, helped to make the Revolution so desired by the Syrian people impossible. To this we can add Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, who for their part have succeeded in creating division within the democratic and secular forces of the Free Syrian Army by favoring, as mentioned earlier, the most reactionary and least democratic forces of the rebellion against the regime.

The United States, for its part, which is responsible for the birth and development of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, both born on the still-smoldering rubble of Afghan and Iraqi societies, chose in 2011 (the year of its official withdrawal from Iraq) to no longer participate directly with its armed forces in conflicts in the Middle East. For all that, after condemning the repression of the 2011 protests and imposing sanctions against the Assad regime, the United States launched its first air strikes in Syria in September 201452https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/statement-president-airstrikes-syria (EN) and, from 2015, sponsored the new Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), made up of 25,000 Kurdish fighters from the YPG/YPJ and 5,000 Arab fighters, with the stated aim of halting the advance of the Islamic State. Initially spared, the Syrian regime finally underwent US strikes in 2017 and 2018, in retaliation for the Syrian army’s use of chemical weapons against civilians in Douma (Damascus) and Khan Cheikhoun (Idlib)53https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity (EN) ; https://www.opcw.org/media-centre/news/2023/01/opcw-releases-third-report-investigation-and-identification-team (EN). That same year, two-thirds of the American troops deployed on Syrian soil were brought back in agreement with Turkey, which then decided to launch an offensive in the Kurdish-controlled border zone in order to establish a “security zone” there54https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/fff9400a-a0b3-4ff4-be05-e18d00a046cf (EN). Nevertheless, the United States maintained a strong presence in Syria; in 2021, it carried out a series of air strikes against Hezbollah and its Iraqi allies, including Hachd al-Chaabi, who were held responsible for attacks against “western interests” in Iraq55https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-carries-out-air-strikes-against-iran-backed-militia-iraq-syria-2021-06-27/ (EN).

Russia, which has been one of the Syrian regime’s main military backers since 2015, was diverted by its invasion of Ukraine, which didn’t go exactly as Putin would have liked. It had to withdraw a significant part of its contingent from Syrian territory56By 2020, Russia had control over 75 sites in Syria, including 23 military bases, 42 points of presence and 10 observation points. While an estimated 63,000 Russian military personnel were deployed in Syria between 2015 and 2018, on the eve of the war in Ukraine this number appears to have fallen to 20,000 – https://daraj.media/108925/ (AR) ; https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/russian-forces-in-syria-and-the-building-of-a-sustainable-military-presence-i/ (EN) to redeploy it in eastern Ukraine, while the 250 to 450 Wagner mercenaries operating notably in the Syrian governorates of Homs and Deir ez-Zor, remaining without leadership since the Prigozhine mutiny, were reportedly ordered to report to their base in Hmeimim (Latakia governorate) and return to the authority of the Russian military command57The main Russian military bases in Syria are located in Tartus, Hmeimim (Latakia) and since 2019 in Qamishli (Al-Hasakah).. Some of those who refused were possibly sent back to Russia or redeployed to Mali. As a result of the withdrawal of Russian troops, some of the military bases under their control were transferred to the Iranian armed forces, notably the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah. However, Russia retains its military forces in Syria and has no intention of relinquishing its share of influence in the region, particularly in the face of Iran, which remains its main competitor there.

Iran, which has been the primary supporter of the Assad regime since the reign of Bashar’s father, Hafez, remains the key player in the Syrian war. Without the military support of Iranian militias, the main one being the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Assad regime would probably not have been able to hold out, not least because of Hezbollah’s involvement in the trafficking of Captagon, one of the regime’s main resources. After denying their presence in Syria, the Iranian regime and Hezbollah ended up openly supporting the Assad regime, calling it both a “jihad against Sunni extremists” and a “necessary intervention to protect Palestine and resist Israel”. In the propaganda of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah, unconditional support for the liberation of the Palestinian people is a mirage that works well, particularly among the Western left58https://alsifr.org/syria-protests (AR). Where one might have expected unanimous support for the Syrian revolution from the majority of revolutionary left-wing forces, a resounding silence responded to the chants of the Syrian demonstrators. In the naive imagination of the left, Iran, Syria and the Hezbollah (and Hamas) militias constitute an indisputable bulwark against American imperialism and Israeli colonialism. In reality, Hezbollah’s main concern is to maintain its quasi-hegemonic hold on Lebanese society while working frantically to keep Syria within Iran’s zone of influence, on which its entire survival depends. Between 2013 and 2018, the Syrian regime’s siege59See the film “Little Palestine”, by Abdallah al-Khatib – https://youtu.be/GbpxMFNuYVY (AR / FR) and then violent eradication of the world’s largest Palestinian Yarmouk refugee camp (suburb of Damascus)60Before 2013, the Yarmouk camp was home to over 160,000 Palestinian refugees., which can easily be considered an operation of ethnic cleansing carried out with the complicity of Hezbollah and Palestinian movements like PFLP and Hamas61Hamas militants in Yarmouk initially fought the Assad regime until 2013, when Hamas timidly criticized the intervention against the Yarmouk camp, before maintaining a position of neutrality, due to its financial and military dependence on Hezbollah. Hamas also maintains its headquarters in Hezbollah’s stronghold in Dahiyeh, Lebanon., is enough to disqualify the latter’s propaganda as to the reality of their struggle for the emancipation of the Palestinian people.

Israel, without intervening militarily on Syrian soil, has never stopped launching drone strikes on Iranian infrastructures in Syria. In fact, not a month goes by without rockets hitting Hezbollah buildings or executives, the militia being the main concern of the Israeli regime. Yet, Israel has never shown any willingness to support the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people. If we look at the situation rationally, we understand that Israel has no interest in the establishment of a democratic society in an Arab country on its borders, as any democratic progress in the region would naturally lead to Arab solidarity with the Palestinians and a threat to Israel’s apartheid regime. In fact, the Assad regime and Hezbollah have largely contributed to restricting the political organization and resistance of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Syria62https://alsifr.org/syria-protests (AR), which is not to Israel’s displeasure.

WHAT COULD HAPPEN NEXT ?

 

Like the Syrian people as a whole in 2011, the Suwayda demonstrators can hardly win a revolution without external support or a large uprising of the Syrian population in the main other governorates.

As for the Free Syrian Army, it’s hard to expect enthusiastic support for the Druze uprising, given that the aspiration of the majority of the current fighting groups remains the establishment of an Islamic caliphate that is difficult to reconcile with the democratic and secular aspirations of the Suwayda protesters. Nevertheless, in all the governorates, whether under the control of the regime or the rebels, there are still remnants of democratic movements who see the Druze insurrection as an immense source of hope. This is why those who still believe in a non-confessional, democratic society have spontaneously taken to the streets of various towns to express their solidarity with Suwayda, whether they be Sunni Muslims, Alawites, Christians, Syriacs, Arabs or Kurds.

Here again, one would expect Kurdish organizations, which have managed to maintain their autonomous status in a good quarter of the country and proclaim loud and clear that they are driven by a revolutionary, universalist and democratic project, to express more strong and unconditional support for their brothers and sisters in Suwayda. But beyond a communiqué from the women of the Syrian Democratic Council calling for Syrian women to take the political issue into their own hands, we haven’t heard much from the Kurdish revolutionary movements. This suggests that, in accordance to their well-established autonomy, the Kurds don’t feel much concern for what’s happening south of the Euphrates, whether the fate of the rest of the Syrian people or that of the Palestinians. It’s sad to see the extent to which solidarity with other struggling communities is not perceived as a sine qua non for the survival of the project for Democracy in the Middle East. Moreover, recent events in Deir ez-Zor have done little to bolster Arab confidence in the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG): between August 27 and September 7, the Syrian Democratic Forces, largely dominated by the YPG, clashed with local Arab factions affiliated to the Deir ez-Zor Military Council following the dismissal and arrest of an Arab senior commander of the SDF, Ahmed al-Khubail also know as Rashid Abu Khawla. Although the sanctions taken against him were justified in view of the accusations of corruption and drug trafficking made against him by the local population, the arrest fueled the anger of its supporters, who launched an assault on the SDF, resulting in the death of 90 people over the eleven days the fighting lasted63It was finally under US pressure that a withdrawal and ceasefire agreement was initiated by the FDS, motivated by the fear that ISIS cells, regime forces and pro-Iranian militias would take advantage of the situation to regain ground in the region.. The backdrop to this conflict is the reproach levelled at the Kurds by the local population, who legitimately blame them for their hegemonic control of the area, which is seen as disrespectful considering the Arab majority living there64https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-deir-ezzor-sdf-fights-arab-tribes-control (EN).

Among the Druze, there is intense debate about the procedure to be followed. A certain mistrust seems to persist with regard to the autonomist and confederalist proposal. Some people see in the autonomist claim a risk of separation from the rest of the Syrians, unable to grasp the difference between autonomy and independence, while others confuse the means with the end: when they are told about establishing democratic assemblies and struggle committees to organize the revolt in the medium term, they think they are being told about a long-term project for society, and find it hard to believe in the people’s capacity for self-organization without mediators and leaders. As a result, political organization in the context of the popular uprising in al-Karami Square is still struggling to take on the form of the Egyptian Tahrir of 2010 or the Ukrainian Maïdan of 2014, when it would perhaps be sufficient to take up the recipes and positive experiences of the 2011 uprising, and in particular that of the Local Committees described by the Syrian anarchist Omar Aziz65https://www.fifthestate.org/archive/397-winter-2017/the-legacy-of-omar-aziz/ (EN) ; https://www.syria.tv/عمر-عزيز-يدخل-غيابه-العاشر and set up in many cities at the time. Unfortunately, if no grassroots organizing initiative is put in place, we run the risk of seeing sheikhs and heads of traditional family clans propelled as leaders, to the detriment of lesser-known individuals or collectives driven by more progressive and genuinely emancipatory ideals.

Already, Russian ambassador Anatoly Viktorov has paid a visit to the sheikh of the Druze of Galilee (Israel) Muwafaq Tarif66https://www.aljazeera.net/politics/2023/9/21/انتفاضة-السويداء-مستمرة-اتصالات, while American representatives French Hill, Joe Wilson and Brendan Boyle have called on phone the sheikh of Suwayda Hikmat Al-Hijri67https://syrianobserver.com/news/85155/american-senator-reaches-out-to-sheikh-al-hijri-in-suweida.html (EN) ; https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/us-news/2023/09/21/us-politicians-speak-to-druze-leader-sheikh-al-hajari-as-anti-assad-protests-continue/ (EN), trying to initiate negotiations with the Druze community to ensure that the outcome of the revolt would be in line with their interests in the region. Nor should we doubt that Saudi butcher Mohammed Ben Salman, who is conducting diplomatic dealings on all sides with Iran, China, Israel, the United States and France, will also come to shake up the region’s future, so much does his interest in weaponry acquisition and uranium enrichment outweigh the fate of the people, whether Syrian or Palestinian. For the Saudi tyrant, it obviously doesn’t matter that these peoples remain caged, as long as they are martyred in silence and don’t disturb usual business. And that’s not counting Bashar al-Assad’s recent visit to Beijing at the invitation of Chinese despot Xi Jinping, to break out of his isolation and secure China’s support for a deal to “rebuild” Syria. The very act of all these vultures is enough to generate suspicion and speculation, which cannot be beneficial to the popular movement underway. In view of the chaos that the various states have generated in Iraq and Syria over the last twenty years, we can legitimately say that only solutions implemented by the people for the people can hope to lead to a semblance of peace and democracy. For now, the people of Suwayda have categorically refused to join under any banner that has political or economic interests in Syria. Let’s hope it will last and succeed in this way !

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